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ABSTRACT 
 Historically, military intelligence analysts and U.S. forces, frozen in their 
preferred strategy of attrition warfare, have undervalued civil information in conflicts 
against irregular threats. As operating environments grow more complex, uncertain, and 
population-centric, the roles of Civil Affairs Forces and civil information will become 
increasingly relevant. Unfortunately, the current analytical methods prescribed in Civil 
Affairs doctrine are inadequate for evaluating complex environments. They fail to 
provide supported commanders with the information required to make informed 
decisions. The purpose of this research is to determine how Civil Affairs Forces must 
retool their analytical capabilities to meet the demands of future operating environments. 
The answer lies in developing an organic Civil Affairs analytic capability suitable for 
employing data-driven approaches to gain actionable insights into uncertain operational 
environments, and subsequently, integrating those insights into sophisticated operational 
targeting frameworks and strategies designed to disrupt irregular threats. This research 
uses case studies of organizations, across a range of industries, that leveraged innovative 
data-driven approaches into disruptive competitive advantages. These organizations 
highlight the broad utility of the prescribed approaches and potential pathways for Civil 
Affairs Forces to pursue in creating an analytic capability that supports effective civil 
knowledge integration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the former U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley explains in his 
foreword to The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, the character of warfare is 
rapidly changing.1 He notes that America’s strategic competitors are combining emerging 
technologies with their study of military doctrine and operations. He argues that the U.S. 
Army must evolve to retain its ability to compete and, if necessary, defeat strategic 
competitors such as Russia and China in future conflicts. Milley’s point, combined with 
the central idea of the multi-domain operations (MDO), implies that there is no winning in 
the future operating environment, only a return to competition. The U.S. Army’s Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) writes: 
Army forces, as an element of the Joint Force, conduct Multi-Domain 
Operations to prevail in competition; when necessary, Army forces 
penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems and 
exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic objectives 
(win) and force a return to competition on favorable terms.2  
This outlook serves as the impetus for this research. Milley asserts that U.S. forces must 
find ways to compete under the threshold of armed conflict, a role typically assumed by 
organizations within the interagency, interorganizational, and multinational institutions.3 
This assertion has profound implications about the future role of the U.S. Army as a 
component of the Joint Force. In other words, the envisioned transformation will require 
radically different authorities and formations to achieve America’s political-military 
objectives. Also, Milley’s perspective on the disruptive role emerging technologies will 
play in the competition and conflict phases cannot be overstated. There is no shortage of 
examples demonstrating the disruptive effects of fusing emerging technologies and 
innovative methodologies on the battlefield. With these points in mind, this research 
 
1 Mark A. Milley, “Foreword,” in The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC 
Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2018), i. 
2 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 
2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, 2018), vii. 
3 Milley, “Foreword,” i. 
2 
evaluates the future operating environment, the role that Civil Affairs Forces (CA) will 
assume in support of the Army and Joint Force, and the utility of using technology-enabled 
data science.  
 This thesis research seeks to broaden Milley’s vision of the future in one crucial 
aspect. It argues that modest investments and changes in personnel, education, technology, 
and organizational structures will improve the performance of U.S. forces in the 
competition phase. These new considerations would occur beneath the threshold of armed 
conflict, nested under the Joint Concepts of Integrated Campaigning (JCIC), Operating in 
the Information Environment (JCOIE) and Human Aspects of Military Operations 
(HAMO).4 These investments and changes in force structure emphasize the need for a 
calibrated force posture and maximization of human potential outlined in the MDO 
concept.5 These two elements would leverage existing authorities and programs of record, 
particularly U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) Civil-Military Engagement 
(CME), to maximize the utility of persistent engagement elements while supporting them 
with a robust analytical capability.6 The combination of the persistent engagement 
elements armed with a potent analytical capability designed to reduce the complexity of 
future operating environments will improve the performance of the U.S. Army and Joint 
Force against irregular threats. This proposal supports the most important aspect of the 
MDO concept, the acknowledgment that the central purpose of irregular threats is to 
 
4 Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Concept for Integrated Campaigning 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/
Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257; Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE) (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/concepts/jcoie.pdf; Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO) (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/concepts/
human_aspects_military_ops.pdf. 
5 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 
2028, iii, x. 
6 Department of the Army, Civil Military Engagement, Army Techniques Publication 3-57.80 




perpetuate an infinite game and exhaust finite players.7 Civil affairs operations (CAO) in 
support of CME, like all Special Operations Forces (SOF), offer a low-cost, economy-of-
force solution for the U.S. Army to be an infinite player in an infinite game. Dealing with 
irregular threats in the competition phase under the threshold of armed conflict should 
support and enhance the Army’s operational concept of convergence in armed conflict in 
multiple domains.8 
General Townsend’s tone in the preface of The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain 
Operations 2028 is equally ominous, noting that America’s adversaries exploit political 
and economic domains to achieve their strategic political-military objectives under the 
threshold of armed conflict.9 Townsend believes these strategic approaches risk what he 
describes as, “the strategic depth that gives our Joint Force its operational advantage and 
enables our offensive military capability.”10 Townsend identifies a four-point 
transformation plan to mitigate the threats posed by U.S. adversaries, yet two are 
fundamental to this research. Townsend writes:  
• Drive rapid, non-linear solutions in Army doctrine, organization, 
training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and 
policy; 
• Deepen the operational integration of general purpose and special 
operations forces and with our allies and partners.11 
These two pathways provide the guidance and direction needed to compete in other 
domains and support the concept of an expanded role for SOF CA forces supporting CME 
missions with U.S. allies and partners in future operating environments. There is a clear 
 
7 Simon Sinek, “The Infinite Game” (Lecture, The New York Times Conferences, New York, NY, 
May 31, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tye525dkfi8. 
8 The U.S. Army’s MDO concept defines convergence as “the rapid and continuous integration of 
capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch 
the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command 
and disciplined initiative.” United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-
Domain Operations 2028, iii, 20. 
9 Stephen J. Townsend, “Preface,” in The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC 
Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2018), iii. 
10 Townsend, iii. 
11 Townsend, iii. 
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need for a robust analytic capability focused on the civil domain to build a contextual, 
intuitive understanding of the operational environment, particularly across the 
informational, social, and political domains.  
 One of the central findings of the research presented here is that the U.S. 
underperforms against irregular threats because U.S. forces and their interagency partners 
lack a contextual understanding of their operational environment. For instance, Zachary 
Shore illustrates this point beautifully in the initial pages of his book A Sense of the 
Enemy.12 He describes the inability of U.S officials to identify the second-in-command of 
the Taliban over three separate rounds of peace talks despite what he describes as, “a 
decade of military operations across Afghanistan.”13 This failure resulted in an imposter 
swindling U.S. officials out of an undisclosed sum of money and what Shore asserts as, 
“[an] exposure of how poorly the United States knew its enemy in this ongoing war.”14 As 
the threats to U.S. national security become more complex (composed of irregular, 
networked, resilient threats and centers of gravity remaining population-centric), U.S. 
forces will require additional ways to generate insights into future operational 
environments to reduce their complexity. Traditional methods have proven inconclusive 
and inadequate.15 With the Army’s MDO concept requiring effective civil knowledge 
integration, other methods and analytical techniques must be adapted or developed to meet 
the demands of the future operating environment.16 Fortunately, the fields of data science 
and social science offer solutions to improve U.S. forces’ understanding of their 
 
12 Zachary Shore, A Sense of the Enemy: The High-Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1. 
13 Shore, 1. 
14 Shore, 1. 
15 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), 4; United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-
Domain Operations 2028, 6, 8. 
16 U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, Civil Affairs: 2025 
and Beyond (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, 2018), 7. 
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operational environment in the same way they impacted other markets, industries, and 
professions in the recent past.17  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How should the Civil Affairs Branch retool its analytical capabilities to meet the 
demands of the future operating environment?  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Civil Affairs (CA) forces lack the analytical capabilities necessary to provide their 
supported military commanders and political leadership with the quality and type of 
information they require to make informed decisions. The types of analytical methods 
prescribed in the current CA doctrine are inadequate and require significant changes to 
meet the demands of uncertain operational environments. As adversaries and competitors 
adopt strategies designed to add complexity and uncertainty into operating environments 
(OE), CA forces must adapt and implement innovative analytical methodologies to inform 
operational and strategic approaches to disrupt, deter, and defeat competitors and 
adversaries in future operating environments.  
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT  
This research aims to determine the best approach to adopting strategic analytical 
capabilities within the Civil Affairs Branch. The strategic analysis capability must 
incorporate valid data analysis methodologies and data science approaches for structuring 
and visualizing data to reduce the complexity of the operational environment. It should 
possess the capability of modeling the operational environment, and use the insights 
derived from these analyses to inform operational and strategic approaches in a prescriptive 
and predictive manner. 
 
17 Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, Kindle (New York, NY: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2003); Michael Lewis, The Undoing Project: A Friendship That Changed Our Minds 
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2017), 16. 
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D. THESIS STATEMENT 
To compete in future operating environments, the Civil Affairs Branch must 
develop an organic, data-driven analytic capability featuring the application of data 
science, social network analysis, statistical modeling and analysis techniques, hypothesis 
testing, and counterfactuals to improve the performance of U.S. Forces against irregular 
threats. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research uses case studies of organizations, across a range of professions, to 
show the broad applicability and utility of adopting data-driven and evidence-based 
approaches as a means to gain insights into uncertain environments. Whether they represent 
markets, medical diagnoses and protocols, or predicting criminal activity, each profession 
represented in the following cases shares challenges similar to those normally associated 
with intelligence analysis. This thesis explores the analysis of the civil component, known 
as civil information management or civil knowledge integration, which is a component of 
intelligence analysis. The parallels are easily drawn in the cases of policing and business, 
as these professions incorporate a similar function of predictive quality. For example, 
predicting the time and location of criminal activity follows a similar logic model as 
predicting the actions of your adversaries on the battlefield. The lesser-known relationship 
lies in the medical parallels, yet Rebecca Fisher et al. illuminate the similarities in their 
chapter of Analyzing Intelligence titled “Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?” writing: 
The medical community’s parallel to intelligence analysis may be more apt 
owing to the temporal nature—often urgency—with which members of 
each group must confront difficult challenges of decision making in life-or-
death and high-risk situations. Reliance upon years of training, individual 
experience, and consultation with colleagues has prevailed for centuries in 
medical decision making—an “apprenticeship” learning model of the 
highest order–forming a pattern of expertise and finding support for one’s 
7 
decisions that is remarkably similar to what goes on in the intelligence 
community.18 
Thus, the situations faced by medical professionals and methods for developing expertise 
share a substantial resemblance to the environmental challenges and process of developing 
intelligence analysts within the intelligence community.  
1. Case Selection Criteria 
All case selections meet the following criteria:  
• Each case evaluates organizations operating in dynamic environments 
defined by uncertainty and complexity.19  
• Each case evaluates organizations where human intuition and experience 
were the dominant analytical methods of understanding their environment. 
Decisions based on this analysis determined how the organization 
allocates its limited resources.  
• Each organization adopted a data-driven approach that disrupted and 
rapidly improved areas of concern throughout its respective industry.  
• In each case, the adopted analytic techniques yielded insights that 
challenged the conventional wisdom within their profession.20 These 
insights changed the organizations’ understanding of their environment 
and were subsequently used to develop more effective operational and 
strategic approaches. 
 
18 Rebecca Fisher, Rob Johnston, and Peter Clement, “Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?,” in 
Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives, Second edition (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2014), 60. 
19 Some critics might argue that Major League Baseball does not constitute a dynamic environment; 
however, actors within the business, such as the General Managers and Owners, would disagree on the 
basis that each multimillion-dollar contract and draft pick represents a sizable investment from the 
organization. The complexity and uncertainty lie in assessing the potential performance of individual 
players, which would be similar to predicting the times and locations of criminal activity, or efficacy of 
medical interventions or protocols. 
20 The conventional wisdom was the product of expert judgment based on extensive experience. 
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This research uses multiple secondary sources per case study, and each case study 
is drawn from individuals who directly participated in the event in reports or recorded 
interviews with media outlets. Additional sources include leading experts that assessed the 
lasting impact of these transitions, including Nobel Peace Prize-winning psychologists, 
military strategists, economists, statisticians, social scientists, peer-reviewed journals, 
government reports, and several books from academic presses. Sources specific to the Civil 
Affairs community come from both published and working documents within the Civil 
Affairs Proponent.  
2. Data 
This research uses multiple secondary sources per case study, and each case study 
is drawn from individuals who directly participated in the event in reports or recorded 
interviews with media outlets. Additional sources include leading experts who assessed the 
lasting impact of these transitions, including Nobel Peace Prize-winning psychologists, 
military strategists, economists, statisticians, social scientists, peer-reviewed journals, 
government reports, and several books from academic presses. Sources specific to the Civil 
Affairs community come from both published and working documents within the Civil 
Affairs Proponent.  
3. Analytic Approach 
This thesis begins with a review of relevant literature, which is necessary to form 
the basis of the research and demonstrate its application to the current problem facing the 
U.S. Army and Joint Force in future operating environments. The literature review is 
followed by a presentation of case studies that evaluate the utility of adopting data-driven 
approaches in environments similar to those associated with confronting irregular threats 
in future operating environments, focusing specifically on the civil knowledge integration 
required to support such an activity. These cases represent instances where organizations 
and enterprising leaders innovated or adopted new methods of critically analyzing their 
environments. The cases are followed by an analysis of the U.S. Army’s past efforts at 
analyzing the civil component in conflicts against irregular threats. This analysis is 
followed by a review of the current methods U.S. forces use to generate insights into the 
9 
civil component of their operational environment and subsequent integration of those 
insights into institutional Army and joint planning processes. The methodology and 
recommended analytical techniques set the foundation for the next section which 
investigates the potential applications of underutilized methodologies, techniques, and 
frameworks useful in developing a contextual understanding of future operating 
environments. These methodologies, techniques, and frameworks operate using different 
assumptions and provide a more sophisticated approach in operational targeting and 
strategy development against irregular threats. Lastly, this research closes with 
recommendations and conclusions related to reducing the gap between the actual and 
desired analytical capabilities within the CA community and how this analytical capability 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the body of military literature, there is a distinct lack of emphasis in two areas, 
analysis of the civil component and intelligence analysis. A majority of the literature is 
either classified or resides in doctrinal publications that outline analytical roles, 
methodologies, processes, techniques, and outputs. These processes are typically rigid and 
explained broadly enough to facilitate staff planning processes. In this respect, the Civil 
Affairs (CA) Branch in the United States Army is no different. The sparse literature that 
exists comes from CA doctrine, policy, and practitioners of Civil Information Management 
(CIM). Since the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published The 
U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, the literature regarding the emerging role of 
CA in the future operating environment and their desired analytical capabilities increased 
significantly in publications such as The Small Wars Journal, War on the Rocks, and 
Modern Warfare Institute. The consensus among authors is that the current CA forces and 
doctrine are inadequate to support competition in hybrid environments against near-peer 
threats.21 This realization alludes to the analytical immaturity of Civil Affairs Branch 
within the U.S. Army. This acknowledgment is important because it concludes that warfare 
has changed in character and complexity and Civil Affairs Branch must develop an 
analytical capability to meet the demands of more complex, turbulent, and challenging 
future operating environments.  
While the U.S. Army excels in attrition warfare, its near-peer competitors employ 
strategies deliberately designed to secure their policy objectives under the threshold of 
 
21 Jay Liddick, Thurman Scott Dickerson, and Linda K. Chung, “Calibrating Civil Affairs Forces for 
Lethality in Large Scale Combat Operations,” Small Wars Journal, accessed November 4, 2019, 
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/calibrating-civil-affairs-forces-lethality-large-scale-combat-
operations; U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, Civil Affairs: 
2025 and Beyond; Nicholas Krohley, “Moving Beyond the Post-9/11 Manhunt: Translating Tactical Wins 




armed conflict.22 Russia’s fait accompli seizure of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent 
operations to secure the Donbass region of Ukraine demonstrated to the United States and 
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies the effectiveness of these strategies 
and threats posed by Russian irregular warfare capabilities.23 Opting not to pursue the 
development and replication of U.S. technological advantages, Russia developed 
technologies and capabilities designed to deny U.S. and NATO technological advantages 
while simultaneously dominating the information and cyber domains, using them to wage 
political warfare and undermine Western institutions.24  
In response to the escalation of Russian and Chinese activities, the U.S. Army 
published two strategic documents focused on its role in the future operating environment. 
The Army Operating Concept: Winning in a Complex World (AOC) and The U.S. Army in 
Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (MDO) define the U.S. Army’s theory of victory and 
outline the requirements and capabilities necessary for its forces to defeat near-peer threats 
across the range of military operations.25 These documents acknowledge that the nature of 
warfare has changed and, consequently, the U.S. Army needs to develop capabilities and 
doctrine capable of detecting, deterring, disrupting, and defeating hybrid threats. 
Consequently, the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs Proponent, the entity responsible for 
developing policy and doctrine, published Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond that outlined an 
emerging civil affairs operating concept consistent with the requirements specified in the 
 
22 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts 
Publishing House, 1999); Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder 
(New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2019); Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the 
Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat 
Operations,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (February 2016): 24–29. 
23 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 
2028, 1–15. 
24 Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” 29. 
25 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Army Operating Concept 2014: Win in a 
Complex World, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Department of the Army, 2014); United 
States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028; U.S. 




AOC, MDO, and multiple joint operating concepts.26 This document is relevant because 
it describes the future role, capabilities, and organizational design of CA forces, 
specifically its desired analytical capabilities to support the new CA operating concept.  
With these changes in mind, CA leaders started publishing articles to shape the 
strategic position of the Civil Affairs Branch and identify areas where the branch needed 
to improve. The body of literature consistently identifies CA doctrine as one critical area 
in need of improvement.27 Liddick et al., Krohley, and Yager argue that doctrine is 
insufficient to develop an analytical capability within CA forces. Liddick et al. 
acknowledged the capability shortfall while simultaneously clarifying that “many CA units 
provide varying levels of analysis to fulfill operational requirements.”28 It is an 
acknowledgment that while there is significant room for improvement, the current level of 
analytical support is sufficient to support both conventional and special operations. They 
also suggest that one contributing factor preventing CA forces from developing adequate 
doctrine is the disregard with which conventional forces approach the civil component 
during exercises.29 While frustrating, limiting, and counterproductive, conventional units 
are not responsible for CA’s inadequate analytical capability and doctrine.  
While Nicholas Krohley shares a similar perspective on the inadequacy of CA 
doctrine, he disagrees with Liddick et al.’s argument that CA is providing adequate 
analytical support to its supported commanders. He describes many of the methods 
recommended in CA targeting methodology doctrine as irrelevant. He argues that “The 
‘fill in the blanks’ approach to our ASCOPE and PMESII frameworks drives a closed, 
 
26 U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, Civil Affairs: 2025 
and Beyond. 
27 Liddick, Dickerson, and Chung, “Calibrating Civil Affairs Forces for Lethality”; Eric Yager, 
“Setting the Civil Affairs Analytical Foundation,” LinkedIn, May 11, 2018, https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/setting-civil-affairs-analytical-foundation-eric-yager-pmp/; Nicholas Krohley, “Integrating Civil 
Affairs – An Outsider’s View,” Civil Affairs Association, September 18, 2019, 
https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/single-post/2019/09/18/Integrating-Civil-Affairs-%E2%80%93-An-
Outsider%E2%80%99s-View. 
28 Liddick, Dickerson, and Chung, “Calibrating Civil Affairs Forces for Lethality.” 
29 Liddick, Dickerson, and Chung. 
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reductive intellectual process that is ill suited to delivering granular, actionable insights.”30 
Krohley believes that CA is missing the point of their activity, which he identifies as the 
mandate to deliver “actionable insights” into “an integrated targeting process.” This 
structure is aimed at providing a comprehensive understanding of the operational 
environment, enabling the disruption of the socio-political structures connecting the 
insurgency and the local populations supporting it.31 Lastly, Krohley contends that the 
current process creates “a dangerously incomplete and ultimately misleading view of our 
enemies. Networks like the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban do not float, cloud-
like, above the terrain. They cannot be understood as something distinct from the societies 
in which they operate.”32 Krohley’s observations offer keen insights into how to improve 
the process without recommending how to generate those insights, yet he provides process 
improvements and relevant areas of focus to improve U.S. forces’ understanding of the 
operating environment with relevant outputs.  
Where Krohley provides macro criticisms of CA doctrine, Yager provides more 
specific criticism of the content and processes recommended in Field Manual 3-57: Civil 
Affairs Operations and Army Techniques Publication 3–57.50: Civil Affairs Civil 
Information Management.33 He argues from his extensive experience with the Civil 
Affairs Branch, Civil Information Management, and as an accomplished data scientist. In 
describing the recommended analytical techniques suggested within the doctrine, Yager 
remarks, “Data science encompasses so much more than these 17 pages embody and, as 
such, the actual application of data analytics to CA operations is either never done or is 
relegated to CA practitioners who previously studied data analytics.”34 He adds further,  
 
30 Krohley, “Moving Beyond the Post-9/11 Manhunt.” 
31 Krohley. 
32 Krohley. 
33 Yager, “Setting the Civil Affairs Analytical Foundation”; Department of the Army, Civil Affairs 
Operations, Field Manual 3-57 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019); Department of the 
Army, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, Army Techniques Publication 3-57.50 (Washington, 





FM 3-57’s definition of analysis presents CIM analysis loosely as 
descriptive analytics in that it defines how to visualize data without defining 
a method to analyze or a way to predict future trends. Some of the methods 
discussed include link diagrams, nodal diagrams, PMESII-PT/ASCOPE 
charts, stability matrix, activities matrix, geospatial depictions, and map 
overlays. All these tools are used to depict information, but none of them to 
garner a conclusion.35 
These are important distinctions because most CA forces responsible for conducting CIM 
understand they possess valuable information, but they lack the means to analyze it 
effectively, a sentiment captured in the “CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil 
Affairs.”36 In essence, the current doctrine emphasizes the process of creating products 
without providing the means to conduct analysis. This emphasis also explains why critical 
stakeholders in the conventional forces and intelligence communities undervalue of CA 
outputs.37 
The lack of data analysis techniques within CA doctrine is the one reason why civil 
information is underprioritized and undervalued within the intelligence community. Flynn 
et al. provide evidence to support this argument in the opening of their work Fixing Intel: 
A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan observing, 
Based on discussions with hundreds of people inside and outside the 
intelligence community, it recommends sweeping changes to the way the 
intelligence community thinks about itself—from a focus on the enemy to 
a focus on the people of Afghanistan. The paper argues that because the 
United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts 
and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus 
still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the 
environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect 
and persuade.38  
 
35 Yager. 
36 Samuel L. Hayes Jr. and Ken Nguyen, “CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil Affairs” (Capstone, 
Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 52–57, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45870. 
37 Krohley, “Moving Beyond the Post-9/11 Manhunt”; Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. 
Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: 
Center for a New American Security, 2010), 7. 
38 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, 4. 
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Flynn et al.’s powerful statement and affirmation of the intelligence community’s focus on 
threat groups blinded them to the broader socio-political aspects of their operating 
environment. Among the sweeping changes listed in the document was the directive to 
prioritize more civil information.39 They argue, “This vast and underappreciated body of 
information, almost all of which is unclassified, admittedly offers few clues about where 
to find insurgents, but it does provide elements of even greater strategic importance – a 
map for leveraging populist support and marginalizing the insurgency itself.”40 Flynn et 
al.’s analysis and recommendations underscore two points that clearly illustrate why the 
intelligence community undervalued the civil aspects of their operating environment. 
The first point is that U.S. forces decided to fight the insurgents and not the broader 
insurgency, which violates key positions argued by Nagl and Galula, prominent strategists 
in counterinsurgency operations. Nagl argues: 
Conventional military forces are too prone to emphasize offensive actions 
such as capturing or killing terrorists rather than the predominantly political, 
economic, and security requirements upon which the intelligence available 
from civilians to sophisticated weapons systems to create targeted killing 
campaigns against insurgent leadership. This approach offers only false 
hope; for every insurgent captured or killed another one (or often several) 
will appear–so long as they are enabled by passive civilians and a moribund 
government presence. To win, the government must secure and control the 
local population.41 
This fact reveals the strategic misalignment of priorities, focus, and effort between U.S. 
forces and their stated strategy, which leads to an illuminating question. If there exists no 
pathway to victory in Afghanistan using “lethal targeting alone,” then why are the vast 
majority of intelligence analysts and assets dedicated to analyzing threat groups?42 
 
39 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, 4. 
40 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, 7. 
41 John A. Nagl, “Foreword,” in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2006), vii. 
42 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, 4,7. 
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Blanken and Overbaugh answer this question in their refute to Flynn et al.’s paper.43 They 
claim the overall design, function, and purpose of military intelligence is to evaluate and 
assess threats to the force using a deductive argument. They argue that the military 
intelligence units and analysts are a product of an organization designed to function in a 
specific type of environment (a machine bureaucracy) which they liken to “complex mass 
production facilities, such as an automobile plant.”44 One characteristic of these 
environments is a prioritization of standardization of process over a requirement for 
specialized education and training. They argue that the purpose of military analysts at 
higher echelons is to filter and verify intelligence in support of their political leadership. 
While Flynn et al. blame the intelligence community for the dysfunction and lack of 
relevance, Blanken and Overbaugh place the responsibility with the political leadership’s 
failure to clearly define their political end states and policy objectives. Thus, in the absence 
of guidance, the intelligence community and military defaulted to their intended purpose 
and core competencies, doubling down on their network-centric targeting approaches to 
dismantle threat networks, defying the narrative that “we cannot kill our way to victory.”45 
However, pursuing solely kinetic approaches has thus far not proved a sound strategy for 
defeating insurgencies.46 
The second point Flynn et al.’s analysis highlights is that the preferred U.S. military 
strategy of attrition and the organizational design of its intelligence units are optimized to 
defeat conventional armies, not insurgencies and hybrid threats.47 The combination of 
these two factors led analysts to focus on threat groups and ignore civil information 
 
43 Leo Blanken and Justin Overbaugh, “Looking for Intel?... Or Looking for Answers? Reforming 
Military Intelligence for a Counterinsurgency Environment,” Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 4 
(July 27, 2012): 559–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.688307.  
44 Blanken and Overbaugh, 564. 
45 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, 8; Krohley, “Moving Beyond the Post-9/11 
Manhunt.” 
46 McFate, The New Rules of War, 94–96. 
47 Blanken and Overbaugh, “Looking for Intel?,” 563–66; Hy S. Rothstein, “Civil-Military Relations 
and Assessments,” in Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure, ed. Leo J. Blanken 
and Jason J. Lepore (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 22.  
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perceived as less relevant. To solve this problem, Flynn et al. recommended that analysts 
should focus on capturing data from sources including “civil affairs officers, PRTs, 
atmospherics teams, Afghan liaison officers, female engagement teams, willing non-
governmental organizations and development organizations, United Nations officials, 
psychological operations teams, [and] human terrain teams” to obtain the information 
necessary to analyze and assess their operational environment.48 These recommendations 
would be more consistent with the stated strategy of counterinsurgency operations and 
ways to progress towards aligning U.S. political goals and operational benchmarks noted 
as the Clausewitzian gap, or the theoretical space between political policy goals and 
military objectives.49 Nevertheless, Flynn et al. confirm the underutilization of CA’s civil 
information, critical to the success in countering both insurgencies and hybrid threats that 
effectively use the civil component for cover and concealment.50 In dedicating the majority 
of analytical resources towards insurgent groups, the military intelligence apparatus left a 
blind spot in their understanding of the operational environment: the linkages between 
insurgents and local social-political structures.51  
Flynn et al. confirm this blind spot in their observation that the intelligence 
community could not answer fundamental questions about their operating environment: 
Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the 
powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the 
correlations between various development projects and the levels of 
cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best 
position to find answers—whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers—U.S. 
intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high 
level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information 
they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.52  
 
48 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, 4. 
49 Leo J. Blanken and Jason J. Lepore, “Principals, Agents, and Assessment,” in Assessing War: The 
Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 6. 
50 Liddick, Dickerson, and Chung, “Calibrating Civil Affairs Forces for Lethality”; U.S. Army Special 
Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond, 6. 
51 Krohley, “Moving Beyond the Post-9/11 Manhunt.” 
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Despite CA reports describing these atmospherics and other relevant information, Flynn et 
al.’s characterization of the military intelligence effectiveness against the insurgency in 
Afghanistan is reminiscent of warnings present in David Galula’s Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice.53 In the “Foreword,” John A. Nagl argues that “modifying 
organizations, training, and equipment of conventional forces, critical as it is, is insufficient 
to satisfy the demands of counterinsurgency operations.”54 Essentially, the blind spot is an 
indicator that the Joint Force and its military intelligence apparatus has not adapted well to 
counterinsurgency operations or has not applied the principles outlined in Galula’s book. 
However, Galula’s influence is noted in the Army’s MDO operating concept and 
accompanying Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond, which explains CA’s operating concept in 
support of MDO.  
As near-peer hybrid capabilities increasingly pose a greater threat than 
insurgencies, the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond emphasizes the need for additional 
analytical capabilities to support the Army’s MDO concept by detecting and defeating 
near-peer hybrid capabilities within future operational environments. Critical to the success 
of this operational view is its concept of Civil Knowledge Integration (CKI), nested under 
the Joint Operating Concept of Human Aspects of Military Operations (HAMO).55 CKI 
proposes future CA forces must focus on the “collection, fusion, analysis, evaluation, and 
integration of civil knowledge to inform commanders’ situational understanding and 
decision making.”56 Further, the Civil Affairs Proponent argues that future CA forces must 
do two things. First, it contends that an “expanded practice of civil information 
management (CIM) applies civil expertise and predictive analysis to evaluate, model, and 
anticipate human geography, which includes the decision making of relevant actors.”57 
Second, it proposes the core of the future Civil Affairs Branch capabilities require the 
following capabilities:  
 
53 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare. 
54 Nagl, “Foreword,” x. 
55 U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, Civil Affairs, 8. 
56 U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, 8. 
57 U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, 8. 
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Future CA elements integrate emerging technologies while conducting CR 
in MDO in the civil component of traditional domains, and across the 
spectrum of social media and the breadth of the information environment. 
CA forces must combine social science, advanced analytical practices, and 
technology platforms to interpret civil information from complex datasets; 
identify networks, patterns, and critical information; and project changing 
conditions in human geography. Examples of technology-enabled social 
analysis include predictive analysis, relational database management, 
spatial analysis, data mining, link analysis, content analysis, and sentiment 
analysis. Future CA technologies must be able to input and output in formats 
that are compatible with the Army’s Common Operating Environment 
(COE) and Command Post Computing Environment (CPCE).58 
These requirements greatly exceed current CA analytical capabilities and will require 
significant investments in human capital to achieve.  
Past efforts aimed at expanding CA analytical capabilities proved ineffective, 
resulting in a rebranding of current capabilities and an overselling of its analytical 
capabilities. Hayes and Nguyen capture this sentiment in their Naval Postgraduate School 
capstone project titled “CA 2025: The Strategic Redesign of Civil Affairs” when 
participants described their leadership’s overselling of analytical capabilities as 
undermining CA’s strategic position within the force.59 Where tools such as Palantir and 
Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) added a descriptive geospatial, 
temporal, and relational capability by combining elements of other intelligence analysis 
software such as ArcGIS and Analyst Notebook (ANB), they failed to deliver a more 
sophisticated analytical capability as these systems provide a synthesis of the same 
analytical methods. While there is a utility in these systems enabling CA personnel to 
perform their established analytical methods and techniques more efficiently and 
effectively, they fail to provide insights beyond these established methods. In essence, CA 
Forces utilized these programs, originally designed to meet the needs of intelligence 
professionals, to suit their purpose and populate their civil reconnaissance and civil 
engagement reporting. Even the open-source data analysts at Protected Information 
 
58 U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, 8–9. 
59 Hayes and Nguyen, “CA 2025,” 55–57, 98. 
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Exchange (PiX) develop products in the PMESII-PT/ASCOPE format at the request of 
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces.60 The result is inventing more ways to 
do the same thing, reinforcing the methods that Krohley argues leaves the common 
operating picture of the operational environment “dangerously incomplete.”61 Therefore, 
new methods must be developed and adopted to gain further insights into the operational 
environment. Fortunately, there is literature that recommends methods and techniques that 
analysts can leverage to obtain these insights and integrate them into both strategy and 
operations.  
In his foundational work Networks and Netwar with David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla 
argues social network analysis (SNA) is a useful tool for generating innovative insights 
and facilitating an understanding of irregular threats such as transnational criminal 
organizations, organizations whose structures resemble “networks rather than the more 
traditional hierarchical structures.”62 He is far from alone in this argument. The consensus 
among experts such as Sean Everton, Daniel Cunningham, Nancy Roberts, Valdis E. 
Krebs, and Stuart Koschade agree with Arquilla’s assertion.63 While Everton and Roberts 
voiced some reservations about using SNA for lethal targeting, they offer useful guidance 
on using SNA to develop strategies for disrupting and defeating irregular threats in their 
article “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks.” They illustrate, “how social network 
analysis can be a useful tool to flesh out the strategic options within both the kinetic and 
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non-kinetic approaches.”64 Yet, the benefits offered by SNA are not limited to the analysis 
of adversarial organizational structures. Arquilla argues the applications of SNA also 
extend to the analysis of friendly networks serving dual purposes.65 David Krackhardt 
agrees with Arquilla’s assertion, as his works focus on the efficiency of organizational 
structures and the identification of experts within informal networks.66 These experts make 
a compelling argument for using SNA in a myriad of ways to support intelligence and 
organizational analysis activities, yet SNA is conspicuously absent from the literature and 
working documents within the CA literature as a required capability, suggesting it is no 
longer being considered as a potential analytical tool.67 The absence is conspicuous 
because the Civil-Military Engagement program specifically lists network analysis and 
network engagement as a task for Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE) operating 
under these specific authorities.68 Despite these omissions, many within the CA 
community understand the utility and potential applications of SNA through their exposure 
to its techniques and metrics while attending Naval Postgraduate School and many CA 
students in the Defense Analysis program have employed these techniques in their thesis 
research and capstone projects.69  
Among the other tools listed by the CA Proponent in their Civil Affairs: 2025 and 
Beyond is the requirement for CA forces to “combine social science, advanced analytic 
practices, and technology platforms to interpret civil information from complex datasets,” 
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which is not defined in CA doctrine or JCIM Manuals in any meaningful sense.70 Thus, 
the CA Proponent outlined a desire to develop a data science capability to supplement its 
limited analysis capabilities that are not mentioned anywhere in Army or Joint doctrine. 
Vasant Dhar describes data science is a rapidly growing interdisciplinary field that 
combines mathematics, statistics, computer science, and information science.71 He 
suggests it uses elements of these disciplines to extract knowledge and insights from both 
structured and unstructured data using a variety of statistical applications, algorithms, and 
systems. Eric Yager, a veteran Civil Affairs Officer, analyst, and Business Analytics M.S. 
candidate, attacks civil affairs doctrine in his article “Setting the Civil Affairs Analytical 
Foundation” arguing the analysis described in CA doctrine are “tools used to depict 
information, but none of them garner a conclusion.”72 He emphasizes the need for data 
science techniques in Civil Affairs analysis to transition the analysis from descriptive to 
predictive. He recommends structuring datasets, using social network analysis, and 
regression analysis to determine the relationships between the events in both temporal and 
relational terms to determine the social network potential.  
The addition of data science capabilities would resolve some of the issues outlined 
in the Joint Civil Information Management User’s Manual 2.0 such as “no interoperable 
systems for storing and transmitting civil information” and improve the “standardization 
of collecting, consolidating, and sharing civil information.”73 Data science is widely used 
throughout the financial, marketing, medical, technology, and analysis industries and 
maintains broad potential applications for analyzing the civil component of future 
operating environments. There is sufficient evidence to support the concept of integrating 
data science into CA analysis capabilities. The United States Agency for International 
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Development (USAID) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) both incorporated data 
science into their organizational capabilities with USAID establishing a data repository 
named the Foreign Aid Explorer (FAE) and CIA establishing its Directorate of Digital 
Innovation in 2015.74  
The last area nearly absent from military literature is Social Movement Theory 
(SMT). There are several concepts nested under SMT such as social identity theory (SIT) 
that have profound applications for the future operating environment, particularly in the 
political, social, and informational domains. The current SMT model outlined in both 
Gemma Edwards’s book Social Movements and Protests and Doowan Lee’s article “A 
Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare” provide an excellent framework 
to understand the socio-political dynamics behind social movements.75 The key 
assumption that all violent extremist organizations are social movements engaging in 
political violence opens pathways for new knowledge.76 Doowan Lee offered U.S. 
policymakers and special operations forces responsible for conducting unconventional 
warfare a new operational approach with the potential for more durable political outcomes. 
He uses the social movement theory model as a means to articulate the interrelationships 
between a social movement’s structural strains, which he describes as broad socio-
economic processes. Organizational resources and networks are described as 
organizational strength or political opportunities, and narratives associated with cultural 
framing can be articulated as strategic framing.77 
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Although consistent with Clausewitz’s notion that “war is the continuation of 
politics by other means,” the common consensus among experts was that violent groups 
represented a different population and, therefore, should be categorized differently.78 Marc 
Sageman’s work Misunderstanding Terrorism offers a contrasting opinion based on social 
identity theory that provides additional insights into motivations behind political violence. 
He argues groups and actors engaging in political violence do so because their perceived 
collective identity is threatened, which triggers a martial identity.79 The implications of 
using social identity theory are profound. Other SMT and SIT theories such as group 
polarization and social polarization are also useful in understanding the operational 
environment.80 A RAND study titled Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine attributes Russia’s failures to coerce further concessions from Ukraine to 
Russia’s underestimation of the Ukrainian national identity.81 Consequently, the 
consensus among policy experts, strategists, and social scientists state that there is a utility 
in leveraging these components of SMT to develop operational approaches and strategies 
to cultivate resiliencies against and resistance to irregular threats using the insights derived 
from SMT and SIT theories and frameworks.82  
Many of these concepts are not widely understood among military audiences 
because they are largely absent from both military and international relations literature 
primarily concerned with improving the lethality of its military forces. SNA, SMT, and 
data science techniques are not applied in CA’s analysis of the civil component, which 
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leaves significant gaps in the U.S. Army and Joint Forces’ understanding of the operational 
environment. Therefore, this research is necessary to support the CA Proponent’s concepts 
of CKI and the MDO concept of competing with near-peer threats under the threshold of 
armed conflict in future operating environments. Civil Affairs’ propensity to outsource its 
analysis to military intelligence analysts and overreliance on information systems to 
perpetuate the same reductivist CIM processes needs to be re-examined and rethought.83 
Intelligence and targeting processes designed specifically to target threat networks will 
consistently lead to an undervaluing of the civil information needed to emerge from armed 
conflict and return to competition on favorable terms.84 The methods prescribed in doctrine 
lack the analytical potency and validity required to generate new insights that build an 
intuitive, contextual understanding of the operational environment.85 In light of this 
evidence, the CA Branch must adopt innovative analytical tools, techniques, and 
frameworks to meet expectations of their emerging role in support of the Army and 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
The following case studies outline the disruptive effects of innovative data-driven 
approaches to markets and industries. Each instance provides a different lesson about how 
data driven approaches have helped disadvantaged organizations solve problems yielding 
either a competitive advantage or a way to invest resources more efficiently. Each scenario 
can serve as a model for the U.S. military for developing and processing insights from the 
operational environment and securing favorable outcomes against irregular threats. 
A. MONEYBALL—MODELING MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
Billy: If we try to play like the Yankees in here, we will lose to the Yankees 
out there.  
Grady: Boy, that sounds like fortune cookie wisdom to me Billy.  
Billy: No, that’s just logic. 
— Moneyball86 
1. Background 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, discussions occurred within Major League 
Baseball (MLB) of rich teams subsidizing poor teams to increase their competitiveness. 
From the MLB Commissioner Alan H. Selig’s perspective, MLB’s “two poorest teams 
such as the Oakland A’s and Tampa Bay Devil Rays” could not compete with teams like 
the New York Yankees with budgets two-to-three times their size.87 To prove Selig wrong, 
Billy Beane, with the support of the Oakland A’s Front Office, invested in an innovative 
idea of applying statistical modeling and analysis to obtain new baseball knowledge and 
build a competitive baseball team even with a severely restricted budget. 
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2. Problem 
The principal problem facing Billy Beane and the Oakland A’s was how to compete 
with other MLB organizations with budgets three times their own. The Oakland A’s were 
losing their best players because their contracts were expiring and the team could no longer 
afford to retain them. Other teams, like the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox with 
budgets in excess of $120 million, were able to draft, trade, and retain the players of their 
choice with little fiscal consideration. The secondary issue was the uncertainty associated 
with player selection. Each player contract was a risky investment with little certainty of 
how that player would develop and perform. As Nate Silver describes in his book The 
Signal and the Noise:  
The demand to know what the future holds for different types of baseball 
players—whether couched in terms of scouting reports or statistical systems 
like PECOTA—still greatly exceeds supply. Millions of dollars—and the 
outcome of the World Series—are at stake each time a team decides which 
player to draft, whom to trade for, how much they should pay for a free 
agent.88  
Thus, the stakes are equally high for all the teams, as each team invested millions of dollars 
into players with no certainty of their future performance. 
3. Innovation 
Beane and his special assistant, Paul DePodesta, used statistical modeling and data 
analytics to develop insights into the game of baseball. They found hidden knowledge from 
their willingness to experiment and refusal to submit to the common attributional biases 
rooted in the game such as player size, appearance, mechanics, and personality. They 
discovered player traits that other teams undervalued and then exploited the market of 
talent, purchasing players with those traits at a discounted rate. Lewis added further: 
Many of the players drafted or acquired by the Oakland A’s had been the 
victims of an unthinking prejudice rooted in baseball’s traditions. The 
research and development department in the Oakland front office liberated 
them from this prejudice, and allowed them to demonstrate their true worth. 
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A baseball team, of all things, was at the center of a story about the 
possibilities—and the limits—of reason in human affairs. Baseball—of all 
things—was an example of how an unscientific culture responds, or fails to 
respond, to the scientific method.89  
In essence, Billy Beane and the Oakland A’s sought innovative ways to analyze baseball. 
Through analysis, they identified insights to inform their strategies within the game and 
find bargain players with specific statistics to fill their roster. Consequently, the Oakland 
A’s offloaded star players such as Jason Giambi and Johnny Damon and recreated their 
aggregate on base percentage with three undervalued players including Jeremy Giambi 
(Jason Giambi’s brother), David Justice, and Scott Hatteberg. Everyone in baseball thought 
Jason Giambi and Johnny Damon were vital to the team’s success, and the decision defied 
the conventional wisdom of Billy’s scouting team which had relied on their subjective 
assessments and intuition. For Billy’s team of scouts, with 30 years of experience in 
baseball, this process was unsettling.  
Billy Beane was remarkable because he was able to impose reform on the institution 
within the Oakland A’s. The subjective assessments and biases towards baseball players 
and their value were well-entrenched and to question this wisdom was blasphemy. There 
is something fundamentally human and intangible surrounding baseball. Luck, chance, and 
attributes were considered a part of the game to the point where even the relevant statistics 
of the game, such as errors, were subjectively collected. Beane’s search for new baseball 
knowledge led him to value those with an outside perspective. Lewis writes:  
With that, the coup was complete. Paul’s list of hitters were distinctly not 
guys the scout found driving around. They were guys Paul found surfing 
the Internet. Some of the names the older scouts do not even recognize. The 
evaluation of young baseball players had been taken out of the hands of the 
old baseball men and placed into the hands of people who had what Billy 
valued the most (and what Billy didn’t have), a degree in something other 
than baseball.90 
This willingness to experiment and accept an outside perspective proved an essential 
component to their success. Their efforts changed everyone’s understanding of baseball. 
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The insights garnered from their models concluded that attributes like a player’s footspeed 
could be overvalued, while a seemingly insignificant detail such as an unorthodox pitching 
motion could be undervalued.91 Billy and DePodesta found other statistics, once thought 
to be relevant, such as team batting averages, had little correlation to scoring runs. Lewis 
explains: 
By analyzing baseball statistics you could see through a lot of baseball 
nonsense. For instance, when baseball managers talked about scoring runs, 
they tended to focus on team batting average, but if you ran the analysis you 
could see that the number of runs a team scored bore little relation to that 
team’s batting average. It correlated much more exactly with a team’s on-
base and slugging percentages. A lot of the offensive tactics that made 
baseball managers famous—the bunt, the steal, the hit and run—could be 
proven to have been, in most situations, either pointless or self-defeating. “I 
figured out that managers do all this shit because it is safe,” said Alderson. 
“They don’t get criticized for it.” He wasn’t particularly facile with 
numbers, but he could understand them well enough to use their 
conclusions. “I couldn’t do a regressions analysis,” he said, “but I knew 
what one was. And the results of them made sense to me.92 
Discovering relationships between on-base percentages and wins dispelled the false 
narratives associated with the importance of specific statistics, business practices, and 
player traits. They found the relationships that mattered such as walks, on base percentages, 
and slugging percentage correlated with runs which translated to wins.93 They also found 
things that did not correlate to runs and wins such as stealing bases and using sacrifice 
bunts to advance players, so Beane took those decisions out of his manager’s hands.94 The 
A’s would no longer use these tactics because they were statistically detrimental to the 
team’s performance. Beane and DePodesta also changed their business practices to recruit 
undervalued players out of college in lieu of signing unproven players out of high school 
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because college players’ statistics were more widely available and validated against better 
competition.95  
Beane and DePodesta’s statistical models grew progressively more complex as the 
process continued to prove effective. They contracted a company called AVM Systems to 
obtain a more sophisticated model of the game.96 According to Lewis, Ken Mauriello and 
Jack Armbruster, former statisticians modeling derivatives on Wall Street, created AVM 
Systems with a data set of every game event from the previous ten years.97 Mauriello and 
Armbruster saw an opportunity in baseball due to its inefficient data capture. Statistics such 
as singles, doubles, or sacrifice flies that baseball recorded proved irrelevant. AVM 
systems coded the game differently, ignoring the traditional ways baseball was recorded. 
Lewis also notes Mauriello and Armbruster divided the field into a numbered matrix and 
captured the velocity and trajectory of every ball hit.98 He goes on to say the sophistication 
of the model accounted for every defensive play as well. For example, players were debited 
and credited for their contributions to events on the field such as a runner’s decision to 
extend their hit into extra bases against a specific player attempting to throw them out. 
Essentially, Lewis believes AVM Systems captured the complexity of the game and 
modeled it, thereby removing its mystery. The AVM model proved effective at capturing 
the value of players. Since using AVM Systems, the Oakland A’s have used a form of this 
model to inform their decisions and strategies with incredible results, thereby changing the 
way baseball is perceived, managed, and played forever. 
4. Outcome 
Beane and DePodesta were essentially counting cards in Las Vegas casinos. The 
success of the Oakland A’s was the proof that their process worked. Lewis remarks, “When 
I first stumbled into the Oakland front office, they were coming off a season in which they 
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had spent $34 million and won an astonishing 102 games; the year before that, 2000, they’d 
spent $26 million and won 91 games, and their division.”99 It was not the wins that were 
astonishing, but the price from which they achieved these wins.  
The other indicator of success was the rapid rate at which the Oakland A’s approach 
diffused to the other teams. Most teams, even those with robust scouting and development 
programs like the St. Louis Cardinals, adopted a more analytical approach.100 Following 
multiple successful seasons, John Henry, the owner of the Boston Red Sox, offered Billy 
Beane $12.5 million dollars for a five-year contract.101 In an interview, Lewis reveals that 
Henry thought the deal would be a bargain.102 Billy Beane became more important than 
any of the players on the roster. Now twenty years later, Moneyball is used as a prototypical 
example of innovation and application of data analytics to radically alter an industry and 
produce results once thought impossible. 
For the three years preceding the publication of Moneyball, Lewis adopted Doug 
Pappas’s method of measuring a team’s financial efficiency.103 Lewis describes Pappas’s 
method as measuring how much an MLB organization paid for each win past 49 wins in 
marginal dollars, assuming the minimum an organization could pay for a team was $7 
million. Oakland A’s process gave them a quantifiable competitive advantage.104 Lewis 
explains:  
Over the past three years the Oakland A’s had paid about half a million 
dollars per win. The only other team in six figures was the Minnesota Twins, 
at $675,000 per win. The most profligate rich franchises—the Baltimore 
Orioles, for instance, or the Texas Rangers—paid nearly $3 million for each 
win, or more than six times what Oakland paid. Oakland seemed to be 
playing a different game than everyone else. In any ordinary industry the 
Oakland A’s would have long since acquired most other baseball teams, and 
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built an empire. But this was baseball, so they could only embarrass other, 
richer teams on the field, and leave it at that.105 
These numbers are significant because they represent the effectiveness of what a data-
driven approach can achieve. Traditional methods were unlikely to yield such positive 
results because the organizations selected radically different players (e.g., high school 
players) trying to achieve the same objective of winning games as cheaply as possible. 
When decisions regarding player selections and strategies were valued more accurately on 
the strength of their relevance to generating runs and wins, the Oakland A’s held the 
competitive advantage.  
5. Analysis 
Michael Lewis describes Moneyball as his favorite story as a writer.106 As Lewis 
explains, “At the bottom of the Oakland experiment was a willingness to rethink baseball: 
how it is managed, how it is played, who is best suited to play it, and why.”107 However, 
the genesis of the Oakland A’s willingness to experiment did not start with Billy Beane.  
Fiscal challenges, scientific perspectives, and market opportunities combined to 
generate the organizational culture necessary to support, a former player, Billy Beane’s 
strategy and decisions. First, the organization faced significant fiscal challenges in 
comparison to other teams. Thus, the A’s personified the time-honored adage of necessity 
driving innovation. Second, a former GM, named Sandy Alderson, approached the game 
with a scientific perspective, laying the groundwork for Beane and his staff to follow.108 
Alderson came to the organization as a well-educated lawyer from San Francisco and a 
former Officer in the Marine Corps. This unique background and fresh thinking created an 
atmosphere within the A’s organization culture that defied convention. Third, Billy 
Beane’s background as a former player provided him with a unique perspective, an 
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understanding of the subjective assessments of his scouting staff and biases governing 
professional baseball should be approached with skepticism. Lastly, the market 
opportunities in the late 1980s and early 1990s were optimal to attract the interest of 
statisticians and other parties. Lewis explained that the market opportunities encompassed 
two parties, those described as hardcore baseball fans and the academically-trained 
statisticians coming from Wall Street where they applied their skills valuing and trading 
derivatives. Yet, as opportunities on Wall Street were saturated with statisticians, some 
applied their trade to other markets such as baseball.  
As Malcolm Gladwell concluded in the book Outliers, there exists windows of 
opportunity, transition, and change.109 Gladwell argues that Bill Gates possessed hidden 
advantages in large part due to the year of his birth. The opportunity cost for others born 
before Gates was too large, shifting careers from well-paying jobs building mainframes 
while supporting a family is a big gamble, and people born after Gates were not old enough 
to take advantage of the emerging opportunities. Gladwell makes the same argument 
regarding the top 75 wealthiest people throughout the history of the world; twenty percent 
were born in the United States during the 1830s. Their birth years postured them to be at 
their prime in the 1860s and 1870s when the United States underwent a period of great 
change. Railroads were constructed, Wall Street was established, and industrial 
manufacturing emerged providing enterprising people with the opportunity to amass 
fantastic wealth. Similarly, statistics within baseball started changing with people like Bill 
James self-publishing four paperback books from 1977 to 1980 that shaped Alderson’s 
understanding of the game.110 It was in this spirit that the Oakland A’s found themselves 
with the necessity and opportunity to test radical ideas. 
Despite Lewis’s proclamation that “the debate is over,” statistical approaches did 
not displace scouting staffs. If anything, the analytics assist them in making better 
 
109 Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success (New York, NY: Hachette Book Group, Inc., 
2008), 42–54. 
110 Lewis, Moneyball, 62.  
 
35 
decisions.111 For instance, the budget for the Oakland A’s scouting staff actually increased 
following their run of success. Much like the Oakland A’s, most teams adopted a hybrid 
approach to make informed decision and curb their natural biases. For instance, the Red 
Sox hired Bill James, a “stathead” or one who evaluated players with statistics, to manage 
the analytical processes for their organization.112 As a result, Silver noted, “they won their 
first World Series title in eighty-six years in 2004 using a fusion approach that emphasized 
both statistics and scouting.”113 In contrast, one of the few teams that severely cut their 
scouting budget in favor of a purely statistical approach was the Toronto Blue Jays. The 
reward for their effort was performing “poorly in drafts from 2002 to 2005.”114  
The case of Moneyball is packed with lessons for the Civil Affairs community. 
There is plenty of conventional wisdom to explain the complexities and uncertainty 
associated with the various conflicts around the world. As CA forces maintain 
unprecedented access to information through its civil reconnaissance and civil engagement 
mandates, it must grapple with the same questions and challenges that Beane and 
DePodesta confronted. With limited resources, what variables and relationships are the 
most significant? Which resources and investments are overvalued or undervalued within 
the foreign assistance, counterterrorism, and development markets? Is it access to 
unemployed military age males, information, healthcare and clean drinking water, or 
political access that drive an insurgency? Is it a political narrative reinforcing a targeted 
social identity?  
CA forces must start asking better questions to form their analysis and develop 
more sophisticated ways of capturing, organizing, and analyzing data to dispel false 
narratives, reduce the level of subjectivity, bias, and complexity. It should challenge the 
conventional wisdom prevalent in the defense, diplomatic, and development communities.  
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The example Lewis provides with Moneyball parallels Krohley’s argument that the 
Civil Affairs Branch should focus on producing actionable insights and feed those insights 
into a more sophisticated targeting mechanism.115 Currently, CA forces and the Joint Force 
view the world as the institution of baseball once viewed the game of baseball, overvaluing 
teams based on team batting averages and players based on their footspeed. The Civil 
Affairs Branch must learn from this lesson and begin playing a different game if it wishes 
to compete in a hybrid environment against near-peer threats. A game driven by data 
analysis, modeling, and insights into the operational environment that direct its strategies 
and investments. Gladwell’s window of opportunity has opened with the great transition 
occurring in both warfare and U.S. Forces. Current members of the CA community must 
be provided the opportunity to think differently and apply their talents to provide disruptive 
impacts within the operational environment. 
B. JACK MAPLE, COMPSTAT, AND FIGHTING CRIME WITH DATA 
Jack said that he was getting an education in Times Square. He said he was 
getting a master’s degree in crookology. He was starting to believe that he 
could read crime the way, like, a weatherman can read a weather pattern.  
—PJ Vogt, The Crime Machine116 
1. Background 
In their New York Times Bestseller Freakonomics, Levitt and Dubner evaluated 
several topics using economic and statistical studies to reveal the hidden relationships 
between industries, actors, and events. One question they sought to answer was, “Where 
have all the criminals gone?”117 From 1975 to 1990, the crime rate increased 80 percent 
in the United States.118 Experts like criminologist James Alan Fox forecast the coming 
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decade to be a “bloodbath” as crime rates would continue to rise.119 Former cops, like Bill 
Courtney, agreed with Fox’s assessment.120 His characterization of the crime in New York 
City equated to a reoccurring nightmare. In an interview with PJ Vogt, Courtney describes 
the situation in visceral detail: 
BILL: All right, so I, uh, I became a transit cop in 1983. You, you just can’t 
understand how bad it was back then. I don’t know like when you were 
born, but– 
PJ: ‘85. 
BILL: Okay. When you were five years old, New York City was a horror 
show. 
NEWSCLIP: This is WYNN. And the murder rate just keeps on rising.  
BILL: It was just one horrific event after the next.  
NEWSCLIP: That’s an average of five or six homicides a day.121 
Bill Courtney’s experience and perspective as a police officer provides insight into the New 
York Police Department (NYPD) officers’ abject hopelessness towards their responsibility 
of enforcing the law and protecting their citizens. This feeling of hopelessness was a 
reflection of an ineffective system in dire need of transformation. Similar to the Oakland 
A’s, the situation facing the New York City Police Department (NYPD) was daunting and 
required innovative solutions to confront the growing crime epidemic.  
At the peak of the crime epidemic, the citizens of New York City elected Rudolph 
“Rudy” Giuliani and William Bratton as their Mayor and Police Commissioner. Giuliani’s 
political campaign promised to clean up the streets of New York City, which had 
transformed into a criminal cesspool. Consistent with Giuliani, Bratton claimed he would 
cut crime in the city by half. The question was how they intended to keep their political 
campaign promises. What followed was what Bill Bratton called the “Athenian period,” in 
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which political leadership and law enforcement leadership demonstrated a willingness to 
implement different policing policies to end the crime epidemic in their city.122 
2. Problem 
In the early 1990s, the problem facing the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) was how to confront the growing crime epidemic afflicting their city without the 
data to understand the full scope of the problem, a clear strategy for dealing with the crime 
epidemic, and accountability mechanisms to hold precincts accountable for their crime. All 
of the NYPD’s previous efforts and policing policies had proved ineffective. Reactive and 
community-policing policies were insufficient to deter criminal activity.123 Moreover, the 
NYPD lacked meaningful data, a means to understand the scope of crime in the city. Also 
missing were critical forms of accountability and a strategy of policing capable of reducing 
crime.124 The consensus within the contemporary literature suggests that the city was 
descending into lawlessness and chaos.125 Additionally, the NYPD lacked a 
comprehensive understanding of the crime in their city, specifically its scale and 
sophistication. Policing strategies capable of combating and preventing crime events 
throughout the city were required. The systems of local policing had proven ineffective at 
recognizing criminal patterns and connecting crime events that police departments 
considered mutually exclusive. The system of community policing created an atmosphere 
of hopelessness for those in law enforcement. The combination of these factors contributed 
to the overall receptiveness to changes in policing policy and strategy among New York 
City’s political leadership, NYPD’s leadership, and the citizens residing in the city. 
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Problem-oriented and intelligence-led policing concepts to solve the criminal 
pandemic in New York City would emerge from an unlikely character who created 
CompStat. His name was Jack Maple. All accounts of Maple, a New York City Transit 
Police Officer, describe him as an intelligent, abrasive, and stubborn man with a unique 
sense of style and personality.126 Both his partner, Bill Courtney, and his wife, Bridgid 
O’Connor, describe Maple as a brilliant analytical thinker convinced that the NYPD’s 
approach towards fighting crime was archaic and misguided.127 However, Maple’s 
perspective rarely aligned with that of his leadership. This resulted in several situations 
where Maple found himself at risk of losing his job or being reassigned to other precincts 
two hours away from his residence as punishment tours.  
Transit officers were assigned to protect transit centers and transportation 
infrastructure that spanned the city. Maple used his mandate as a transit officer and his 
inductive reasoning to go where he thought the criminals would be. The logic of Maple’s 
approach seems to be captured in a model later developed by Clarke and Eck as described 
in Tim Newburn’s Handbook for Policing, where crime events depend on the convergence 
of offender, target/victim, and location.128 For example, Maple noted that subway stations 
in specific locations like Times Square experienced bottlenecks during periods of heavy 
traffic, and these bottlenecks were likely to attract pickpockets.129 Undeterred by 
punishment assignments and convinced his methods were valid and necessary, Maple 
found his way into assignments that revealed his potential for applying predictive analysis 
to the crime epidemic in New York City, and with each success he was promoted to 
positions where he could implement his methods on incrementally larger scales.  
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Eventually, Maple worked his way into various projects within the transit system 
where he proved capable of developing innovative solutions to criminal challenges. One 
such problem was an increased prevalence of random wolfpack attacks of subway 
patrons.130 These violent attacks consisted of 20 to 30 assailants using knives and box 
cutters against their victims. Jack had a task force composed of 24 transit police officers 
and used a mixture of analysis and deception to reduce the number of attacks from 1,200 
to 12 in one year. Following his success against the wolfpack attacks, Maple pitched the 
big idea of the “Charts of the Future” that resembled a crafts project. Maple instructed Bill 
Courtney to cover the walls of their office in paper and recreate the New York City 
Subway’s 430 stations. On this creation, Maple and Courtney coded the criminal activity 
reported and plotted it with markers and stickers of specified colors. This allowed them to 
temporally and geospatially depict where and when crime would occur. This analog visual 
representation of the New York City transit system, coupled with analysis, aided the team’s 
effort to isolate rail lines at specified times to disrupt criminal activity. The result of Jack’s 
operational insights was a 30 percent drop in felony crime in two years.131 Maple’s method 
proved successful because it produced operational insights that predicted the likelihood 
and location of criminal activity. Thus, the chaos of New York no longer extended into its 
subways, which was once a place where crime thrived.  
In 1993, when Bill Bratton assumed his position as New York City’s Police Chief, 
he made two bold claims. First, he announced he would cut crime in half. Second, Bill 
Bratton announced Jack Maple as his second-in-command to oversee the transformation of 
the NYPD and achieve the target reduction in crime. Both of these proclamations came as 
quite a shock to many within the ranks of the NYPD. Yet, Maple proved his worth and 
ability to apply analytical methods to fight crime. Bratton’s promotion provided Maple 
with the opportunity to once again apply his analytical methodology on a larger scale. The 
broad authority Bratton provided Maple enabled him to make sweeping changes, hold 





investigating. The prevailing perspective was that the NYPD would only investigate crimes 
perpetrated against affluent citizens and cases guaranteed to make the nightly news. For 
example, the NYPD precinct in Manhattan had a policy restricting investigations of 
burglaries in the amount of $10,000 or less. Maple’s philosophy made it clear that all crime 
victims would be represented, which marked a significant change in the NYPD and 
inadvertently changed the relationship with the citizens of New York City. 
Maple was not the prototypical cop. If anything, he was its antithesis. Many within 
the leadership of the NYPD hated Jack Maple because they deemed him to be a “fat freakin’ 
transit cop in a bowtie” who essentially told them that they were incompetent.132 The 
transformation within the NYPD was going to be uncomfortable for the leadership at the 
precinct level. Unfortunately, the Precinct Chiefs maintained an unwritten policy of 
omission. They did not report the crimes they deemed unimportant to the commissioner. 
This lack of accountability created a blind spot for the commissioner, as precincts vastly 
underreported their crime statistics.  
Now armed with the data, Maple, as the Deputy Police Commissioner, could hold 
the old chiefs accountable for the crime in their precincts. He held his notorious CompStat 
briefings daily with the Precinct Chiefs at NYPD Headquarters. Maple demolished the 
NYPD leadership’s unwritten policy of either underreporting or omissions in crime 
reporting with data. PJ Vogt describes these meetings as an inquisition stating:  
Police chiefs, like 50-year-old men, would vomit in the bathroom before 
CompStat meetings. They would try to find friends in the department who 
could tip them off to see if they were up next. These were guys who lived 
in neighborhoods where they ran little armies of 300 men who had to obey 
every single one of their orders, who could never question them about 
anything. And now, they had to go to this other room, where they stood in 
front of a guy in a bowtie, surrounded by everybody they’d ever wanted to 
impress, 200 of their scariest peers, and they just got their lives nitpicked 
apart. They got asked the kind of follow-up questions you ask somebody on 
their first day of the job when you’re convinced they know nothing. And if 





they were fired. One chief told a reporter, “If they’re going to keep having 
these meetings, they should really have us check our guns at the door.”133 
This new mechanism for accountability, enabled by crime data, brought police into crime 
hotspots regardless of their location. As Ratcliffe explains, “CompStat is an accountability 
process that aims to empower mid-level commanders to seek rapid response to emerging 
crime problems and hotspots.”134 Ratcliffe further asserts that CompStat set the foundation 
for both problem-oriented and intelligence-led policing, allowing the NYPD to determine 
priorities and allocate resources more objectively. So, what started as “Charts of the 
Future” evolved into a comprehensive CompStat system comprised of a functioning 
database of criminal activity and morning accountability meetings between Jack Maple, 
the Deputy Police Commissioner, and his precinct chiefs.  
CompStat extracted three key insights. The first insight was that the precinct chiefs 
misrepresented the severity and frequency of crime in their reports to the Police 
Commissioner. Following the implementation of CompStat, a second insight surfaced; 
NYPD was not fighting crime evenly. Maple challenged precinct commanders and ensured 
that low-level crime was confronted across the city. The third insight CompStat revealed 
was that a disproportionate amount of crime could be attributed to a smaller population of 
criminals in a Pareto distribution.135 This revelation would result in the NYPD adopting 
policing strategies and policies designed to target and arrest these prolific offenders and 
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Crime rates started their dramatic decrease in the early 1990s.136 There were a 
number of explanations for this new trend including “innovative policing strategies, 
increased reliance on prisons, changes in crack and other drug markets, aging of the 
population, tougher gun-control laws, a strong economy, increased number of police, and 
a number of other explanations such as an increased use of capital punishment, concealed-
weapons laws, and gun buybacks.”137 During their research, Levitt and Dubner found 
innovative policing strategies received the most citations in their LexisNexis search.  
According to Levitt, the innovative police strategies enabled the largest reduction 
in crime rate of any large city in the United States. He states, “homicide rates fell from 30.7 
per 100,000 people in 1990 to 8.4 people per 100,000 in 2000, a change of 73.6 
percent.”138 The statistics offered by former NYPD officials suggest that the 
implementation of CompStat reduced murders by 20 percent in its first year, and by the 
end of 1995, all felony crime fell by 39 percent.139 These are drastic differences from the 
decade predicted to be a bloodbath. Levitt argues that innovative policing strategies had 
little to do with the crime reduction, instead attributing the crime reduction to the 45 percent 
growth of police officers within the NYPD and the court case decision in Row v. Wade in 
1973 that legalized abortion.140 The legalization of abortion reduced the population with 
the greatest propensity to commit crime, the children of single parents, which roughly 
doubles their probability of committing crime. Despite the difference in attribution, the 
crime rate fell dramatically in New York City and CompStat rapidly diffused to police 
departments around the world.141  
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5. Analysis 
The CompStat story contains numerous lessons for developing and implementing 
data-driven approaches, serving as a prototypical example of an organization solving a 
complex problem through innovative data analysis and visualization techniques. The 
NYPD’s geospatial, temporal, and statistical analyses reduced the complexity of criminal 
activity and allowed the NYPD to focus their attention and effort on the relevant factors, 
much like the Oakland A’s did in the Moneyball story. These techniques provided the 
framework for establishing department priorities and allocating resources effectively.  
CompStat revealed the scope of the crime epidemic problem in the city. Precinct 
Chiefs had been underreporting the crime in their precincts to the Police Commissioner. 
Unless the specific crime was going to make the nightly news cycle, it went largely 
unreported to police headquarters, which had not prioritized data collection for anything 
other than political purposes.142 These processes are somewhat similar to the reporting 
functions within a military organization, in which the commanders set their Commanders 
Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and Priority Information Requirements (PIR), 
defining the criteria needed to be reported immediately to the commander for action (such 
as troops in contact (TIC) or an injury to a service member). Jack Maple’s revelation that 
crime was not being reported by his precinct chiefs led him to believe he needed to break 
the pervasive environment of omission and little accountability. This revelation is 
described in one of Jack Maple’s interviews, where he describes an interaction with 
operations center at NYPD headquarters: 
PJ: Crime victims who were poor, crime victims who were people of color, 
the crime that happened to them, in a million different ways, it was just 
invisible to the police department. Mike says, right in the beginning, he 
remembers Jack actually trying to show him how bad it was.  
MIKE DALY: And I was with him his first night, he was driving around, 
and he, he called operations, says, “You know anything going on?” They 
said, “No all’s quiet commissioner.” He goes, “How about any homicides? 
You got any homicides?” 
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“Well, well we got two in Brooklyn.” “Oh, yeah?” “Yeah.” “How about the 
Bronx?” “Yeah. We got two there too.” “Oh yeah, what about Queens?” 
“One.” He said, “What about Manhattan?” “Well, we got one there too, but 
it’s above 125th Street.” He goes, “All’s quiet though.” “Yeah all’s quiet, 
commissioner.”143 
The passage is revealing in the sense that it provides granular context to the problems the 
NYPD faced and the perspectives of the police officers involved. The interaction reveals 
the status quo apathy that existed at the time among the police officers working at the 
precincts. Once Maple was armed with data, he used it to address crime wherever it was 
prevalent. Another portion of the interview highlights Maple challenging the conventional 
policing wisdom of the time, observing: 
PJ: People were terrified of Jack. He told this story about berating this cop 
from narcotics because he found out the guy had been ignoring complaints 
he was getting from people who were upset about crack deals that were 
happening outside of their houses.  
JACK: You know, these fucking people are afraid here. We gotta do 
something about this. And he said to me, “You know, what do you want to 
make these low-level cases for? We want to make the big cases.” I said, 
“Where do you live? Where do you live? In Clarkstown or one of these 
places?” I said, “What did you pay? What was your house? 300,000, 350? 
Got a nice little police department there? 
PJ: Clarkstown was a rich white suburb. Jack was saying, what if tomorrow 
morning, somebody was selling drugs outside your house in Clarkstown? 
JACK: You think you’d be on the phone to the Clarkstown fuckin’ cops? 
And would you want them arrested? And if they said to you, “Gee, don’t 
you understand? They’re just low-level guys. We’re waiting for the big 
case. And we’re going to be done with the big case in a year. You think that 
would be all right if your children were stepping over crack vials on their 
way to school?” And he said to me, I mean he was great, he said to me, 
“You know, you’re right.”  
PJ: As much as it made everybody hated Jack, CompStat worked. The crime 





Jack Maple urged action, and in doing so, he restored troubled communities’ faith in their 
police precincts that neglected crime they deemed irrelevant. Consequently, the citizens of 
New York City rewarded the NYPD with a broad latitude to enforce the law.  
The transition to a data driven-approach was not easy for the NYPD. It took a 
determined, innovative personality and commitment of personal capital from the NYPD 
leadership to bring about organizational change. These transitions are difficult because they 
alter the former relationships and incorporate measures of accountability which are not 
always comfortable for some actors. The problem was the NYPD operated with a blind 
spot in their shared common operating picture. It was not comfortable for the leadership at 
the precinct-level because they had never been critically assessed or questioned. The 
resulting accountability, however, was essential to understanding their challenges. Once 
the data was collected, processed, and analyzed, the NYPD integrated their insights into 
new policing strategies and policies. As the data revealed the disproportional distribution 
of crime among offender populations, the police began to arrest people for jumping subway 
turnstiles and urinating in the streets. The data revealed the more likely criminals were to 
commit lower offenses, the more likely they were to commit more grievous offenses. 
The CompStat story offers several lessons for the CA Branch. While the Civil 
Affairs Branch uses geospatial and temporal analysis, it has a difficult time analyzing the 
data and extracting insights. Many of the CA insights are derived from inductive 
observations, not from analysis. Hence, the emphasis is placed on civil reconnaissance and 
civil engagement. CompStat shows that effective data capture and analysis should focus 
on reducing the complexity of the operating environment. CompStat also shows that 
innovation should come from within the organization. Similar to the case of Moneyball, 
the data-driven innovation came from within the NYPD. CompStat was the brainchild of 
Jack Maple. He used the methods available at the time to enhance his organization’s 
situational awareness, both when he was a transit police officer and, subsequently, on a 
larger scale when he was the Deputy Police Commissioner of New York City. CA forces 
could benefit from emulating the analytical and integration aspects of CompStat to generate 
new knowledge and pathways to compete under the threshold of armed conflict.  
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The integration of insight into operational approaches and strategies represents the 
other problem facing the CA community. The doctrinal products CA is tasked with 
producing make it difficult to assess the operational variables relevant to understanding 
events and relationships within the proper socio-political contexts. CompStat captured the 
data needed to determine where the NYPD should invest their resources. Their analysis 
linked situational awareness, accountability, and a target criminal population. 
Consequently, the NYPD altered its policies to address these problems. This move resulted 
in more effective police operations and a significant reduction in crime. The CA branch 
should focus on developing an analytic capability that produces similar insights, such as 
determining which actors or groups are more likely to influence IPI political structures, 
and build a more objective, common understanding of the relevant relationships in the 
operating environment.  
C. ARCHIE COCHRANE AND EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE 
It was the absence of doubt—and scientific rigor—that made medicine 
unscientific and caused it to stagnate for so long. 
—Philip E. Tetlock145  
1. Background 
In his book Superforecasting, Philip Tetlock uses examples from several 
professions to illustrate points about forecasting.146 Two examples that reoccur throughout 
his book are meteorology and medicine. This case study focuses on the later, specifically 
evidence-based medicine and its champion Archie Cochrane.147 Tetlock describes Archie 
Cochrane as a renowned British obstetrician and epidemiologist who argued the British 
National Health Service (NHS) should institute random controlled trials of medical 
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interventions in the 1950s and 1960s with little success.148 Prior to evidence-based 
medicine, little critical assessment of medicine existed. Tetlock describes the history of 
medicine as “blind men arguing over the color of the rainbow” and uses a passage from a 
British physician named Druin Burch. Burch describes “most histories of medicine as 
strikingly odd” as “they provide a clear account of what people believed they were doing, 
but almost none at all of whether they were right.”149 Tetlock agrees and suggests that in 
the not-too-distant past, the sick were often better off without the care of physicians 
because their treatments and interventions were either ineffective or counterproductive. For 
example, prescriptions of bloodletting and doses of mercury to induce diarrhea failed to 
save George Washington’s life when he fell ill in 1799.150 In fact, it is more likely these 
interventions served as a catalyst for his death.  
Tetlock proposes that the administration of medicine lacked doubt. Each 
observation where a patient’s condition improved fed their physician’s confirmation bias, 
and every intervention failure was attributed to an incurable ailment. Tetlock’s example of 
Galen, a renowned physician from the Roman Empire and medical authority for millennia, 
demonstrates the point clearly. Galen wrote of one of his treatments, “All who drink of this 
treatment recover in a short time, except those whom it does not help, who all die… It is 
obvious, therefore, that it fails only in incurable cases.”151 Historically, medical literature 
was composed by men convinced of their own expert judgment, yet many of their proposed 
treatments were wrong and dangerous. Tetlock notes two events that almost provided the 
needed breakthroughs, as advances in medicine had stagnated. The first event was an early 
design of a random controlled trial in 1747. Tetlock writes:  
The cure for this plague of certainty came tantalizingly close to discovery 
in 1747, when a British ship’s doctor named James Lind took twelve sailors 
suffering from scurvy, divided them into pairs, and gave each pair a 
different treatment: vinegar, cider, sulfuric acid, seawater, a bark paste, and 
citrus fruit. It was an experiment born of desperation. Scurvy was a mortal 
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threat to sailors on long-distance voyages and not even the confidence of 
physicians could hide the futility of their treatments. So Lind took six shots 
in the dark—and one hit. The two sailors given the citrus recovered quickly. 
But contrary to popular belief, this was not a eureka moment that ushered 
in the modern era of experimentation. “Lind was behaving in what sounds 
a modern way, but had no full understanding of what he was doing,” noted 
Druin Burch. “He failed so completely to make sense of his own experiment 
that even he was left unconvinced of the exceptional benefits of lemons and 
limes. For years thereafter, sailors kept getting scurvy and doctors kept 
prescribing worthless medicine.152 
Another attempt at instituting evidence-based medicine occurred in 1921. A British 
statistician named Austin Bradford Hill responded to a question in Lancet and “laid a 
template for modern medical investigation,” yet the medical community failed to adopt it 
as a standard practice.153 The champions of random controlled trials were met by an 
apathetic and even hostile medical institution.154 
2. Problem 
The central problem in this case is a medical community convinced of the efficacy 
of its treatments without scientific validation through controlled experiments. In other 
words, the medical community relied on subjective judgment to determine the efficacy of 
treatments in lieu of scientific evidence, and stymied attempts at scientific evaluation. 
3. Innovation 
The innovation came in the form of random controlled trials (RCT). While a few 
innovators within the medical, scientific, and mathematics disciplines advocated for its use, 
the issue largely fell on deaf ears. There was little interest in testing the sound judgment of 
respected physicians and their treatments. However, Archie Cochrane persuaded the 
National Health Service to grant him a randomized trial to test the efficacy of his newly 
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established hospital cardiac care units.155 Cochrane randomly selected patients for either 
admission into the cardiac care units or home for bed rest.156 As the trial progressed, a 
group of physicians tried to stop the trial out of concern for the patients denied access to 
care within the cardiac care units. The demands intensified after Cochrane provided them 
with the opposite of the preliminary results. The physicians accused him of being abusive 
and unethical. Yet, when Cochrane revealed the truth that home care performed slightly 
better than the care units, the group responded with silence.  
4. Outcome 
Following the trial, Cochrane published his 1973 book, Effectiveness and 
Efficiency: Random Reflections on Health Services, in which he “questioned the very 
manner in which medicine was practiced and called for the rigorous evaluation of 
effectiveness (whether treatments actually work) and efficiency (whether treatments 
represent the optimal use of available resources).”157 Cochrane unabashedly states that the 
only way to measure the effectiveness of treatments was to test them in randomized 
controlled trials (RCT). Cochrane also noted that the basis for treatment decisions must be 
determined on evidence “rather than on the basis of hearsay, imagined efficacy, or the 
‘standard operating procedure’ mentality that so often fails to consider alternative 
scenarios, derogatory side effects, long-term damage, and blatantly contradictory 
information.”158 Essentially, Cochrane made an unequivocal case for RCTs and laid the 
foundation for evidence-based medicine (EBM). He forced the medical community to 
question itself and define what constitutes clinical judgment.  
After Archie Cochrane published Effectiveness and Efficiency: Random Reflections 
on Health Services, RCT became the standard protocol for assessing the effectiveness of 
medical interventions and laid the foundation for EBM that became a standard throughout 
 
155 Tetlock and Gardner, 30; Fisher, Johnston, and Clement, “Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?,” 
62. 
156 Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 30–31. 
157 Fisher, Johnston, and Clement, “Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?,” 62. 
158 Fisher, Johnston, and Clement, 62. 
51 
the medical community. This critical assessment feature was responsible for more effective 
and efficient medical interventions that enhanced the standards of medicine for five 
decades. Consequently, the consensus among medical professionals is clear; they attribute 
many of the advances made in modern medicine to Cochrane’s work.  
5. Analysis 
Archie Cochrane’s story highlights an issue common to a number of professions. 
His argument made an authoritative institution question its body of knowledge; a task that 
makes most humans uncomfortable – especially authority figures with strong convictions 
and reputations to protect. The process of implementing RCTs and EBM is the prototypical 
example of confronting conventional wisdom in an institution uninterested in change. It 
took someone with a forceful personality such as Archie Cochrane to belittle the opposing 
argument and reveal its ignorance. It was no longer acceptable for medicine to remain 
unscientific. Tetlock illustrates this point when he writes: 
This seems stunningly obvious today. Randomized controlled trials are now 
routine. Yet it was revolutionary because medicine had never before been 
scientific. True, it had occasionally reaped the fruits of science like the germ 
theory of disease and the X-ray. And it dressed up as a science. There were 
educated men with impressive titles who conducted case studies and 
reported results in Latin-laden lectures at august universities. But it wasn’t 
scientific.159 
What was clear to Cochrane then, and is obvious now, is the “only alternative to a 
controlled experiment that delivers real insight is an uncontrolled experiment that produces 
merely the illusion of insight.”160 Tetlock characterizes the result of retaining the status 
quo as “the same toxic brew of ignorance and confidence that had kept medicine in the 
dark ages for millennia.”161 The advent of RCTs and EBM provided the analytical base to 
revolutionize how doctors conducted clinical trials, conducted research and published 
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articles, and shared evidence. This methodology and technique made progress possible in 
medicine.  
While Cochrane’s argument and his legacy have left an indelible impact on the 
medical community, his argument and insights are applicable across other disciplines, 
particularly intelligence analysis and forecasting. Philip Tetlock uses Cochrane’s random 
controlled testing to test experts’ ability to forecast. He researched methods to test the 
accuracy of United States Intelligence Community’s (IC) forecasts of events and trends in 
a multi-billion dollar study consisting of twenty-thousand participants sponsored by the 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).162 Tetlock and his team, on 
the Good Judgment Project (GJP), determined there were ways of thinking and methods 
that could help increase the accuracy of forecasts. They proved it by beating the control 
and academic teams by a margin of 30–70 percent over the initial two years of four-year 
tournament. Thus, Tetlock is considered one of the leading authorities on the topic of 
forecasting and how to improve an organization’s ability to make sound judgments about 
future events.  
Archie Cochrane would be proud. In his early criticisms of the National Health 
Service, he recommended the British government should conduct controlled testing of its 
political policies to see which ones were effective and efficient. This is precisely what CA 
analysts should be doing, yet innovators are met with significant resistance in much the 
same way Archie Cochrane and his predecessors were in an earlier era. As in the Moneyball 
and CompStat cases, CA analysts must isolate the correlations between operational 
variables and determine which courses of action are likely to bring about the desired 
effects. Therefore, there is an element of forecasting and critical assessment necessary to 
measure the effectiveness of CAA. The Civil Affairs Proponent highlighted the need to 
incorporate modeling into their concept of civil knowledge integration in their Civil 
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Affairs: 2025 and Beyond.163 As the CA Proponent investigates how to integrate these 
capabilities, they should consider Tetlock’s description of Bill Gates’s perspective: 
I have been struck by how important measurement is to improving the 
human condition,” Bill Gates wrote. “You can achieve incredible progress 
if you set a clear goal and find a measure that will drive progress towards 
that goal…This may seem basic, but it is amazing how often it is not done 
and how hard it is to get right.” He is right about what it takes to drive 
progress, and it is surprising how rarely it’s done in forecasting.164 
Measuring the civil component is the key to progress in the arenas where the United States 
typically struggles. Perhaps better methods of analysis will yield insights that improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of CAA. 
D. APPLYING ALGORITHMS TO DIAGNOSING HEART ATTACKS 
It is much more gratifying to come up with a decision on your own. Anyone 
can follow an algorithm. There is a tendency to say, “Well, certainly I can 
do better. It can’t be this simple and efficient; otherwise, why are they 
paying me so much money? 
—Arthur Evans165 
1. Background 
In 1996, Cook County Hospital altered the way doctors diagnose patients coming 
into the Emergency Department (ED) suffering from symptoms of onset heart attack, 
namely complaints of chest pain. According to Gladwell, Cook County hospital was 
famous for its trauma care, due to Chicago’s rampant gang violence, and its notorious lack 
of resources. Gladwell writes:  
As the city’s principal public hospital, Cook County was the place of last 
resort for hundreds of thousands of Chicagoans without health insurance. 
Resources were stretched to the limit. The hospitals cavernous wards were 
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built for another century. There were no private rooms, and patients were 
separated by flimsy plywood dividers.166  
The hospital was in poor condition. It lacked resources such as nurses and 
physicians, but, more critically, it lacked the infrastructure to support its patients. The 
hospital had one bathroom to support its patients and lacked air conditioning which led to 
heat-indexes in excess of 120 degrees in the ED. The ED maintained an unceasing volume 
of patients estimated at 250,000 annually. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
the hospital and its staff were completely overwhelmed. In 1996, Brendan Reilly accepted 
the position as the Department of Medicine’s Chairman. Due to the constant chaos within 
the hospital, he directed protocols for specific populations which included homeless 
patients suffering from asthma and those suffering from chest pain. This case study focuses 
on the later population. Gladwell notes that roughly 30 patients a day filtered into the ED 
with concerns that they might be experiencing a heart attack.167 These patients consumed 
more resources than other patients in the form of doctor and nurse attention and duration 
in hospital beds. Complicating matters further, the treatments were equally resource 
intensive and sophisticated, yet Reilly described their results as “maddeningly 
inconclusive.”168 
2. Problem 
The problems facing Brendan Reilly were numerous and overwhelming, yet 
Reilly’s experiment would focus on the one problem that monopolized hospital resources 
with the least certain outcomes. There was obviously a problem with the volume of 
patients, yet the principal problem facing Reilly was twofold. First, he needed to reduce 
the domination of resources by the patients complaining of chest pain. Second, he needed 
to develop a protocol that added certainty to the notoriously inconclusive outcomes 
resulting from the current treatment protocol.  
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The current protocol consisted of nurses taking the patient’s blood pressure, a 
doctor listening to the patient’s lungs with a stethoscope, a battery of questions assessing 
the acuteness and duration of pain, an assessment of lifestyle risk factors such as exercise 
and drug use, and patient history such as cholesterol and diabetes.169 Following the initial 
treatment protocol, technicians then applied sensors on the patient, preparing them for their 
connection to echocardiogram (ECG) equipment. Despite the ECG being a valuable tool, 
it was not always useful in identifying those in serious trouble until the onset of the heart 
attack. Other methods existed to obtain a more accurate diagnosis of a patient’s condition, 
yet the process involved testing a particular set of enzymes which required hours to obtain 
a result. These were hours a patient with serious chest pain might not have for adequate 
intervention. Consequently, doctors made their assessment based on the best available 
information from the treatment protocols that Reilly assessed as inaccurate due to the 
significant variation among cases. Gladwell writes:  
One of the things Reilly did early in his campaign at Cook, for instance, was 
to put together twenty perfectly typical case histories of people with chest 
pain and give histories to a group of medical doctors- cardiologists, 
internists, emergency room docs, and medical residents- people, in other 
words, who had lots of experience making estimates about chest pain. The 
point was to see how much agreement there was about who among the 
twenty cases was actually having a heart attack. What Reilly found was that 
there really wasn’t any agreement at all. The answers were all over the 
map.170 
During Reilly’s evaluation of Cook County Hospital’s protocols, he found that among his 
staff, no consensus existed among the experts. Gladwell claims that between two and eight 
percent of patients who enter emergency rooms experiencing a heart attack get sent home. 
Doctors mitigate this uncertainty by erring on the side of caution, yet this results in a hidden 
cost because only ten percent of the patients arriving in ERs are in the process of 
experiencing a heart attack. Exposure to malpractice lawsuits creating more risk averse 
doctors and constrained budgets forced Cook to find an innovative method for determining 
a more conclusive result. With hospital beds’ rate at $2,000 per night and potential for 
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patients to remain for three days for observation, unnecessary costs were untenable. These 
circumstances forced hospital administrators and doctors to question the utility of their 
current protocols.171 
3. Innovation 
Consistent with prior case studies, this case features an enterprising leader fitting 
the profile of what Philip Tetlock would describe as a fox, who “knows many things” in 
contrast to its antithesis, the “hedgehog [which] knows one big thing.”172 Reilly interpreted 
information from a multidisciplinary background. He was open-minded, systems and data-
driven, and willing to try something innovative thereby challenging the conventional 
wisdom resident within the established protocol. He dedicated time and effort into 
understanding the problem holistically from a decision-making and statistical basis. By 
deciding to try something radical, Reilly adopted the research of Lee Goldman, who 
collaborated with a team of mathematicians to determine which risk factors were 
significant in predicting whether a patient was experiencing a heart attack and reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding the decision.173 After evaluating hundreds of cases, the team 
concluded that a combination of an ECG and three risk factors determined the need for 
immediate intervention. Gladwell describes the three risk factors as “(1) Is the pain felt by 
the patient unstable angina? (2) Is there fluid in the patient’s lungs? (3) Is the patient’s 
systolic blood pressure blow 100?”174 The team developed and refined an algorithm to 
predict the probability of a heart attack. Goldman constructed a decision tree protocol that 
categorized patients on the basis of their combination of risk factors evidenced as 
symptoms. Despite the interest in his articles, no one would volunteer to test his research. 
Consistent with the other cases, the lack of interest in testing Goldman’s research most 
likely stemmed from an unwillingness to accept the possibility that an algorithm could 
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outperform subject matter experts, in this case, medical professionals. Interestingly, the 
Navy sponsored Goldman’s research due to their need to assess patients experiencing chest 
pain on submarines. The U.S. Navy needed a way to assess the severity of the situation 
with more certainty to preserve their operational security.175 
4. Outcome 
Brendan Reilly implemented Goldman’s algorithm following a two-month trial 
period where doctors used the status quo cardiac protocols and their own judgment. Over 
the next two years, the Cook County ED analyzed patient data with the results of 
Goldman’s algorithm outperforming physician estimates by 70 percent. Physicians 
estimated correctly 75 to 89 percent of the time, while Goldman’s algorithm predicted 
correctly 95 percent of the time. Consequently, Cook County Hospital was the first hospital 
to adopt the algorithm for assessing suspected heart attack patients. The algorithm became 
the standard assessment protocol for assessing patients arriving in emergency rooms 
throughout the United States with symptoms of myocardial infarction, commonly known 
as a heart attack.176  
5. Analysis 
The case study of Brendan Reilly and the Cook County Hospital, while unique, is 
not uncommon. Reilly’s multidisciplinary and data-driven background clearly helped him 
understand that the status quo protocols were inconclusive and warranted further scrutiny. 
The lack of critical assessment and analysis of the relevant relationships among risk factors 
would lead to an opportunity using an evidenced-based approach. However, this case 
represents more than finding an innovative solution to a problem that strained resources. 
Only after Goldman and his researchers considered the relationships between risk factors 
and constructed an algorithm based on their available data, could they distill the data down 
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to relevant factors.177 This synthesis and distillation reduced the complexity of the task of 
determining the severity of a patient’s condition and uncertainty surrounding the 
assessment. In addition to reducing the complexity of the task, the algorithm provided the 
means for overcoming human bias inherent in the decision-making cycle of all humans, 
even subject matter experts, resulting in a more objective assessment of reality with a 
known standard error.178 This, in turn, resulted in a much more efficient operation reducing 
the need for costly resources from both a patient and provider perspectives.  
SOF CA elements must learn the relevant lessons this case provides. Despite 
enduring missions to the same locations in a persistent engagement capacity, the 
relationships between relevant variables within operational environments have yet to be 
critically assessed using these statistical analyses and modeling techniques.179 As 
battlefields become more complex, uncertain, population-centric endeavors, the Army and 
Joint Force will require a much more contextual understanding of the operational 
environment distilled into insights they can use to focus their investments and apply their 
resources. Krohley agrees with this assessment arguing the objective for CA is to reduce 
the complexity and uncertainty associated with the civil component of the operational 
environment.180 Thus far, the U.S. track record for fighting insurgencies is 
inconclusive.181 It has not adapted its forces well, however, to the complex challenges 
associated with the nuances and differences of the adversaries. SOF CA’s reporting and 
analysis capabilities focus on both threat reporting to enable kinetic strikes, in lieu of 
concentrating its resources on the socio-political structures supporting transnational 
terrorist organization and violent extremist organizations. SOF CA produces a significant 
volume of information of limited value because it requires it consumers to conduct their 
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own analysis and determine its relevance.182 The evidence that partners undervalue its 
information should be enough to require CA to critically assess its analytical capabilities 
and the potential utility of incorporating data science and analysis techniques. This would 
provide actionable insights into targeting frameworks and strategy development.183 It 
seems that U.S. planners have missed the entire point of their COIN strategy, the challenges 
of COIN are principally politically motivated and require progress in the social and 
political domains. Consequently, accurate assessments of socio-political entities are 
essential to achieving U.S. political-military goals.184  
E. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES 
Gentlemen, we have run out of money so now we have to think. 
—Sir Winston Churchill185 
1. Elements of Successful Analytical Processes 
In the modern context, many associate data-driven and evidence-based approaches 
with those utilized by Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, or Google (FANG) leveraging big data, 
and sophisticated machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence. But this would 
be a misconception. The scale and sophistication of the FANG operational frameworks are 
unique to their business model.186 In contrast, each case illustrates the point that an 
innovative organization can leverage moderately sophisticated statistical analysis to gain 
unique insights into their environment. Yet, this is one of two components. Further 
evaluation reveals another critical aspect of their success: the integration of these insights 
into both operational and strategic approaches of the organization. For example, the 
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Oakland A’s found that bunting did not correlate to scoring runs or winning games, so they 
ceased bunting.187 From a strategic standpoint, the Oakland A’s determined recruiting 
players from college was more profitable because they had more performance statistics 
against higher-quality competition.188 The A’s realized they were investing too much in a 
player’s potential and neglecting a player’s performance, which was more indicative of 
future performance. The process appears basic, but it distills the basic elements of what 
organizations must do to be successful, especially in complex and turbulent environments 
that Blanken and Overbaugh define as an adhocracy.189 They argue organizations must do 
the following: 
1. Develop actionable insights. 
2. Integrate these insights into operations and strategy.  
These fundamental elements define the purpose of any analytical process relating 
to statistics. Krohley emphasizes these point in his article, “Integrating Civil Affairs – An 
Outsider’s Perspective,” and he defines the entire purpose of CAA in support of the Army 
and Joint Force.190 Krohley argues that CA must focus on generating actionable insights 
and, subsequently, integrate these actionable insights into operational targeting 
frameworks and strategy development. This is a stark contrast to CA’s current 
understanding of their role and function within their CIM process, which conflates volume 
with value. While useful in certain respects, Gladwell points out in Blink that less is more 
when it comes to information in certain circumstances. The case study of Brendan Reilly 
and the Cook County Hospital study of heart attack assessment protocols reduced the 
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amount of resources consumed by patients suffering from symptoms of heart attacks by 
reducing the complexity of the physicians’ assessment process to four variables which most 
correlated with the immediate onset of heart attacks.191 
2. Elements of Analytical Process Failure 
All of the cases highlight instances where the process worked correctly, while 
efforts of other organizations such as General Electric (GE) and Proctor & Gamble (P&G), 
eager to replicate the success of these cases, have largely failed.192 Davenport and 
Westerman provide context on why these company transformations to data-driven models 
failed.193 They attribute the failures of GE, P&G, Ford, Sears, and Zynga to four factors. 
First, they attribute the failures to a focus on transitioning to a digital architecture at the 
expense of the other aspects of their operations. They suggest no digital transformation 
should be viewed as a panacea. Second, Davenport and Westerman argue that companies 
underestimate the resources required to sustain these initiatives, which can be a drain on a 
company’s resources in other areas if the return on investment is not immediate or 
nonexistent. Third, they point out the importance of considering the readiness for 
innovation adoption from both a competitor and a customer perspective. Lastly, they reveal 
the allure of a new business model is always strong when other aspects of the business are 
not performing well. They suggest these prospects for change are overemphasized as they 
tend to be associated with such purported panaceas. 
Perhaps the best example of analytical failure for CA to learn from comes 
coincidentally from the same chapter as the Brendan Reilly and the Cook County 
Hospital’s case in Blink, where Gladwell discusses a Joint Forces Command Exercise in 
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2002 known as the Millennium Challenge.194 Gladwell examines Colonel Paul Van Riper 
and his red team, comprised of stockbrokers, defending their notional autocracy from U.S. 
Forces and its new Operational Net Assessment (ONA) tool and Effects-Based Operations 
(EBO) concept, which assumed U.S. forces had near omniscience of the battlefield. The 
goal of the Joint Forces Command exercise was to determine how U.S. planners and 
decisionmakers could leverage these new tools to fight a rogue dictator threatening the 
Persian Gulf region securing victory without the wanton destruction of wars past.195 
Gladwell noted that ONA and EBO promised the U.S. coercive power through the 
combination of deep analysis and manipulation of the diplomatic, informational, military, 
and economic elements of national power.196 Nevertheless, the volume of information and 
the need for constant analysis overwhelmed the staff of U.S. Forces and resulted in 
information overload and abysmal failure. Gladwell noted that Colonel Van Riper and his 
red team destroyed a U.S. Navy Carrier Group and repelled the invasion force twice after 
resets to the exercise due to the added complexity of using the ONA tool.  
These passages illustrate the point that too much information can be 
counterproductive without the proper analysis to determine what information is relevant. 
This is one reason that General James Mattis ended EBO.197 Unfortunately, CA forces 
never fully invested in this type of analysis, instead opting to delegate this task to other 
parties such as military intelligence or relying on technology-enabled analysis tools like 
Palantir to show trends and commonalities between relationships of interest. While useful 
to the U.S. Army and the SOF community and its systems, these techniques adopted an 
unscientific, subjective approaches without mechanisms to test either the veracity of its 
conclusions or success of CA’s subsequent actions. It is the equivalent of Archie 
Cochrane’s argument that without testing U.S. operations, there is no way to know if they 
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were effective against irregular threats. These are the analytic techniques and perspectives 
that must be changed or at a minimum evaluated critically and scientifically, lest CA forces 
choose to maintain its illusion of insight. 
3. Organizational Change Management and Innovation 
Despite the diversity of cases, they share many common elements that improved 
the overall performance of the organization. In analyzing the common elements, each 
organization conducted the following:  
• Adapted out of necessity.  
• Generated new knowledge in the form of insights. 
• Reduced the complexity of their environment. 
• Developed a common understanding of the problem. 
• Committed to the organizational change. 
• Elevated a sufficiently powerful champion to implement their innovation.  
• Demonstrated a willingness to challenge conventional wisdom. 
• Integrated their insights into their operations and strategy approaches. 
While each organization transitioned to a data-driven approach, innovation and 
change management were critical factors underlying their success. Organizational change 
was at the center of each case, and organizational change is no easy task. Each example 
demonstrates the pain organizations experience when confronted with implementing new 
business practices. The confrontations between Jack Maple and his Precinct Chiefs, Billy 
Beane and his scouting staff, Archie Cochrane and his medical colleagues, and Brendan 
Reilly and his ED staff all illustrate their organizational cultures’ resistance to change. John 
P. Kotter, an authority on change management, prescribed an eight-stage process for 
implementing successful organizational changes. The eight stages he lists are as follows: 
1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
64 
2. Creating the Guiding Coalition 
3. Developing a Vision and Strategy 
4. Communicating the Change Vision 
5. Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action 
6. Generating Short-Term Wins 
7. Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change 
8. Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture198 
These eight-stages mirrors the process flow each organization used to transition their 
organization to a data-driven organization. The NYPD, Oakland A’s, National Health 
Service, and Cook County Hospital transitioned through each stage of Kotter’s process. 
All of the organizations possessed a sense of urgency because the problems they 
faced were essential to their survival. The champions in each of these cases had to create a 
guiding coalition to see their methods adopted. Jack Maple could not have changed the 
NYPD without the support from his Police Commissioner and Mayor. All of the actors had 
inter-disciplinary backgrounds and strong convictions to match their personalities. They 
viscerally communicated the vision. Jack Maple and Archie Cochrane were direct and 
abrasive in their confrontations, but in the end, the logic of their arguments persuaded 
others to support their ideas. Consequently, organizational change management 
contributed significantly to their success.  
Each innovation had a disruptive impact on each of their industries. For example, 
most MLB teams adopted statistical modeling techniques following the Oakland A’s lead, 
even teams with the strongest antithetical philosophies.199 CompStat diffused across 
metropolitan areas all over the world, and RCTs and EBM became the standard in 
evaluating medicine and its effectiveness.200 The work of Everett Rogers and Geoffrey 
Moore provides additional context to the success of these organizations and their 
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methods.201 Rogers proposed that for innovations to be adopted and rapidly diffused, they 
needed to meet five criteria, later known as the Rogers Five Factors. These five factors are 
1. Relative advantage—the degree to which a product is better than the 
product it replaces 
2. Compatibility—the degree to which a product is consistent with existing 
values and experiences 
3. Complexity—the degree to which a product is difficult to understand 
and use 
4. Trialability—the degree to which a product may be experimented with 
on a limited basis 
5. Observability—the degree to which a product usage and impact are 
visible to others202 
Each of these innovations provided clear benefits across the five factors. For 
instance, CompStat and Cook County Hospital’s algorithms provided a relative advantage 
in the promise of more efficient operations and more definitive conclusions. The statistical 
analysis involved in Moneyball was more sophisticated than determining whether patients 
recovered more effectively in cardiac care units or at home with bed rest, but the statistical 
methodology and rigor were similar. Lastly, the observability made the largest impact in 
MLB, New York City, and the efficacy of medicine. Critics and teams noticed the Oakland 
A’s strange selection of players, sacrilegious in-game decisions in defiance of the 
conventional wisdom, and competitive record despite a limited budget. Meanwhile, the 
crime in New York City began to plunge due to increased enforcement of low-level crimes, 
and physicians tested the efficacy of their interventions curing their self-imposed blindness. 
The progress in all fronts was astonishing and prompted changes across their industries.  
4. Insights for the Civil Affairs Branch 
In the spirit of Sir Winston Churchill’s quote at the beginning of the chapter, CA 
forces must reflect upon the past eighteen years in Afghanistan and consider the limits of 
its influence and resources. In fourteen of the eighteen years, U.S. appropriations greatly 
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exceeded the point of aid saturation to stabilize Afghanistan with little prospect for 
success.203 Sopko contends most of the indicators found in the Special Inspector General 
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) suggest that U.S. efforts were counterproductive, 
contributing to greater corruption, instability, and conflict.204 Thus, the United States and 
its CA forces must start looking at their operational environment differently if they expect 
to achieve different results.  
The era of Great Power Competition (GPC) and the looming prospect of durable 
disorder will strain budgets and funding for influence operations. Therefore, CA forces 
must adopt the methods such as those employed in Moneyball to determine the 
relationships and correlation between variables in the operational environment such as 
significant activities, actors, information, locations, and operations. Moneyball provided 
an outline for CA forces to follow in finding the factors undervalued by the market. CA 
forces must begin assessing their activities such as investments in aid saturated capital 
regions in a meaningful way, or risk what Tetlock describes as “blind men arguing over 
the color of the rainbow.”205 Operating under the illusion of insight is no longer acceptable. 
While the population density in these capital regions is much higher, the preponderance of 
evidence suggests groups engaging in political violence operate well outside of these 
regions in isolated communities. Therefore, CA must begin to evaluate the relationships 
among variables while determining the efficacy and efficiency of their interventions as 
Archie Cochrane emphasized.206 The analysis component is key, and adopting a data-
driven approach is one way to study these relationships more effectively. CA forces require 
the methodologies and tools capable of delivering conclusions.  
 
203 The parameters associated with aid saturation vary between 15 and 45 percent of the recipient 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). In fourteen of eighteen years, the U.S. contributed more money in 
excess of 45 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP. U.S. appropriations for Afghanistan surged passed 100 percent 
of Afghanistan’s GDP in 2007 and 2010. John F. Sopko, “Afghanistan Reconstruction: Lessons from the 
Long War,” PRISM 8, no. 2 (2019): 32–33. 
204 Sopko, “Afghanistan Reconstruction.” 
205 Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 32. 
206 Tetlock and Gardner, 31–32. 
67 
Critical to CA’s establishment of a data-driven effort is the focus on generating 
actionable insights and integrating these insights into U.S. operations and policies. These 
insights must reduce the complexity of the operational environment and use visualizations 
to expand the working memory of analysts and decisionmakers. This emphasis on analysis 
will alter the composition and function of CA organizations. Thus, there will be an 
organizational change component to accompany enhanced analytical capability. In Leading 
Change, Kotter provides the roadmap for establishing a data-driven, analytical capability 
using his eight-steps. Blanken and Overbaugh offer CA forces the requirements necessary 
to operate effectively in the future operating environment. Blanken and Overbaugh write: 
Members of the organization will need to be highly qualified and motivated, 
and be required to possess advanced and ongoing training and education. 
The management structure will need to be flexible and accommodating, 
both to dynamic external environment, as well as to its own members. The 
organization as a whole must identify new challenges, devise innovative 
solutions, and be prepared to do so over again as the external situation 
evolves.207 
The personnel, organizational structures, training, flexibility, and sensitivity to threats 
within the environment would indicate this capability should reside in a SOF organization. 
Their description is reminiscent of the description Silver describes in his work The Signal 
and Noise, where statistically-prone professionals leave profitable hedge funds to work for 
an MLB team at a tenth of the wage.208 Hence, CA forces should only select those with 
the motivation and aptitude for analytical work to be trained in this analytical activity. Of 
particular interest, CA forces should emulate these case studies and select internal 
innovators from within their formations rather than continue to abdicate this analytical 
responsibility.209 CA forces possess unique experience and context within the Army and 
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Joint Force, as they are responsible for working to develop a diverse network of UAPs with 
which to collaborate and coordinate analytical activities.210 
CompStat suggests another lesson to CA forces in the form of accountability and 
data. CA forces hold the mandate for civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to affirm 
or refute the validity of the information.211 The lesson CompStat conveys is hidden within 
the process of holding Precinct Chiefs accountable for their lack of reporting the 
information required to align NYPD resources towards crime hotspots. What the story 
doesn’t tell is that Jack Maple created a formal network, where the individual precincts 
were required to report their data to NYPD Headquarters daily. This enabled Jack Maple 
and his team to determine the scope of the crime epidemic facing the city for the first time. 
Before CompStat, crime went underreported, unacknowledged, and without data. It was 
impossible to determine the scope of the criminal activity in the city. In this situation, Seth 
McFate’s comparison of Alice in Wonderland to the strategic atrophy of the United States 
seems appropriate, writing, “If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you 
there.”212 Only after the scope of the problem is ascertained, can one proceed to develop 
an appropriate plan to address the problem.  
CA analysts face a similar task as did the NYPD in New York City. They must 
determine the scope of the problem confronting U.S. forces in the FOEs, particularly in the 
social and political domains. Yet, this task is impossible without the support of CA’s 
interagency, unified action partners, and engagement with indigenous populations and 
institutions. Unfortunately, collaborating with interagency and UAP partners can be 
difficult due to the diversity of relationships, interests, and perspectives. The CA network 
is only as good as the strength of the relationships. Where CompStat held meetings to 
question the Precinct Chiefs about their responses, CA analysts should instead use this their 
collaborative opportunities to glean further insights into the civil component of the FOE 
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and build a contextual understanding of the environment for their supported commanders 
and policymakers.213 
One aspect not common to all of the case studies, yet equally relevant, is the 
adoption of a hybrid model that integrates the data-driven approaches to support its former 
intuitive approaches. The organization model used by the Oakland A’s became the standard 
across baseball following the release of Moneyball. Despite Lewis’s assertions that the 
data-driven model displaced the scouting model, the Oakland A’s did not fire its scouting 
staff. On the contrary, the A’s increased their budget and used their analytical process to 
evaluate players and support the decisions of their scouting staff. Silver notes that in a 
competition between his analytical system, PECOTA, against a scouting staff that the 
scouting staff would win.214 He argues that PECOTA is susceptible to making false-
positive predictions (Type I errors), where scouts are less susceptible to making these 
judgments. Silver is not the only advocate for using data-driven approaches to complement 
human intuition. He describes the prevailing approach as “Teams are increasingly using 
every tool at their disposal to make these decisions.”215 Prominent figures like Philip 
Tetlock, Daniel Kahneman, and Anne Milgram argue that any predictive analytic approach 
should utilize the strengths of both humans and machines.216 They promote using 
algorithms that consistently outperform expert judgment in turbulent environments and 
expert intuition in more consistent environments.217 Therefore, CA forces should begin to 
develop the models and algorithms to balance their current intuitive approaches. The only 
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way to begin this task is to maximize human potential.218 Blanken and Overbaugh 
promoted building a capability for the environment in which an organization is to 
operate.219 As the FOE promises to be an adhocracy, the U.S. Army should begin with the 
provision of advanced education and training initiatives to support its required analytical 
capability. Fortunately, the U.S. Army’s MDO concept and supporting CA future operating 
concept outline both these long-term investments as essential to the effort. 
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IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES 
Consistent with the flow of literature in previous sections, this chapter details the 
current methods CA forces use to generate insights and, subsequently, integrate these 
insights into operational planning and strategy development. CA forces generate insights 
from many sources, yet most of their insights are developed in their tactical capacities 
performing tasks such as civil reconnaissance and civil engagement.220 Unfortunately, the 
amount of knowledge generated from CA analysts is limited. This paradigm may appear 
counterintuitive, but the two largest factors contributing to this reality are the analytical 
techniques prescribed in CA doctrine and the lack of analytical training available for CA 
analysts. Overreliance on systems designed for knowledge management and exploratory 
analysis, outsourcing civil analysis to analysts primarily trained in dynamic and lethal-
targeting, and emphasis on the tactical operations over-analytical functions are other 
factors contributing to this deficiency. Yet these factors are derivative of the analytical 
methods prescribed and a lack of analytical training.221 Consequently, the scope of this 
research is restricted to the analytical techniques and processes prescribed in CA doctrine, 
known as the Civil Information Management (CIM) process. This research evaluates the 
current doctrine, capabilities, and practices within the CA community as well as the 
capabilities proposed by CA Proponent to meet the needs of the FOE to determine if other 
capabilities or techniques are more suitable to the task. 
A. CIVIL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE 
Two documents direct the performance of CA analysis. The primary component of 
CA analysis is CIM. The CIM process is CA’s all-encompassing process that dictates the 
management, analysis, and integration of data to support Army and joint planning 
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Support to the Intelligence Information Report,” Small Wars Journal, accessed November 18, 2019, 
https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/beyond-tacit-approval-embracing-special-operations-civil-
affairs-support-intelligence. 
221 Yager, “Setting the Civil Affairs Analytical Foundation.” 
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functions. The U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs Civil Information Management is considered the 
most authoritative document on CIM because its purpose is to define and standardize every 
component of the CIM process.222 The second document, Joint Civil Information 
Management User’s Manual 2.0, also known as the JCIM User’s Manual 2.0, is a more 
detailed document developed by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for 
personnel assigned as Battalion Civil Information Management Chiefs, responsible for 
executing CIM’s analytical, production, and integration functions.223 USSOCOM created 
the JCIM User’s Manual 2.0 to mitigate systemic issues associated with the shortcomings 
within CA doctrine. Other documents such as Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations 
and its joint equivalent Joint Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations provide 
overviews of CIM, but their primary focus is on the roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and 
composition of CA formations.224 These documents comprise the corpus of CA doctrine 
and constitute the authority on all CAA including its analytical processes and functions. 
B. CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT  
This section introduces Civil Information Management and answers the following 
questions: 
1. What is CIM? 
2. What is the purpose of CIM? 
3. What are the components of CIM? 




222 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management. 
223 United States Special Operations Command, JCIM User’s Manual 2.0. 
224 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Civil-




The Joint Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations defines CIM as the “process 
whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is gathered, 
collated, processed, analyzed, and produced into information products, and 
disseminated.”225 The joint definition is accepted and used in all Army doctrine. CIM is a 
continuous, six-step process that is outlined in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The Civil Information Management Process226  
 
225 Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Civil-Military Operations, GL-6. 
226 Source: Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, 2-4, Figure 2-3. 
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2. Purpose 
The CIM Process is the primary analytical method CA analysts use to generate 
insights into the operational environment. The Army Techniques Publication 3–57.50: 
Civil Affairs Civil Information Management describes the primary purpose of CIM as, “to 
develop data that can be incorporated into the running estimate to help the commander and 
staff clearly understand the status of the civil environment within the OE.”227 More 
specifically, the CIM process supports the development of the following products: 
• Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (JIPOE) 
• Common Operating Picture (COP)  
• Centers of Gravity (COG) 228  
Civil Affairs Civil Information Management states these CIM outputs enhance “enhance 
situational understanding … and facilitate well-informed decision making.”229  
3. Components of CIM 
Figure 2, adapted from graphics in Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, 
provides a more detailed look at the individual steps of the process and the work associated 
with each step.230 A description of each step also reveals the complexity of the tasks 
associated with the CIM process. 
 
227 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, 1-1. 
228 Department of the Army, 1–14; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Civil-Military Operations, C–3. 
Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, 1–14; Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Civil-Military Operations, C–3. 
229 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, 1-1. 
230 Department of the Army, 1-3–1-8.  
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Figure 2. The CIM Process Visualized231  
Each step outlines how civil information is collected, organized, analyzed, and distributed 
throughout the supported headquarters, among interagency and UAPs, and integrated into 
the Army and joint planning processes. A short description of each step further defines the 
process.  
a. Step 1: Collection 
The CIM Process starts with data collection. CA forces collect data using several 
methods. CAA such as civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, assessments, reports, civic 
action programs, and collaboration with UAP within the CA network represent a majority 
of the data collected by CA elements.232 The other methods of data collection include data 
mining and intelligence reporting. Doctrine and other sources suggest that roughly 90 
 
231 Adapted from Department of the Army, 1-3-1–8., Figures 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, and 1-7. 
232 Department of the Army, 1-3-1–5. 
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percent of the civil information collected from open-source sources, which is consistent 
with the data collaboration with UAP.233  
b. Step 2: Collation 
The second step of the CIM process is collation. It describes the process in which 
CA forces manage their civil information mainly through compiling raw data into a 
desirable format for transmission to parent organizations. The compilation includes 
classifying and filtering data into its appropriate medium, as well as grouping information 
into reports for dissemination throughout the CA reporting channels.234 
c. Step 3: Processing  
The third step of the CIM process is processing. It describes the process of 
manipulating data into a useable form. The Department of the Army considers the 
processing step as, “information management, which is the science of using procedures 
and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect 
knowledge products, data, and information.”235 After the data is processed, it is considered 
ready for analysis as civil information. This civil information is then used to update staff 
products, databases, or systems that enable analysis in the following step. Doctrine 
recommends maintaining databases and spreadsheets as methods for data storage and a 
way to keep data organized and available for future use.236 
d. Step 4: Analysis 
The fourth step of the CIM process is analysis. The Army Techniques Publication 
3–57.50: Civil Affairs Civil Information Management describes the analysis step as,  
sifting of information for patterns and indicators of past behaviors or ideas 
that might possess predictive value and application (Figure 1–5, page 1–6). 
Analysis molds information into a knowledge product. The most difficult 
 
233 Department of the Army, 3–7; Nelson, “Analytic Outreach,” 322. 
234 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, 4-1-4–4.  
235 Department of the Army, 1–6. 
236 Department of the Army, paras. 5–13. 
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analysis performed uncovers the “unknown unknowns.” Unknowns are 
indicators of future events previously obscured in the background data. CA 
Soldiers must direct analytical efforts to answer the unknowns in the COP 
rather than exhaustively refining known data. Analysis of civil information 
is similar to the normal enemy force-friendly force analysis process but 
instead focuses on— 
• Identifying mission variables. 
• Identifying operational variables. 
• Identifying COGs. 
• Identifying trends. 
• Conducting predictive analysis. 
• Identifying civil vulnerabilities.237 
Analysis is a critical component because it supports the planning process. Doctrine 
emphasizes this point and covers critical thinking approaches, reasoning type, methods for 
forming a hypothesis and using the scientific method, bias, and recommends different 
forms of analysis.238 Civil Affairs Civil Information Management recommends using the 
following forms of analysis to evaluate the operational environment:  
• Civil considerations analysis—Civil considerations analysis is 
conducted in support of mission analysis based on the mission variables 
outlined in the memory aid METT-TC [mission, enemy, troops, terrain, 
time, and civil considerations. Civil considerations are further 
categorized as Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, 
and Events (ASCOPE)]. 
• Systems analysis—Systems analysis is conducted at operational levels 
and above to identify COGs based in the operational variables outlined 
in the memory aid PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, 
information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time). 
• Nodal analysis—Nodal analysis is the study of the interrelationship of 
nodes … [with the intent to identify critical nodes] whose disruption or 
removal becomes a single trend analysis point failure. 
• Link analysis—Link analysis illustrates the interrelationship of people, 
events, and locations through associations. 
• Geospatial analysis—an analysis of geospatial information in relation to 
significant activity, events, actor, or characteristics (attributes) in relation 
 
237 Department of the Army, 1–5, 6-1-6–16. 
238 Department of the Army, 6-1-6–17. 
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to its location as represented on the earth’s surface, on a map, or 
geospatial information system  
• Trend analysis—Trend analysis identifies patterns and inclinations in 
data.239 
e. Step 5: Production 
The fifth step of the CIM process is production. Production focuses on the creation 
of civil information products easily understood by stakeholders. This civil information is 
produced in the form of “answers to requests for information, civil information for the 
common operating picture (COP), centers of gravity, civil considerations products, and 
updates to ongoing CAO assessments, area studies, or running estimates.”240 The products 
created include maps, link diagrams, reports, presentations, and briefing material.241  
f. Step 6: Dissemination 
The sixth, and final, step of the CIM process is dissemination. Dissemination 
focuses on delivering tailored products to meet the needs of civil information stakeholders. 
Examples include “integration into the COP, civil information repositories, reports, update 
briefs, or online databases.”242 Typically, the dissemination of civil information products 
is not limited to a supported headquarters because the CA network includes both 
interagency and unified action partners. Among these products are intergovernmental 
organizations (IGO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), indigenous people and 
institutions (IPI), and actors from across civil society. Doctrine lists direct dissemination 
of products through distribution lists, granting access to systems, sharing with 
multinational and unified action partners’ considerations, and updating the common 
operating picture as the preferred methods of dissemination.243  
 
239 Army Techniques Publication 3–57.50: Civil Affairs Civil Information Management presents nodal 
analysis as a blending of link analysis and systems analysis. Department of the Army, 6-4-6–6. 
240 Department of the Army, 1-6-1–7. 
241 Department of the Army, 7-1-7–4. 
242 Department of the Army, 1–7. 
243 Department of the Army, 8-1-8–3. 
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C. CIM COMPONENTS 
The CIM process can be broken down into data management, and data analysis and 
production components. The data management component is focused on the collection, 
organization, packaging, and transmission of information from the tactical units to the CIM 
Cell responsible for the higher-level analysis. Organizing, manipulating, and integrating a 
prolific volume of reports, assessments, and contact reports are at times difficult to manage, 
depending on the volume and complexity of the information involved in the first three steps 
of the CIM process. The complexity of information will also vary depending on the 
preferred analytical technique applied in the analysis step. The complexity of the analytical 
method chosen will determine the intensity of the data processing effort. These steps are 
essential in setting the foundation for data analysis. “Garbage in, garbage out” is an axiom 
in many data analysis communities and alludes to the fact that any analytical function 
depends on the validity and reliability of the data and assumptions supporting it. For this 
purpose, academics and researchers consistently limit their research to only the most 
reliable, accurate, and reputable data sources available. The first three steps of the CIM 
Process encompass this data management component and they are crucial to data analysis. 
The data analysis and production component in CIM steps four through six focus 
on the synthesis, interpretation, communication, and integration of civil information. While 
each step of the CIM process is essential, this research focuses on the analysis step of the 
CIM process because it dictates how all of the other steps are organized and executed. In 
other words, the types of analysis an analyst selects will determine what information is 
gathered and how the information will be coded and manipulated to meet the geospatial, 
relational, lexical, or temporal analysis requirements. Furthermore, an analyst’s selection 
of an analytical method also determines the types of conclusions and products needed to 
communicate their insights. For these reasons, this research considers the analysis step the 
most important step within the CIM Process.  
Where these steps are significant and relevant, the focus of this research is on the 
analytical methods employed once the data reaches the CIM Cell. It evaluates the analytical 
methods employed by CA analysts. There are significant implications attributed to how 
data is collected and managed, as in the earlier cases of Moneyball and CompStat, yet the 
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analytical methods employed by the CIM Cell will dictate how subordinate CA forces 
collect and manage their data. For example, if relational data is used, then the data 
collection will differ depending on whether CA analysts use Social Network Analysis or 
Link Analysis techniques. Since each method relies on different assumptions. Thus, the 
information requirements for CA elements change depending on the analytical methods 
employed.  
The majority of CA products (outputs) such as reports, staff products, and briefings 
support formal U.S. Army or Joint doctrinal planning processes as inputs. These formal 
planning processes are the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) or Joint Operations 
Planning Process (JOPP). Therefore, Army and joint planning information requirements 
dictate the questions driving the selection of analytical techniques. CA analysis is only as 
good as the questions its leadership asks and the analytical techniques at its disposal. Thus, 
the limitations consist of the quality of questions, supported commanders, other 
stakeholders, and CA analysts who ask about their OE, as well as types of analytical 
methods at the CIM Cell’s disposal. 
D. DATA AND REPORTING MEDIA 
The majority of data supporting the analytical functions of the CIM process come 
from tactical CA elements and their headquarters element in the form of a Regional Civil 
Military Support Element (RCMSE) or Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). Data 
comes in the form of situation reports (SITREP), operational summaries (OPSUM), contact 
reports (CONREP), key leader engagement (KLE) worksheets, assessments of 
infrastructure, and storyboards (SB). All CIM products are descriptive in nature and 
reported in a narrative form. All post-mission products are prepared in Microsoft Word, 
PowerPoint, or Excel. Depending on the element and their deployed capabilities, some CA 
elements provide shapefiles and database files with vector data representing points of 
interest in their OE, plotted during their operations. These reports and media comprise the 
civil information inputs used by a particular CIM analysis step. 
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E. ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES RECOMMENDED IN DOCTRINE 
There are a variety of analysis techniques recommended in CA doctrine. Civil 
Affairs Civil Information Management recommends using six different forms of analysis 
supported by other associative and analytical tools to support these techniques.244 These 
recommended forms of analysis can be categorized as geospatial, relational, and temporal. 
This section will consolidate what doctrine attempts to communicate.  
1. Civil Considerations Analysis and Systems Analysis 
Civil considerations analysis and systems analysis must be combined under systems 
analysis. While these analyses are conducted separately and independently to support 
Army and joint planning frameworks, CA elements combine these two analyses into a 
targeted approach known as the PMESII-PT/ASCOPE Crosswalk which categorizes 
information into components where the civil considerations and operational variables 
overlap. The synthesis of these techniques forms a framework used to identify 
vulnerabilities within the civil component. The synthesis also comprises a critical 
component of determining the COGs. The PMESII-PT/ASCOPE Crosswalk is depicted in 
Figure 3. This framework uses the vulnerabilities identified in the analysis to determine the 
root cause of instability or conflict.  
 




Figure 3. PMESII-PT/ASCOPE Crosswalk245 
The process continues using the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework 
(ICAF), Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF), or District 
Stability Framework (DSF) to identify root causes of local conflict using cultural and 
perception data, in addition to evaluating sources of both stability (resiliencies) and 
instability (triggers). The ICAF and DSF act as Structured Analytic Techniques (SAT), 
which add rigor, transparency of assumptions, and guide judgments towards more objective 
ends.246 Figure 4 is a representation of the TCAPF, which is an adaptation of the ICAF 
and DSF.  
Following these analyses, the CA element complete the process using systems 
analysis to determine the local COG, analyzing critical capabilities, critical requirements, 
and critical vulnerabilities. These analytical processes are used to determine where CA 
elements should focus their efforts and have the greatest impact on reducing the drivers of 
instability and conflict. 
 
245 Source: Department of the Army, Civil Military Engagement, 5–14., Figure 5-14. 
246 Randolph H. Pherson and Richards J. Heuer Jr., “Structured Analytic Techniques: A New 
Approach to Analysis,” in Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives, Second 
edition (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 231–48. 
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Figure 4. Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework247 
2. Link Analysis 
Link analysis is an important form of relational analysis that visualizes the 
relationships and associations between actors, organizations, places, and things. CA 
doctrine defines link analysis as the following: 
Link analysis is the process of identifying and analyzing relationships 
between personnel, contacts, associations, events, activities, organizations, 
and networks to determine key or significant links. CIM analysts use link 
analysis to determine who is involved with whom and how they are 
involved. Link analysis tools include association matrices, activity matrices, 
and link diagrams.248 
Doctrine recommends developing link diagram charts using association matrices and 
activities matrices. These matrices are important because they highlight associations 
between relevant actors and events. and when combined into a link diagram, display links 
to visually form a more contextual and intuitive understanding of the interrelationships 
 
247 Source: Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, 6–8., Figure 6-3.  
248 Department of the Army, 6–7. 
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between relevant factors. Figures 5 is a representation of a diagram that relates to actors, 
organizations, events, locations, and physical objects. 
 
CA doctrine suggests, “Entities are linked together through associations, locations, and 
events. This offers the greatest potential for further analysis. When individuals are only 
linked to individuals, the only association they have to the rest of the link chart is through 
another person, failing to link the entity by membership in a group or an association with 
another entity or an event.” 249 
Figure 5. Link Diagram250 
 
249 Department of the Army, 6–11. 
250 Source: Department of the Army, 6–11., Figure 6-7. 
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3. Nodal Analysis 
The purpose of nodal analysis is to synthesize systems analysis and link analysis. 
Within CA doctrine, Army Techniques Publication 3–57.50: Civil Affairs Civil Information 
Management defines nodal analysis as the following:  
Nodal analysis reveals the interrelationship between people, organizations, 
entities, and locations. The individual nodes represent complex 
relationships between a person, place, or physical thing that are a 
fundamental component of a system and link the behavioral, physical, or 
functional relationships between the nodes. Critical nodes are those 
identified as being essential and whose disruption or removal becomes a 
single trend analysis point failure.251  
Figure 6 is a depiction of a nodal analysis visualization. Nodal analysis is similar 
to the PMESII-PT/ASCOPE because it compares relevant areas, actors, and organizations 
across the operational variables. More importantly, it displays centers of gravity and their 
relationships to their supporting structures. These supporting structures defined as the 
interrelationships between actors, places, or things that determine which nodes require 
disruption, destruction, or support. 
  
 
251 Department of the Army, 6-7-6–9. 
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The nodal analysis representation commonly found in CA doctrine. This representation is 
useful to CA analysts for several reasons. One of the most important reasons is its display 
of the operational environment as more than a military problem and any solutions will 
require effort in other domains. The fusion of link analysis and systems analysis is useful 
communicating the importance of relationships across the operational variables. 
Figure 6. Nodal Analysis Representation252 
4. Geospatial Analysis 
CA doctrine recommends using geospatial analysis to support the commander’s 
visualization of the operating environment. It defines geospatial analysis as  
analyzing imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and 
visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities 
that are of interest to the supported commander. Geospatial analysis 
produces imagery-based products and geospatial information in a GIS 
common to the entire DOD that is designed to capture, store, manipulate, 
and manage all types of geographically referenced data.253 
CA doctrine defines geospatial information as  
analyzing imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and 
visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities 
that are of interest to the support commander. Geospatial analysis produces 
 
252 Source: Department of the Army, Civil Military Engagement, 5–33., Figure 5-13. 




imagery-based products and geospatial information in a GIS common to the 
entire DOD that is designed to capture, store, manipulate, and manage all 
types of geographically referenced data.254 
Geospatial analysis is important for three reasons. First, it provides the foundation for 
creating a COP, which helps the supported commander visualize the relevant aspects of the 
civil component. Second, geospatial analysis shows the complex interrelationships 
between operational variables and civil considerations identified in the PMESII-PT/
ASCOPE synthesis. Finally, geospatial analysis is important because it adds context when 
fused with other analytical methods. Hence, it has relevance in support of other products 
and staff planning processes. Figure 7 depicts this last point in a geospatial analysis of the 
civil considerations.  
  
Figure 7. Geospatial Analysis and Civil Considerations Overlay255 
 
254 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, 6–12. 
255 Source: Department of the Army, 6–13., Figure 6–8 
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5. Trend Analysis  
Trend analysis focuses on the temporal component of the civil component and the 
operational environment. It links actors, groups, organizations, events, and attributes in 
space and time. The primary purpose of trend analysis is to analyze relationships and 
patterns of events and behavior over time. Many systems of record use timelines, graphics, 
and wheels charts to identify trends.  
F. INTEGRATING FUNCTIONS 
The CIM process identifies its integrating functions in its dissemination step. These 
integrating functions determine how civil information gets communicated to other staff 
sections and integrated into doctrinal planning processes. 
1. Doctrinal Outputs of CIM 
The doctrinal outputs of CIM are the information products and inputs other staff 
functions require to develop plans and operations. These staff products differ in size, scope, 
complexity, and purpose, as necessary, to support specific staff information requirements 
and functions. These CIM outputs include the following:  
• Common Operating Picture—Staff situational awareness tool that visually 
depicts the relevant aspects of the OE to support the supported 
commander’s understanding of the civil component  
• Civil Affairs Operations Estimate—Comprise of Area Studies, Civil 
Affairs Assessments, and Surveys 
• Annex K and Annex G—Annexes to Operations and Execution Orders in 
Army (Annex K) and Joint Doctrine (Annex G) 
• Annex V and Annex P—Interagency Coordination and Host-Nation 
Support Annexes to Operations and Execution Orders  
The value of each CIM product diminishes as the information enters more formal planning 
processes because the civil information is stripped to suit relevant military information 
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purposes. For example, the COP and Civil Affairs Operations estimate will contain more 
context-rich information than the annexes.  
2. Civil Information in Support of Targeting Frameworks 
CA elements contribute to joint and dynamic targeting processes through its 
systems analysis outputs such as the identification of COGs, critical capabilities, 
requirements, and vulnerabilities. CA elements also contribute to the non-lethal targeting 
process in two ways. They recommend locations possessing critical infrastructure or 
capabilities for non-strike lists, and courses of action to influence specific targets using 
non-lethal means. CA planners participating in the joint targeting working groups and 
targeting boards play an important role in integrating civil information into operations and 
operational planning at each echelon.  
3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 
(JIPOE) 
The U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activity program plays 
a significant role in integrating relevant civil information into the broader intelligence 
community.256 CIM is not an intelligence activity, yet military intelligence officers 
supporting CA units use debriefings of CA elements as a means of answering intelligence 
information requirements (IIR).257 CA elements use IIRs are an informal metric used to 
internally assess the value and performance of CA elements, when properly supported with 
qualified military intelligence officials. This specific support integrates civil information 
relevant to the intelligence community into the human intelligence reporting systems for 
interagency distribution. Historically, this specific support is either sourced organically or 
sourced from military intelligence units supporting either the Theater Special Operations 
Command (TSOC) or Army Component Command (ACC). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
 
256 Samuel L. Hayes Jr., Daniel K. Chaves, and Christopher W. Tunning, “Operationalizing Civil 
Affairs’ Value, CIM: Breaking Partner Silos to Illuminate and Shape Network Warfare” (PowerPoint, 
Commander’s Initiatives Group, Fort Stewart, GA, November 2016); Rita Johnson, “IWTC Virginia Beach 
Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities Course Earns Joint Certification,” CHIPS, January 19, 
2019, https://www.doncio.navy.mil/CHIPS/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=9936. 
257 Ordiway, “Beyond Tacit Approval.” 
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that CA elements organically supported by specifically-trained military intelligence 
officers create more effective integration practices in the form of significantly increased 
IIR production. Thus, it seems that organic intelligence support provides more effective 
integration for the intelligence community and its interagency partners.  
4. Integration Value of Doctrinal Outputs 
While the staff inputs provide a significant volume of information and rich context, 
the quality of the information degrades as inputs are entered into the standard formats 
needed for Army planning processes. Standing documents such as the Annex K and Annex 
G include lists, plans, orders, and narratives as information inputs. The purpose of these 
documents is to provide an informative overview including as much information as 
possible to support parallel planning processes. Visualizations of data are not typically 
embedded in these documents, yet civil affairs analysis products would be included in the 
appendices which adds significant value to these standard doctrinal products. Standard 
formats are necessary for efficient information consumption, planning, and subsequent 
analysis, but there is a cost associated with limiting the analysis to the production of 
doctrinal inputs. A reduced synthesized context that is difficult to explain and understand 
in a non-visual format may result.  
The functional owner is also a factor in civil information value reduction. For 
example, CAA and products support both operations and intelligence staff functions. As 
such, the civil information disseminated supports their activity and priorities, which at 
times contrasts with CAA priorities pertaining to informational, social, and political 
domains. Military commanders are primarily concerned with the military and security 
issues underpinning their purpose and mission. Their secondary and tertiary priorities are 
often the focus of CAA. The systems analysis depicted in Figure 6 displays this point well. 
It shows the military component as one of many components interrelated in a complex 
problem. Unfortunately, this misalignment of priorities leads to a reduced understanding 
of the OE and suboptimal decision outcomes. CA elements recognize this fact and many 
times create separate products to meet and communicate their specific contextual needs.  
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G. TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED ANALYSIS CAPABILITIES AND 
PROGRAMS OF RECORD 
Technology-enabled analysis and programs of record streamline the two-step 
process of generating insights and integrating these insights by consolidating all of the tools 
and products into one digital environment. CA elements leverage a variety of technology-
enabled analysis systems to store, analyze, produce, and distribute fused civil and threat 
information to its partners. These information systems enable more efficient collaboration, 
analysis, and fusion with consolidated access to a variety of analytical tools used to perform 
relational, geospatial, and temporal analysis. For example, Palantir includes analytical tools 
that function like Analyst Notebook and geospatial tools that operate similarly to Google 
Earth within in its Gotham and Gaia platforms. The development of private and shared 
workspaces for collaborations across staff functions with publishing capability makes it 
easy to disseminate information to a wide variety of interested partners.  
In addition to the consolidation of analytical tools, these information systems use 
backend data science to create structured datasets from unstructured data. This 
functionality creates efficient data structures to facilitate data management and analysis 
with one significant downside. The backend transformations creating these data structures 
only exist to support the functionality of their system. To complicate matters further, most 
systems do not integrate data from other information systems, as they operate with different 
data structures. These information systems have different strengths and weaknesses and 
can be leveraged to support the specific needs of the Geographic Combatant Command 
(GCC) and component commands. Unfortunately, each GCC, TSOC, and component 
command have their preference, which makes the consolidation of data within information 
systems impossible.258 Figure 8 highlights the variety of information systems used by CA 
units in different theaters.  
Although not a complete list, the following systems comprise the majority of 
information systems and analytical environments used by CA analysts.  
 
258 United States Special Operations Command, JCIM User’s Manual 2.0, iii. 
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• Palantir (Gotham and Gaia) 
• Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) 
• International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE) 
• ArcGIS 
• Protected Information Exchange (PiX) 
• Defense Common Ground System (DCGS) 
• Civil Information Management Data Processing System (CIMDPS) 
• All Partners Access Network (APAN)  
Of note, the preferences in systems differ based on the component supported. CA 
units supporting SOF elements use Palantir because it is the preferred platform of their 
supported unit. Equally, CIDNE and INDURE are used predominantly in Title 10 
environments, or theaters engaged in armed conflict such as the United States Central 
Command.  
Palantir and CIDNE serve a similar function as CA elements use both systems for 
reporting, analysis, and dissemination techniques. These two classified systems are the 
most widely used in the CA community.  
ArcGIS is the most prominent government geospatial analysis system used by the 
geospatial engineers in the CA CIM Cells to support geospatial product development.  
DCGS provided a common analytical platform for all Army units, however, 
Palantir emerged as a better analytical option to support SOF. As a result, Palantir is 
building the Army’s new information system to meet their changing analytical needs.  
PiX is an unclassified information system that hosts a team of open-source analysts 
with relevant regional experience capable of creating tailored geospatial and temporal 
products for their users. PiX also hosts collaborative environments to connect users with 
similar areas of interest.  
93 
CIMDPS is an information system evolved from its predecessor, the Civil Affairs 
Operations System (CAOS). Although developed specifically for CA forces, the system 
functioned as a repository with little analytical capability. As a result of the limited utility 
offered in the system, CA units looked to other systems to meet their analytical needs. 
APAN is an unclassified platform, developed by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), used to collaborate with interagency, multinational, and IPI partners. 
There is no Common Access Card requirement, which makes it an attractive option for 
sharing information products with partners outside of the USG.  
 
The USACAPOC CIM Cell created this CIM COP from a 2015 survey of all CA units to determine which 
information systems they used to meet their repository, analytical, production, and dissemination needs. 
Figure 8. Civil Information Management Common Operating Picture259 
 
 
259 Source: United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command Civil 
Information Management Cell, “Civil Information Management COP” (PowerPoint, Civil Information 
Management Common Operating Picture Update, Fort Bragg, NC, July 2015). 
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H. CIM OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
There are several operational challenges associated with CIM. USSOCOM created 
the Joint Civil Information Management User’s Manual 2.0 to highlight these operational 
challenges and clarify the analytical techniques outlined in doctrine stating, “Each Service 
has experienced similar challenges when managing civil information and difficulty 
collaborating with civilian stakeholders without a standard methodology.”260 Operational 
challenges for all services and interagency partners include: 
1. No common language defining the civil domain  
1. No common reporting standards 
2. No common graphic symbols  
3. No common naming convention 
4. No common data collection procedures  
5. No common data storage procedures and standards 
6. No interoperable systems for storing and transmitting civil information, 
7. No common system for relief in place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) 
data/information transfer 
8. No common education or training for managing civil information261 
The JCIM User’s Manual 2.0 highlights the effects of these challenges as: 
These challenges degrade the JFC’s ability to achieve unity of effort among 
military, government, humanitarian assistance (HA), and development 
communities. Standardized TTP for collecting, consolidating, and sharing 
civil information mitigates some of these challenges and supports decision-
making and unity of effort. The impact of these challenges on stakeholders 
in the operating environment includes: 
1. Incomplete situational awareness of civil domain  
2. Redundant efforts and wasted resources262 
These operational challenges degrade the quality of civil information available to 
supported commanders. Incompatible systems and differing reporting standards are the 
results of poor data management functions that diminish the efficiency and effectiveness 
of analysis due to data availability and data quality. Fortunately, the CA community has 
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mitigated or resolved many of these operational challenges. Unit Standard Operating 
procedures, doctrine, and systems are now streamlined to fit the component, TSOC, and 
GCC standards. USSOCOM published the JCIM User’s Manual 2.0 in an attempt to 
standardize CIM across CA formations in SOF, general purpose forces, and reserve 
component.263 Expanded use of systems such as Palantir and CIDNE streamlined the CIM 
process and reduced the criticality of the naming conventions that were fundamental to 
functional CIM in the older systems. In other words, in systems capable of querying 
keywords across all reports in the system, it is less critical to organize the naming 
conventions in a manner to aid a user’s search for relevant information. Therefore, while 
important for organizational purposes and internal functionality, naming conventions are 
less relevant in technology-enabled systems. Expanded use of Palantir and CIDNE also 
aided the data collection and storage procedures to meet the organizational requirements 
in the system. The transition to advanced technologically-enabled analysis systems 
mitigated most of the operational challenges associated with CIM. 
I. ANALYTIC CAPABILITIES FOR THE FUTURE OPERATING 
ENVIRONMENT  
As discussed in the introduction and literature review, the consensus among 
security experts is clear in their perspective on the future operating environment. They 
argue that future operating environments promise to be more turbulent and complex, 
leaving traditional approaches unviable for producing outcomes favorable to the U.S. and 
its interests.264 The U.S. Army’s MDO and supporting CA future operating concept 
outlined in the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond indicate the role of CA forces will expand 
as the preponderance of problems are linked to the shifts in human geography, governance, 
and the privatization of violence.265 The changes in human geography encompass trending 
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issues such as migration, demographics, and urbanization. State authority, legitimacy, 
identity, and polarization are forecasted to become governance issues in the future. The 
privatization of violence raises different concerns and contributes to the irregular warfare 
capabilities of U.S. adversaries and competitors. As these groups expand their influence 
and control under the threshold of armed conflict, they exploit the seams between civil and 
military problems. CA forces will require a greater understanding of their future 
operational environments to confront this growing threat and increase the likelihood of 
effectively and efficiently securing favorable outcomes. Thus, the predominant method of 
understanding is the concept of CIM and civil knowledge integration (CKI).  
1. Required Analytical Capabilities 
In the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond, the Civil Affairs Proponent outlines its 
components of the solution to challenges in the future operating environment.266 One 
concept central to the solution is CKI. Figure 9 is a representation of the commander’s 
intent and operating cycle of the proposed solution. It highlights the role of CKI in support 
of the CA operating concept. The CA Proponent highlighted several innovative analytical 
capabilities and bodies of knowledge, as needed, to “manage (process, evaluate, and track) 
domain-relevant civil information and actors over time. CA forces produce civil 
knowledge, integrate it with intelligence and other information, and effectively target the 
civil component through the development and employment of civil networks.”267 
 
266 U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, Civil Affairs: 2025 
and Beyond, 7–10. 
267 U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, 7. 
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Figure 9 is the visual depiction of the commander’s intent for CA forces in and under the threshold 
of armed conflict. CA forces are tasked with continuously producing civil knowledge and integrating 
it with information from other sources to understand the civil component of the operational 
environment. Once understood, CA forces leverage their civil networks to support the activities 
necessary to secure favorable outcomes and return to competition.268  
Figure 9. Components of the Solution269 
The Civil Affairs Proponent highlights the following analytical capabilities as being 
necessary to understand, anticipate, shape and exploit the human geography in FOEs: 
• The CA force must be fully capable of persistent CR and CE across 
domains, to include cyberspace, and of building and maintaining a global 
lexicon of military-relevant local, regional, and transregional civil 
information and civil (political, economic, social, infrastructure, and 
information) networks.  
• A future expanded practice of civil information management (CIM) 
applies civil expertise and predictive analysis to evaluate, model, and 
anticipate human geography, which includes the decision making of 
relevant actors. 
• CA forces must combine social science, advanced analytical practices, 
and technology platforms to interpret civil information from complex 
datasets; identify networks, patterns, and critical information; and 
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project changing conditions in human geography. Examples of 
technology-enabled social analysis include predictive analysis, relational 
database management, spatial analysis, data mining, link analysis, 
content analysis, and sentiment analysis.  
• Future CA technologies must be able to input and output in formats that 
are compatible with the Army’s Common Operating Environment 
(COE) and Command Post Computing Environment (CPCE) currently 
being developed so that information can be mutually shared in a timely 
and efficient manner that facilitates rapid action and response.270 
They go on to propose developing the following areas of expertise in future CA Soldiers: 
• The CA Soldier’s future as subject matter expert on all civil information 
across time and space requires a long-term investment with extensive 
training and education. The future CA Soldier must possess regionally 
relevant language and interpersonal capabilities to interface efficiently 
and effectively with the civil component.  
• CA Soldiers require an effective understanding of political science, rule 
of law, public health, public administration, economics, and social 
anthropology to understand and effect change within the human 
geography.  
• The future CA Soldier needs a professional working knowledge of 
information technology to efficiently navigate cyberspace and applicable 
programming.  
• Future CA Soldiers apply descriptive and inferential statistics in order to 
effectively measure and evaluate civil trends and the effects of CAA. 
• Future CA elements utilize technology-enabled research and analysis 
methods to effectively identify, evaluate, engage, and network relevant 
civil actors according to interests, functions, capabilities, and 
vulnerabilities (IFCV). Future CA forces navigate cyberspace to detect, 
analyze, develop, and employ social media and online civil networks to 
shape local, regional, and transregional information environments and 
leverage civic action.  
• Future CAA form an integral part of unconventional warfare. CA forces 
are responsible for developing the civil component of resistance, to 
include its political legitimacy and governmental capabilities. CAA are 
critical to the consolidation of the gains of conventional and 
unconventional warfare, as well as the transition from civil unrest to 
stable governance and legitimate administration.271 
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This list of requirements is extensive. There are numerous references to expanding the 
analytical quotient of the force. Fusing these capabilities with technology-enabled research 
and analysis methods and expanded bodies of knowledge in anthropology and social 
science would improve the overall performance of the CAA, and subsequently the MDO 
formations they support.  
2. Civil Affairs Force Modernization Assessment  
The Civil Affairs Force Modernization Directorate is in the process of completing 
their first Civil Affairs Force Modernization Assessment (FMA).272 This is a 
comprehensive effort to evaluate CA forces and the capabilities they require to support 
future MDO formations. This FMA identified a majority of the priority CA capability 
shortfalls from the functional needs assessment (FNA) fell within the CKI category. In fact, 
31 of 126 capability gaps identified by the directorate during their FNA were former civil 
knowledge integration tasks.273 Figure 10 shows the distribution of old core competency 
tasks.  
First impressions note that the FNA identified more issues with the CAO and CMO 
mission command tasks, yet when further analyzed by priority the picture changes 
considerably. This number expands to 47 of 126 when former preparation of the 
environment tasks is included, which closely resembles the CKI tasks. These capability 
gaps exist across all echelons of CA elements including within the Brigade Combat Teams 
(BCT), component command, TSOCs, and Theater Civil Affairs Planning Teams 
(TCAPT). Of the tasks ranked as top priorities, 16 of 24 are civil knowledge integration 
tasks with severities of failure ranging from critical to catastrophic. The FMA Directorate 
team listed the probability of failure of all top priority tasks as frequent. Figure 11 displays 
the numbers when these categories of shortfalls are considered by priority. The graphic 
displays the number of old core competency tasks in the first two priorities. These results 
indicate that while mission command carries the majority of capability shortfall, the 
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priority of the needs resides with CKI, which highlights a clear need for stronger analytics 
and integrating processes.  
 
Figure 10. Number of Functional Needs Assessment Capability Shortfall 
Tasks by Core Competency Category274 
The CA FMA also noted a need to expand the number of analysts and diverse skills 
to support organic CA formations at the company-level. They would be part of the 
Intelligence, Cyber, Electronic Warfare, Signal (ICEWS) formation within a Multi-
Domain Task Force (MDTF). The intent is to add a robust capability to support CAA. 
Therefore, the CA Proponent’s Force Modernization Directorate identified the lack of CA 
analysis capabilities and suggested that adding more horsepower in the form of organically 
grown support to the CA Company as a MDTF. 
 
274 Adapted from U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, “Civil 




When the priority of needs in the FNA are considered, the results show the preponderance of critical 
needs rests with CKI. The failures associated with CKI are greater in severity than their CAO/CMO 
Mission Command tasks, which dominate priorities two and five. This shows that the Civil Affairs 
Proponent considers CKI their highest priority.  
Figure 11. Number of Capability Gaps by Core Competency and Priority275 
J. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Previous sections in this chapter discussed the current and desired future analytical 
capabilities of CA forces to combat irregular threats in future operating environments. The 
effective and efficient integration of civil information and insights into both Army and joint 
planning processes will depend on CA’s ability to execute CIM and CKI tasks. Currently, 
CIM is the primary analysis and integration function for CA elements to provide relevant 
civil information and analysis to their supported commander and network of partners. The 
assessment of relevant literature, case studies, doctrine, and force modernization plans 
 
275 Adapted from U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent. 
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reveal several prominent themes. The synthesis of these documents is important to 
understanding the way forward for CA analytical capabilities and pitfalls associated with 
those paths. There are consistent systemic issues present in CIM that undermine the 
strategic value position of the CA Branch, some of these need to be accepted as irrelevant 
if new methodologies are considered – others require attention in the form of investments 
in human potential. The battlefield has changed in character and dimensions. CA forces 
must adopt innovative analytical tools and frameworks to produce the insights necessary 
to inform both operational and strategic approaches that result in favorable outcomes for 
the U.S. and its allies.  
1. Doctrine, Training, and Investment in Human Potential 
The literature frames the problems associated with analyzing the civil component 
using the methods prescribed in CA doctrine. Liddick et al., Krohley, and Yager provide 
relevant criticisms of CA doctrine and its inadequacy in supporting advanced analytical 
functions.276 Krohley provides the strategic purpose of CIM noting CA forces must focus 
their efforts towards developing insights into the socio-political networks supporting 
irregular threats, and integrating those insights into sophisticated targeting mechanisms 
designed to erode the threat’s base of support.277 These are strategic points that attribute 
U.S. failures in COIN environments to the U.S. forces’ inability to analyze the civil 
component of the operational environment competently. There is ample evidence to 
support this conclusion, as Zachary Shore’s offering in A Sense of the Enemy, Clark and 
Eddy’s in Warnings, and Blanken et al. in Assessing War. All make the same point in 
different ways.278 They point to the underlying misalignment of incentives, motivations, 
and the inherent difficulty in assessing the human domain. Hayes and Nguyen’s capstone 
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work at the Naval Postgraduate School captured this point in a different way. The point is 
that the CA leadership’s continued rebranding and overselling the value of CA analytical 
capabilities damages CA’s reputation and brand.279  
Perhaps the largest confirmation of Krohley’s point is Flynn et al.’s assessment that 
civil information was severely underutilized by military intelligence analysts.280 It is a 
testament to the lack of fusion and synthesis associated with the information provided by 
CA forces, despite a steady volume of reports and information generated through its partner 
network. However, it would be folly to attribute these integration failures to the people. As 
Edward Deming, the founder of Total Quality Management, identified it was not the 
person, but the process.281 He dedicated three chapters of his book, The New Economics, 
to communicate this point. His methods revolutionized management processes for 
Japanese companies such as Toyota. The result was astounding with Japanese auto 
manufacturers seizing a significant share of the market from their American counterparts. 
These factors bring about a relevant question. Why would CA continue to champion the 
same methodology and processes if their performance is known to be ineffective, or at the 
very least inconclusive? Yager provides some insight into why CA analytical processes 
struggle to make sense of things, something the JCIM User’s Manual refers to as 
“sensemaking.”282  
Yager’s criticism of CA doctrine is brutal. He emphasizes CIM doctrine 
recommends using useful analytical techniques without providing a standard method of 
executing its analysis recommendations.283 CIM doctrine deprives CA practitioners of the 
tools necessary to reach conclusions. Yager describes CA analysis as building descriptive 
products for others to analyze. The Army Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations 
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highlights that CA analysis is a joint effort with military intelligence professionals.284 The 
caveat to this point is that military intelligence analysts are responsible for analyzing the 
threats, not the civil component of the environment. The common counterargument to this 
is that CA analysis is the responsibility of CA forces at every echelon, yet these forces are 
not trained in how to determine statistical relationships between variables. Thus, the 
uncertainty associated with assessing the effects of CAO becomes apparent. How do CA 
forces know if their actions were effective? How do they know if they used their resources 
efficiently? They cannot be certain because, despite their persistent presence, they lack the 
means to test the effectiveness of their operations and strategic approaches. Does this 
argument sound familiar? These are the same arguments encountered in the case studies 
across the MLB, law enforcement, and medicine. Archie Cochrane had to destroy the 
counterargument to his advocacy of evidence-based medicine in his book, Effectiveness 
and Efficiency: Random Reflections on Health Services, for the medicine to cease its 
resistance to change.285 He understood the only alternative to controlled testing is the 
illusion of insight.286 Similarly, CA must test their conclusions and find new ways to see 
their operational environment objectively. In doing so, they can dispel the false narratives 
and influence efforts towards more efficient conclusions that close the Clausewitzian Gap.  
Unfortunately, the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond identifies the components of the 
solution in the same way CA doctrine articulates its recommended analytical processes.287 
It identifies a laundry list of required analytical capabilities, some of which would greatly 
enhance the CA’s analytical capabilities. The focus on managing complex data sets, 
database management, and modeling are steps towards building a data science and open-
source data analysis capability. These tools are needed to share and consume data across 
platforms and share with data fluent partners. The document also prescribes developing a 
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predictive analysis, which requires a thorough understanding of statistics and other 
mathematical applications. These capabilities will require significant investment from the 
CA Branch to develop and retain. Continuing education and training will be required to 
preserve these skills. Technology-enabled analysis makes these skills possible, yet these 
processes cannot be ceded solely to machines. Even Nate Silver’s system, PECOTA, is 
prone to issuing false positives where human intuition would not.288 
Unfortunately, most of these skills require a graduate-level education to employ 
efficiently and effectively. If CA forces assessed and selected its population on their 
aptitude and potential to fill analytical roles, then the process of developing the capability 
would be a far easier task. Other organizations in the intelligence community view 
intelligence analysis as it’s a distinct discipline, bordering on a vocation.289 They take 
intelligence analysis seriously, and the Civil Affairs Branch does not from an institutional 
standpoint. Three pieces of evidence that support this claim. First, CA analysts rely on 
external support to analyze their data and develop their own conclusions.290 Next, despite 
the effort applied in the aforementioned types of analysis outlined in the CIM process, CA 
forces make inductive arguments based on their observations. There is no testing capability 
to determine the validity of their claims. Finally, the primary responsibility for executing 
the CIM process at the team level rests with the CA Team Leader and CA 
Noncommissioned Officer, the most inexperienced members on most CA teams.291 CA 
forces must be prepared to approach their analysis of the civil component with the same 
rigor as their intelligence community counterparts. 
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One conclusion drawn from the literature is the investment in human potential 
necessary to meet the analysis capability outlined in Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond.292 
The Civil Affairs Branch is fortunate to possess a depth of talent within its ranks. Many of 
the successes claimed by CA formations can be attributed to the diverse make-up of its 
members. The reason for episodic analytical brilliance is often due to soldiers with a 
previous background in data science or intelligence analysis. This statement is supported 
by Eric Yager’s argument when he states, “the actual application of data analytics to CA 
operations is either never done or is relegated to CA practitioners who previously studied 
data analytics.”293 Civil Affairs has the components to conduct data analytics, but without 
formal training, it cannot assemble the pieces. The problem starts with doctrine and 
exacerbated by CA forces’ focus on supporting tactical operations at the expense of 
supporting operational and strategic echelons.294 
2. Organizational Design 
In their response to Flynn et al.’s argument that the military intelligence 
organizational structure required a drastic reform to remain relevant and meet the needs of 
counterinsurgency operations, Blanken and Overbaugh suggest that an organization’s 
design must complement the environment in which it is designed to operate.295 Their 
description of an adhocracy environment and requirements for organizations to operate 
effectively mirrors the future operating environment and potential CA organizational 
structures. CA formations, particularly their analytical elements, must be designed to 
operate in these environments effectively. Blanken and Overbaugh provide a list of 
characteristics concerning management structures, personnel, and investment required for 
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success as continuous, rigorous, and demanding. Given these characteristics, CA must 
decide on whether it prioritizes the tactical or the operational and strategic echelons.  
Concerning the potential return on investment offered by this strategic civil affairs 
analysis capability, Eric Yager suggests placing a data analysis capability with either the 
TSOC or GCC staff because these assignments typically last two to three years.296 
Personnel would have the longevity and focus required to build a contextual understanding 
of the environment. Additionally, this type of analysis occurs over long periods, depending 
on the units of measure and time-series qualities of the data. With USSOCOM mandating 
a two-to-one dwell time between deployments for its forces, it is unlikely a rotational 
presence could sustain the commitment required by persistent presence requirements. 
Furthermore, rotationally deployed forces would lack the endurance required to see the 
evolution of the operational environment throughout iterated six-month rotations. Placing 
this data analytics capability within the TSOC or GCC would enable more effective and 
efficient integration of civil knowledge with its interagency and multinational partners of 
the GCC staff. CKI is nested with the commander’s intent, and placing this analytic 
capability on the operational staff integrates the insights generated from the analysis into 
operational and strategic plans at the TSOC and GCC echelons. Enduring relationships 
perform better than episodic relationships when it comes to coordination and 
collaboration.297  
Yager’s suggestion challenges the conventional wisdom, which is to retain this 
analytic capability in CA formations at the Company-level to support tactical elements. 
The CA FMA Directorate appears to favor retaining the analytical capabilities outlined the 
Civil Affair: 2025 and Beyond within CA’s organic formations, allowing for potential 
alignment with the Intelligence, Cyber, Electronic Warfare, and Signal (ICEWS) concept 
 
296 Yager, “Setting the Civil Affairs Analytical Foundation.” 
297 Barbara D. Adams and Robert D.G. Webb, “Trust in Small Military Teams” (Humansystems 




within a CA Company Headquarters to comprise a portion of a MDTF.298 It is a question 
of priorities for those designing the new capability, determining its purpose, and assessing 
its potential strategic utility to the force. This leads to a broader question. Should the 
strategic utility of Civil Affairs reside within the U.S. Army General Purpose Forces (GPF) 
or USSOCOM SOF formations under CME?  
3. Is Civil Affairs Doctrine Reductivist? 
In his article “Tactical Wins into Strategic Success,” Krohley claims that the 
PMESII-PT framework that drives CA analysis is reductivist in nature.299 He describes it 
as “a ‘fill in the blanks’ approach of our ASCOPE and PMESII frameworks drives a closed, 
reductive intellectual process that is ill suited to delivering granular, actionable 
insights.”300 An example of this would be a standard format on a contact report that lacks 
a section for conversational context, as it only focuses on attributes. Where the form is 
neat, tidy and professional-looking, it lacks the capacity for content relevant to the analysis. 
Many insights can be missed as a result of formatting. Another example of this approach 
would be an online home loan application following an overseas assignment lasting more 
than two years, and the only response the system will accept is a U.S. residential address. 
The system of data capture loses context when items do not fit neatly into categories.  
There is merit to Krohley’s argument. For example, the graphic taken from Joint 
Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations and depicted in Figure 12 is a representation 
of CIM’s suggested purpose, which is to “connect-the-dots.”301 It shapes how the Joint 
Force understands the employment of CA forces and how CA forces understand CIM. 
While ceding the point that the figure is labeled notionally, the figure is a mental model 
shaping the perception of what in reality would be a dense network of relationships. All 
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assumptions must be assessed. Which leader is the legitimate authority in the area? This is 
a difficult question to answer without proper methodology and metrics. CA’s current 
methodology and processes lack the capacity to measure these types of observations or test 
its judgments.302 
  
Figure 12. Notional Civil Information Management Connects-the-Dots 
between People in the Operational Environment303 
Another example from the Joint Publication 3-25: Countering Threat Networks 
depicts a notional threat organization.304 Figure 13 depicts a threat network organized as 
a centralized hierarchy of threat network actors and capabilities.305 The threat network in 
reality could include actors operating in multiple roles amid multiple overlapping 
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legitimate and covert networks. The reality is always messier and more complex. Krohley 
illustrates this point as well. He argues that U.S. lethal targeting methodologies assess 
threat networks as if they exist separate from the populations that support them.306 
Figure 13 illustrates this point and suggests the U.S. should be focusing on the blind spot 
that is not represented in this graphic, or the actors with the ties to legitimate political 
authorities, without which these insurgencies would fall apart. 
 
Figure 13. Visualization of a Notional Threat Network307 
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V. CLOSING THE GAP: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR 
CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION 
In simple terms, the CA Branch requires an innovative approach similar to the ones 
illustrated in the case studies. In the case studies, challenging environments forced 
organizations to innovate. Similarly, CA forces find themselves in the same situation. Some 
argue the future operating environment arrived in 2014 when Russia seized Crimea in a 
fait accompli action.308 Thus, CA should approach developing an analytical capability 
worthy of serving the MDTFs and Joint Force with urgency, a critical factor in 
organizational transformation.309 Future operating environments will continue to evolve 
in complexity and turbulence.310 As such, the U.S. Army’s MDTFs and the Joint Force 
will require CA to improve its analytical capabilities to understand their environment and 
develop pathways that ensure favorable outcomes.311 To do so, CA must prioritize its 
analytical quotient as the CA FMA identified. The scale and placement of this capability 
may remain subjects of debate, but the development of innovative analytical means with 
which to analyze the civil component of the operating environment is not. The components 
of the solution lie in establishing competencies with data to utilize data science techniques 
and incorporating social network analysis (SNA) as a means of assessing networks of 
interest to generate insights that inform operational and strategic approaches. The success 
of the CA branch rests upon its ability to execute this task.  
A. DATA SCIENCE APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES 
As in the case studies, Civil Affairs must improve its analytical quotient to meet 
the complex challenges of the FOE. After publishing the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond, 
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Civil Affairs leadership find themselves in the shoes of Billy Beane and Bill Bratton, 
claiming that a new approach is required to deliver on their commitments to support MDO 
formations. What Civil Affairs is missing is a means to test their assumptions and actions. 
Much like the resistance Archie Cochrane encountered, some within the CA Branch see no 
need or pathway available to test something they perceive to be intangible. However, as 
readers noted in Moneyball, Civil Affairs is the victim of inefficient data capture.312 The 
first thing CA elements require is a methodology capable of capturing and validating their 
data. Fortunately, these techniques and methodologies exist. Data science and open-source 
data analysis share some common components that combine to provide the means to begin 
identifying the relevant relationships within the operational environment and assessing 
them objectively.  
1. What Is Data Science? 
The term data science is difficult to define due to its interdisciplinary background, 
ambiguous boundaries, and evolutionary nature. Wil Van der Aalst, one of the leading 
authorities on data science and process mining, examines these points in his book Process 
Mining: Data Science in Action writing,  
In recent years, data science emerged as a new and important discipline. It 
can be viewed as an amalgamation of classical disciplines like statistics, 
data mining, databases, and distributed systems. Existing approaches need 
to be combined to turn abundantly available data into value for individuals, 
organizations, and society.”313  
The amalgamation of other fields is an important aspect of data science because fusing 
elements of other fields together such as applied statistics, computer science, and data 
mining is useful for providing additional analytic methods; yet, the field of data science is 
constantly evolving. Figure 14 provides a visual representation of the disciplines that 
comprise data science. Of particular interest to CA forces are the behavioral and social 
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sciences and predictive analytics applications of data science, as these topics are used to 
influence people and help ascertain future trends. 
 Despite the issues of providing a precise definition, Wil van der Aalst provides a 
broad definition of data science writing: 
Data science is an interdisciplinary field aiming to turn data into real value. 
Data may be structured or unstructured, big or small, static or streaming. 
Value may be provided in the form of predictions, automated decisions, 
models learned from data, or any type of data visualization delivering 
insights. Data science includes data extraction, data preparation, data 
exploration, data transformation, storage and retrieval, computing 
infrastructures, various types of mining and learning, presentation of 
explanations and predictions, and the exploitation of results taking into 
account ethical, social, legal, and business aspects.  
The above definition implies that data science is broader than applied 
statistics and data mining. Data scientists assist organizations in turning data 
into value. A data scientist can answer a variety of data-driven questions. 
These can be grouped into the following four main categories [146]: 
• (Reporting) What happened? 
• (Diagnosis) Why did it happen? 
• (Prediction) What will happen? 
• (Recommendation) What is the best that can happen?314 
This is the definition that CA Branch should utilize as they establish an analytic capability. 
The definition, while broad, focuses on delivering value using data in the media outlined 
in Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond while continuing to provide the CA narrative in the 
reporting and diagnosis roles needed to fuel both U.S. Army and joint information 
requirements.315 This data science definition parallels the Civil Affairs Proponent’s 
definition of civil knowledge integration and describes tasks that enable CA forces to 
deliver value to their supported commanders. However, there is one key difference between 
the data science and civil knowledge integration concepts, data science is constantly 
evolving with the open-source community developing new methods of analysis daily. The 
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benefits of incorporating data science approaches into civil knowledge integration are the 
adaptive properties of the data science field. As operational environments evolve in 
complexity, data science will continue to develop methods with which to assess it. 
 
Figure 14. The Components of Data Science316 
  Unfortunately, many conflate the term data science with coding, big data, machine 
learning, and artificial intelligence.317 While these are aspects of data science that receive 
the most attention, these terms also constitute buzzwords that create a perception that data 
science can only generate insights using highly advanced contract systems to perform 
sophisticated analytical tasks. In reality, CA forces could reap benefits from integrating the 
most basic forms of data science. In his journal article “Big Data and Science: Myths and 
Reality,” Jagadish dispels these common misperception writing: 
 
316 Source: Van der Aalst, Process Mining, 12. Figure 1.5 
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It is completely understandable that many lay people picture a Big Data 
System as a magic piece of software that takes Big Data as input and 
produces deep insights as output. Unfortunately, this misperception suits 
many companies, and even some academics, very well. This way, someone 
who builds a Big Data system (in the sense described above) can create the 
illusion of solving the whole problem from soup to nuts even if they are 
focused on just a piece of it. The same goes for someone who develops a 
novel analysis algorithm. But Big Data is most definitely not machine 
learning on Map Reduce.318 
In other words, Jagadish argues that data science cannot be distilled into one piece of 
software that magically provides insights to an organization. He contends that people will 
remain a critical part of the intense analytical process. He continues explaining this point 
in the following paragraph writing: 
The main point it makes is that there are many steps to the Big Data analysis 
pipeline, with crucial decisions required at each step, and many challenges 
to address in each. The first decision is what data to record or acquire, and 
how to make the best of data that is imperfect. Then decisions must be made 
to represent the data in a manner suitable for analysis, possibly after 
extraction, cleaning, and integration with other data sources. Even in the 
analysis phase, which has received much attention, there are poorly under-
stood complexities in the context of multi-tenanted clusters where several 
users’ programs run concurrently. The final interpretation step is perhaps 
the most crucial, because it cannot be delegated – someone is responsible 
for making decisions based on the result of the data analysis and this person 
has to understand and trust the results obtained first.319 
Jagadish’s argument is critical because it indicates that CA analysts must be the ones 
making these decisions, especially when it comes to issues of inconsistency and incomplete 
data.320 The perspective of CA analysts will be critical towards defining the boundaries 
and organizing the analysis. In short, CA forces cannot delegate this task to others or 
software if they want to trust the results of their analysis.  
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2. What Is Open-Source Data Analysis? 
In his article “Using Big Data to Ask Big Questions,” Chase Davis, a journalist at 
the New York Times, argues that datasets of varying sizes allow researchers and journalists 
to explore both big questions and small questions data scientists would have never thought 
to ask.321 As in the cases discussed above, the key to understanding an environment begins 
with efficient data capture and sound statistical analysis.322 Following this foundation in 
statistics, open-source data analysis leverages open-source data, which is increasingly 
available within the open-source community, academia, nongovernmental organizations, 
and government agencies ranging from the municipal to the federal-level.323 In fact, many 
U.S. government agencies publish datasets to provide their citizens with enough 
information to make informed decisions on topics such as property values, crime, and flood 
zone watershed.324 While CA analysts should not limit their scope to open-source data, 
they should know where to find datasets useful to their analysis.  
The last component of open-source data analysis is using open-source software for 
the statistical computing required to analyze the datasets. This contrasts with many of the 
systems currently employed by CA forces and their analytical elements. While these 
systems are useful for many purposes, alternative open-source software and analytical tools 
have been made available by a distributed online community of developers on a free and 
open basis, and these open-source tools increasingly offer more advanced analytic 
capabilities than those provided by traditional CA systems. However, there is one caveat: 
using open-source software combined with the suggested techniques will require 
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significantly more training and education to employ effectively across CA forces. This is 
one criticism and argument against placing this capability in the CA formations at the 
company-level. The investment required to make this training common to all CA forces 
may be too great to achieve a significant return on investment.325 The more economical 
approach would limit the scope of the activity to attract qualified candidates with 
regionally-focused context from within the branch. This has important implications for the 
added capability, particularly in collaboration and coordination efforts with interagency 
and UAP partners if integrated properly. 
3. Benefits over Existing Analytic Methods in Civil Affairs 
Unfortunately, standard methods for analyzing data using both data science and 
open-source data analysis techniques do not exist in CA doctrine.326 Adding any capability 
using these disciplines would greatly aid CA in several ways. The first way of adding this 
capability would begin the long-avoided transition to developing quantitative approaches 
towards assessment and investment.327 CA must begin to assess their investments in its 
network and outcomes. Without committing this approach, CA will remain in the dark 
about the efficacy of their prescriptions. 
The second way this capability benefits CA forces is the potential to gain 
effectiveness and efficiency in their operations. If CA forces can execute CKI with newly 
attained insights, then future MDTFs, U.S. Army, and Joint Force will be better postured 
to make decisions on where to focus their efforts. The strategic value of reducing the 
complexity of the environment paid a dividend in many other cases rich with data such as 
baseball, law enforcement, and medicine. There is no reason to suspect an analysis of the 
operational environment using these methods would be any less beneficial. Making 
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informed decisions balanced by the probability of success or failure is better than the 
subjective approaches currently employed.328 
4. Applications  
There are many open-source data analysis applications using these techniques. 
However, most of these applications only exist in academia and private industry.329 Hedge 
funds use these techniques to evaluate financial data to make predictions about markets 
and structure their financial positions to maximize gains while protecting against deep 
losses. While the U.S. Army’s military intelligence elements possess open-source 
intelligence analysts, these analysts doctrinally focus their attention on the threats to U.S. 
Force, or they are assigned to develop an understanding of their operational environment 
through the analysis of public records, public speeches, and foreign media.330 In essence, 
open-source intelligence analysts are ill-suited to the tasks required in evaluating the civil 
component of future operating environments. Flynn et al. discussed this topic at length, 
concluding that reform of the intelligence community was necessary to improve the 
performance of U.S. forces combating irregular threats.331 
So, where does that leave U.S. forces? U.S. forces must now adapt to the demands 
of their environment. Figure 15 is a representation of the data science hierarchy of needs. 
It shows in graduated levels of advancement the increasing sophistication of needs as 
organizations with varying resources seeking to leverage data-driven approaches must 
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transition to meet the needs of their customers.332 CA forces are in the early phases of the 
“explore/transform” stage. The immediate needs of CA rest in the “aggregate/label” stage, 
as this thesis is promoting analytics. If Civil Affairs wants to transition to an “AI/Deep 
Learning” organization in the future, it must first understand and establish the analytics 
that provides its foundation.  
 
Figure 15. The Hierarchy of Data Science Competences 333 
5. Connecting Data Science to Civil Knowledge Integration 
The data science and open-source data analysis methods and techniques discussed 
here provide an opportunity for greater civil knowledge integration for three reasons. First, 
data science and open-source data analysis techniques extract knowledge insights from the 
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data. These techniques allow for assessment of the correlation between variables in the 
operational environment over time. These insights are easier to consume and promote a 
common understanding of the environment. CompStat was a clear example of how this 
concept could work in practice in a governance role.334 
Second, these techniques contribute to greater CKI because to the CA doctrinal 
outputs feeding both U.S. Army and Joint planning processes is not contextually relevant. 
The doctrinal CA outputs, while informative, are not contextual and not designed to link 
specific variables outside of doctrinal PMESII-PT/ASCOPE in a meaningful way, other 
than to mention that an association appears to exist.335 
The third way these methods contribute to enhanced CKI is the ability to 
incorporate interagency and UAP data. Without the development of this capability, the 
integration of these datasets and relevant civil information into Army processes is neither 
efficient nor effective. 
6. Components of the Analytical Method 
There are a number of components to developing a competence in application of 
data science and opens source data analysis techniques. The following components and 
considerations are far from all-inclusive, but represent an important starting point for 
assessing the requirements for developing an initial capability.  
a. Developing Structured Data 
Data comes in two forms: structured and unstructured. Hadley Wickham and 
Garrett Grolemund refer to structured data as rectangular data in their book, R for Data 
Science, which is a representation of structured data.336 It is an effective way of indicating 
that data must be transformed into a format that machines understand. This format is rows 
and columns, in which rows are observations and columns are variables. Civil Affairs 
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doctrine off-handedly references the relevance of structuring data into spreadsheets for data 
storage or inclusion into other data management infrastructures such as databases. In 
essence, the value of building structured datasets for analytical purposes (i.e., determining 
the relationships between variables) was never considered or communicated. Similarly, 
structured datasets are requested in most unit CIM reporting standard operating procedures, 
yet CIM Chiefs seldom enforce their creation because CA doctrine lacks a medium to 
leverage data in this form. Doctrine must change to stress the importance of creating 
structured data sets for further analysis in statistical software.  
b. Transparent Collection Methodologies 
One important element missing from the current CA methodology involves the 
development of a coding scheme prior to collecting the data. The decision of selecting a 
coding scheme is critical because it determines the focus of their reports and the relevance 
of specific associations. Rigorous data codebooks provide a transparent description of 
original sources of information and the objective and subjective factors underlying coding 
choices.  
Codebooks are commonly found accompanying the open-source datasets. The Kent 
State University Library suggests codebooks should contain the following criteria: 
• The name assigned to the variable 
• What the variable represents (i.e., its label) 
• How the variable was measured (e.g., nominal, ordinal, scale) 
• How the variable was actually recorded in the raw data (i.e., numeric, 
string; how many characters wide it is; how many decimal places it has) 
• For scale variables: The variable’s units of measurement 
• For categorical variables: If coded numerically, the numeric codes and 
what they represent337  
It further notes, “A good codebook allows you to communicate your research data 
to others clearly and succinctly, and ensures that the data is understood and interpreted 
 




properly.”338 Thus, codebooks are the primary method for researchers and analysts to list 
key assumptions, limitations, and to explain the creator’s criteria for observations, 
variables, methods of evaluation. As such, they affect the boundaries and sources used to 
capture the data in a data collection plan in a structured way in either matrices, edge lists, 
or node lists. Following the data collection, an analyst must determine what type of analysis 
is the most appropriate for the data given the nature of the problem and time available to 
complete the task. 
c. Units of Analysis 
Units of analysis are fundamental to any analytical effort.339 They determine the 
scope and scale of analysis. The units of analysis should be relevant to the problem or 
research question, and would be determined by supported commanders or other 
stakeholders as required. Additionally, the units must be consistent with the limits of the 
available data collection methods. The units of analysis drive the number of observations; 
however, the units will also be limited by an analyst’s ability to collect time-series data. 
Units of analysis will likely vary depending on the medium employed to obtain the data. 
For example, a social media application programming interface (API) offers the ability to 
collect data on a scale not possible in other media where individual observations occur at 
fixed intervals.340 APIs and social media offer the ability to collect data accruing an 
exceptionally high rate.341  
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d. Open-Source Data  
The amount of data available today is staggering. Everyone from rural counties to 
metropolitan cities release data daily related to things such as crime, property, and traffic. 
Similarly, research institutions publish their data for users to manipulate and analyze. There 
are a variety of sources and types of data. The format and composition of the data 
determines the methods available for data analysis. These methods consist of geospatial, 
relational, temporal, and lexical analysis, all of which are useful at producing insights into 
the OE. Open-source datasets featuring categorical, geospatial, and temporal data exist 
across USG agencies, academia, IGOs, NGOs, and development banks. Some examples 
include the United States Agency for International Development Foreign Aid Explorer, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Fragile State Index, 
Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED), The World Bank, and Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program.342 These and many other organizations provide structured data sets 
that can be used for exploratory and explanatory data analysis. Figure 16 is an example of 
using this analytical technique to extrapolate insights from the relationships between 
variables within the OE. 
Figure 16 is a visual representation of a structured dataset compiled from multiple 
sources and transformed into a dataset with a country-year unit of analysis. Of note, the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) assesses the perceived levels of state corruption and 
transparency, with higher values representing countries with more corruption. The Fragile 
State Index (FSI) estimates the factionalization of elites within countries on a scale from 0 
to 100, with higher values representing states with more factionalized elites. Figure 16 is 
significant because it appears to show a positive correlation between U.S. foreign 
assistance and foreign aid flows, perception of state corruption, and factionalized elites 
from 2006 to 2015. The appearance of a correlation is significant because it indicates that 
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states with higher perceptions of corruption receive the majority of U.S. foreign assistance 
and aid, which appears to create environments that further factionalizes elites within 
recipient countries. Exploratory analysis of this type provides a way to assess potential 
policy implications with respect to foreign assistance and aid flows to countries with 
substantial corruption. This example of exploratory analysis requires further confirmatory 
analysis to determine the significance of the correlation and any potential causal 
relationships, which is determined by lagging variables over time. 
  
Figure 16. The Relationship Between Factionalized Elites, Corruption, and 
U.S. Foreign Aid by State Actor Gross Domestic Product (2006–2015)343 
Figure 17 is the visualization of a quadradic model testing the relationship between 
state instability and a variable representing U.S. foreign aid as a percentage of the recipient 
state’s gross domestic product (GDP). A logarithmic transformation is applied to smooth 
the distribution of extreme observations in the U.S. foreign aid as a percentage of GDP 
variable. The model controlled for state corruption, population, polity, human rights, and 
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the number of years a state’s chief executive occupied the office. The model shows a non-
linear relationship between state instability and the amount of U.S. foreign aid the recipient 
state received as a percentage of their GDP from 2006 to 2015, which becomes more 
positive as aid levels increase. This positive correlation is evidence to support the 
hypothesis that U.S. foreign aid flows contribute to state instability. This model is relevant 
because it provides a method to determine a point where aid flows remain efficient, which 
could represent a significant leap forward for CA analysts. These analytic techniques are 
useful in evaluating past policy outcomes to generate insights for future operations and 
policy recommendations. 
 
Figure 17. The Effects of U.S. Foreign Aid on State Instability344 
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e. Open-Source Data Analysis Software 
The collation and processing steps of the CIM process most accurately reflect the 
tidying and transforming steps, commonly referred to as wrangling, of the data exploration 
workflow described in the R for Data Science depicted in Figure 18.345 To perform this 
function, CA analysts can use a variety of software. Figure 18 is the representation of 
conducting exploratory analysis and the subsequent processes prior to visualization. Often 
data sets require “tidying” to accommodate for typos, or other mistakes or irregularities.346 
Codebooks explain these irregularities and the parameters defining the data, hence their 
value. The information in these helps analysts make determinations in categorizing and 
interpreting data.  
 
Figure 18. Data Exploration Workflow347 
(1) R 
R is a powerful, open-source programming language capable of wrangling, 
visualizing, and modeling large datasets. R uses downloadable software packages to 
execute a wide variety of tasks. It is free and the content on the Comprehensive R Archive 
Network (CRAN) and GitHub allow a for a wide variety of analyses using statistical, 
mathematical, visualization, modeling, and programming techniques. Its ability to process 
data across relational, geospatial, temporal, lexical, and statistical analyses makes it ideal 
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for researchers and analysts conducting exploratory and confirmatory analysis. The 
publication quality graphics, social network analysis, and geospatial packages continue to 
grow in application and complexity. The statistical regression analysis packages allow 
users to test and model the correlations they find during exploratory analysis.  
(2) Python  
Python is a popular and powerful, general-purpose programming language adapted 
for functional programming such as data science.348 It is more popular than R, especially 
for natural language processing (NLP), but its list of libraries and applications for statistical 
analysis are less extensive. These capabilities are growing with the expansion of libraries 
and packages available to apply data science and machine learning techniques. NumPy, 
Pandas, Matplotlib, Scipy, PyTorch, and scikit-learn are useful for applying data science 
principles to transform, model, develop, and run machine learning algorithms for tasks like 
classification, clustering, and regression.349  
f. Considerations 
There are two considerations worthy of discussion regarding software selection. In 
a situation akin to Civil Affairs utilizing several programs of record for CIM to leverage 
the strengths of each, the open-source community often has several programs that perform 
similar functions with nuanced differences. In the case of R and Python, it might be 
beneficial to develop proficiency in both languages to maximize the strengths of each.350 
Attempts to standardize software selections and analytic techniques in rapidly changing 
environments are likely to fail due to the flexibility needed to be successful in these 
environments. As Blanken and Overbaugh described the flexibility of management, 
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continuing education, and competence requirements for adhocracies, the use of several 
analytical techniques and platforms might be necessary to achieve the preferred 
outcome.351  
The second point worthy of highlighting is the fact that the open-source community 
is collaborative and always learning.352 Support can be found on forums such as Stack 
Overflow that provide responses from the experts in the community. CA analysts could 
leverage this collaborative environment to support the need for evolving analytical 
techniques while lessening the need to hire outside support or contractors.  
(1) Exploratory Analysis and Confirmatory Analysis 
Exploratory analysis is used to develop a familiarity with data.353 It is 
quintessentially exploring the depths of data through visualizations to determine if patterns, 
trends, or outliers warrant further attention. Visualizations help analysts by expanding their 
working memory and aids in generating new questions and insights. Confirmatory analysis 
is hypothesis testing. After generating new hypotheses, confirmatory analysis either rejects 
or accepts the null hypothesis revealing the statistical significance of relationships or 
models. It is important to develop the capacity for both types of analysis. All exploratory 
analysis requires confirmatory analysis to confirm the hypothesis generated during 
exploratory analysis.  
(2) Statistical Models 
There are several statistical techniques that CA analysts may use to confirm or 
reject the existence of statistically significant relationships and their strength. These 
statistical techniques are also used to assess models and their goodness of fit in explaining 
the distribution of data. Data science makes these statistical procedures easier to explore 
with the aid of visualizations. In visualizing the distribution of data, analysts can make 
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assessments about which types of relationships better represent the data and the 
environment.  
(3) Linear Regression Models 
Regressions are a statistical method of measuring the correlation between 
independent (explanatory) variables and a dependent (response) variable in models.354 
Models allow researchers and analysts to determine which variables are relevant in 
explaining the response in others. Consequently, models allow researchers and analysts to 
make predictions of future expected outcomes based on the analysis of prior observations. 
Regression models come in many forms and range in complexity from univariate, bivariate, 
and multivariate models that test the relationships between a specified number variables in 
the model.355 Essentially, in multivariate regression models, machines a draw a line 
through multidimensional space to determine the slope with the least error between the 
interactions of independent variables and their effect on the response variable. These 
mathematical procedures determine the line and model that best fits the data, which may 
vary depending on the distribution of observations. Without visualizing the resulting 
model, however, it is difficult to assess the relationship that best fits the data. Anscombe’s 
Quartet, depicted in Figure 19, demonstrates this point and serves as a great example of 
why visualization is necessary to support effective modeling.356 
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Anscombe’s Quartet is significant because it demonstrates the same model (slope) based 
on the assumption of a linear relationship for the data distributions of all four figures. While 
Figure 1 shows a model correctly assuming a linear relationship, Figure 2 shows a situation 
where the analyst should consider a quadratic model to fit the data. Similarly, Figures 3 
and 4 demonstrate the effects of outliers and skewed distributions the on the model, which 
leads to suboptimal representations of the data.  
Figure 19. Anscombe’s Quartet357 
(4) Logistic Regression Models 
Logistic regressions evaluate categorical dependent variables with binomial 
distributions, meaning the predicted value of the dependent variable is a probability.358 
Logistic regressions test the probability of an event occurring in a binary way, either the 
event occurs or it does not occur. Logistic regressions are particularly useful for assessing 
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things such as the predicting the onset of armed conflict or determining the probability of 
a patrol encountering an improvised explosive device on an operation.359  
(5) Poisson Regression Models 
Poisson regressions assume a different response variable value and distribution.360 
Poisson regressions model count variables.361 These are variables, such as counts of 
deaths, that can only take on positive integer values. Such models have potential 
applications for CA analysts to employ them to study patterns of violence geospatially. For 
example, a model predicting the number of events that occur in specified grid cells based 
on preidentified indicators representing independent variables could be of great value to a 
supported commander assessing the risk to U.S. forces. Two recent theses demonstrate the 
potential of these methods. Chew and Kuah geospatially modeled the probability of 
political violence events in Ukraine following the Euromaidan Movement based on the use 
of social media-derived sentiment metrics.362 Similarly, Colin Foote modeled the onset of 
violent events in response to digital shutdowns directed by the Indian government.363  
7. Risks and Shortfalls 
There are several risks associated with developing a data-driven capability. The 
perverse incentives these methods often produce can yield negative effects on the 
organization using them. Both Hernandez et al. and PJ Vogt discuss the effect of these 
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risks.364 One source heavily cited in the CompStat case is the PJ Vogt podcast “The Crime 
Machine Part I,” which discusses the creation of CompStat.365 The sequel titled “The 
Crime Machine Part II” discusses the perverse incentives associated with using these 
analytic techniques over an extended period. Despite the diminishing marginal returns 
associated with using these analytic techniques, there is a political and public perception 
that continued use of these methods will translate to a perpetual decrease in crime.366 To 
maintain this perception, the NYPD misrepresented the severity of crimes as lesser offenses 
to keep the crime statistics artificially low. In a similar vein, Hernandez et al. discuss the 
same problem with assessments of irregular warfare in Afghanistan.367 They observed a 
constant effort to show progress, and the pressure to maintain this progress caused the 
Afghan Assessment Group to change its assessment criteria to maintain the artificial status 
quo.  
The second risk associated with adopting data-driven processes is the 
organizational change required to secure the return on investment. This sort of 
organizational change may not be feasible or appropriate as Proctor & Gamble and General 
Electric discovered.368 Blanken and Overbaugh suggested this in their response to Flynn 
et al.’s Fixing Intel report.369 They argue Flynn et al.’s proposed transformation would fail 
because they would fundamentally alter the design, function, and organizational purpose 
of the military intelligence establishment, which is to filter and validate intelligence at each 
command echelon before reaching its political leadership. They argue these changes to the 
intelligence community require a transition of the intelligence process from a deductive to 
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an inductive approach, which requires radically different personnel selection and training 
methodologies for military intelligence analysts. The implications of such a transformation 
are great with respect to the difficulty in its undertaking as well as the suitability of such a 
task when more efficient solutions exist. Blanken and Overbaugh’s discussions parallel the 
argument for developing CA analysts using data-driven approaches, where the 
organizational change and effort required to build such a capability may not be worth the 
investment from a feasibility and suitability standpoint. This insight provides a segue into 
the third risk which is the organization’s ability to adapt and integrate the effects of the 
new analytic approach.  
While the organizational changes recommended by Flynn et al. parallel the central 
argument of this thesis, CA lacks the rigid bureaucratic structures and specialization of the 
intelligence community.370 After a careful reading of Blanken and Overbaugh’s argument, 
the establishment of a potent CA analytic capability seems to be the missing link in the 
military intelligence equation.371 Despite these insights, implications exist for introducing 
these types of data-driven approaches into highly structured and bureaucratic information 
environments such as military commands. Military commands must learn how to interact 
and integrate the insights from the data-driven approaches. Hernandez et al.’s chapter of 
Assessing War provides a clear example, wherein the conclusion they argue: “New data is 
often treated as additional data for collection and not as different data. A data-centric focus 
to IW can quickly overwhelm other parts of the planning process.”372 Therefore, the intent 
is to not introduce competing data that might overwhelm the information flows existing 
within a military command. This new data must form a symbiotic relationship with the 
information already understood within the standardized military command information 
ecosystem. For the same reasons, Blanken and Overbaugh argued that the inefficiencies at 
higher echelons of the military intelligence apparatus are a product of bureaucratic 
design.373 They suggest that changing the organizational design would conflict with their 
 
370 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel. 
371 Blanken and Overbaugh, “Looking for Intel?” 
372 Hernandez, Ouellet, and Nannini, “Circular Logic and Constant Progress,” 228. 
373 Blanken and Overbaugh, “Looking for Intel?,” 565–74. 
134 
purpose and overwhelm the political leadership with a deluge of unfiltered information. 
Thus, the risk of overwhelming the information flows within established organizations is 
significant and any new analytic capability must delineate its outputs accordingly. One way 
to achieve this delineation is to target the higher-order operational targeting and strategy 
development to reduce the complexity of other planning and operations tasks.  
B. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Responding to networked crime groups will require new and innovative 
responses. Such traditional responses as ‘counterleadership targeting’ (e.g., 
the takedown of Pablo Escobar or attempts to capture Osama Bin Laden) 
have dominated strategy to date, with little long-term effect. Networked 
groups are resilient. Their organizational flexibility allows them to absorb 
such shocks and rechannel their efforts to remain intact. This organizational 
ambiguity frustrates hierarchical organizations, since their efforts to contain 
the opposing criminal forces are frequently too rigid or too slow to stop 
these adversaries.  
—John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt374 
1. What Is Social Network Analysis? 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, 
Crime, and Militancy that social network analysis is a useful tool in analyzing networks 
and developing strategies to disrupt adversarial networks and organizations. Developed by 
social psychologists, organizational sociologists, and “pursued by anthropologists, 
sociologists, and organizational theorists,” social network analysis (SNA) offers a contrast 
to the prevailing perspective.375 The underlying premise in SNA is that an actor or 
organization’s power and influence is derived from their location within the social structure 
of the network. Hence, Cunningham’s focused definition, “social network analysis is a set 
of theories and techniques to understand social structure visually and statistically.”376 In 
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contrast with prevailing approaches, individual attributes are less relevant in SNA. Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt write,  
In this view, power and influence depend less on one’s personal attributes 
(e.g., resources, attitudes, behaviors) than on one’s interpersonal relations—
the location and character of one’s ties in and to the network. The “unit of 
analysis” is not so much the individual as it is the network in which the 
individual is embedded. Not unlike complexity theorists, social network 
analysts view a network as a systemic whole that is greater than and 
different from its parts. An essential aim is to show how the properties of 
the parts are defined by their networked interactions, and how a network 
itself functions to create opportunities or constraints for the individuals in 
it.377 
The key takeaway from Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s passage is that the social structure 
of networks, when viewed as a system, convey meaning useful to analysts and researchers. 
Analysts and researchers derive this meaning from an actor’s position within a sociogram, 
which is the visual representation of the network’s structure, and the results of the SNA 
measures. An actor’s location is determined by a combination of a analyst-specified 
algorithm and the relational inputs of the network. In other words, the social space between 
actors is not random. It is determined by their pattern of their relationships. Algorithms 
place actors sharing numerous ties closer together and actors without ties further apart.  
2. Key Assumptions 
SNA is set of theories and techniques built on some key assumptions. In their work 
Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network 
Analysis, Cunningham et al. describe the following assumptions:  
• Ties between actors function as conduits for the transfer or flow of 
information, sentiment, material and/or nonmaterial goods, or other 
resources (e.g., funds, supplies, information, trust, and enmity).  
• Actors, along with their actions and motivations, are interdependent, 
rather than independent, with other actors. 
• A network’s social structure reflects enduring patterns of interaction 
between actors. 
• An actor’s position in the social structure impacts his or her beliefs, 
norms, and behavior. 
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• Repeated interactions between actors give rise to social configurations 
that take on a life of their own and cannot be reduced to constituent 
components even though actors remain dependent upon those 
components.  
• Social networks are dynamic and responsive to changes in the actors, 
sub-groups, and ties between actors.378  
These assumptions are relevant because they embody the social science upon which social 
network analysis is based.379 They give meaning to the ties between actors, social 
processes driving tie formation, and the tie’s function in the network. These points aid in 
the interpretation of sociograms and measures of network topography and centrality. As 
such, these key points carry significant implications for use by CA elements conducting 
CAO. Detecting subgroups and investigating patterns of ties will be useful in predicting 
how a network might function or predicting recruitment rates of irregular threats. Thus, it 
is not only important to understand the metrics of social network analysis, but also the 
theories supporting the measures and their meaning. 
3. Benefits over Existing Analytical Methods in Civil Affairs  
CA analysts use several analytical techniques to understand the civil component of 
their operating environment, but Liddick et al. identify the prevailing method of civil 
network analysis as link analysis.380 Cunningham et al. add that analysts use the systems 
analysis techniques prescribed in CA doctrine, such as nodal analysis, which serve as inputs 
for link analysis.381 While Cunningham et al. concede that link analysis is useful in 
visualizing the operational environment, they argue that its utility is limited to the benefits 
of visualization. They define link analysis as, “the visual depiction of relations among 
entities.”382 These entities may include actors, entities, and things such as locations, 
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events, and physical objects. In other words, link analysis is a multi-modal analytical tool 
that constitutes a relational depiction of the network and known operational environment 
with the placement of nodes decided by analysts.  
In contrast with link analysis, SNA offers several benefits to CA analysts in the 
form of visualizations, data quality, and mathematical inferences. Cunningham notes that 
SNA visualizations, known as sociograms, are the product of algorithms that determine the 
social space between actors.383 Algorithms place actors with common ties closer together 
and actors without common ties further apart, thereby producing a visualization whose 
structure implies meaning based on the pattern of relationships. Thus, the algorithms 
provide a relative form objectivity with respect to node placement and social space. 
Everton proposes an additional benefit exists as multiple algorithms allow analysts to view 
the network from multiple perspectives revealing connections and structures of interest.384  
4. Applications 
In his book Disrupting Dark Networks, Sean Everton provides numerous examples 
of SNA’s utility in both understanding and disrupting dark networks.385 He suggests, 
“SNA has enhanced our understanding of how dark networks organize themselves and has 
offered potential strategies for their disruption.”386 The application of SNA towards 
understanding and disrupting irregular threats is growing. In Valdis Kreb’s “Mapping 
Networks of Terrorist Cells,” he assessed the Hamburg Cell that perpetrated attacks on the 
World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001.387 Stephen Koschade’s analysis 
of Jemaah Islamiyah laid out a framework for understanding terrorist cells and 
demonstrated its utility writing, “Such a framework will assist in (1) understanding the 
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communication and structure of such cells and (2) assist in predicting the likely outcomes 
of terrorist cells when employed in real-time intelligence analysis.”388  
 In moving beyond the application of SNA towards the study of irregular threats, 
there are a few examples of its operational effectiveness against irregular threats, 
particularly in the use of non-kinetic approaches. Everton mentions two successful cases 
referring to operations in northern Iraq and Singapore using Psychological Operations to 
implode an insurgent network and rehabilitation and reintegration strategy to return 
terrorists back to society.389 Perhaps the greatest utility of applying SNA towards irregular 
threats lies in developing strategies for their defeat. In their article “Strategies for 
Combating Dark Networks,” Everton and Roberts suggest using both kinetic and non-
kinetic approaches including “targeting, organizational targeting, capacity-building, 
institution building, psychological operations, information operation, and 
rehabilitation.”390 Using SNA to inform U.S. strategies based on the assessments of 
irregular threat network structures is consistent with the data-driven approaches examined 
in this research. The current process decision makers use to develop strategies are entirely 
subjective without rigorous, transparent means of assessing effectiveness.391  
Chaves et al. and Hayes and Nguyen illustrated another potential use of SNA.392 
Chaves et al. illustrates the utility in using SNA to assess UAP networks best postured to 
support North Korean populations in the event of large-scale combat operations on the 
Korean peninsula. Hayes and Nguyen applied SNA to assess the power of the CA network 
including units, partners, and stakeholders in the community. Both of these projects 
displayed the potential application of SNA for the assessment of networks internal to CA 
to identify which relationships are the most relevant and useful.  
 
388 Koschade, “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 559. 
389 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, xxix. 
390 Everton and Roberts, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 4–6. 
391 Hernandez, Ouellet, and Nannini, “Circular Logic and Constant Progress,” 219–31. 
392 Chaves, Christmas, and Sloulin, “Humanitarian Assistance on the Korean Peninsula”; Hayes and 
Nguyen, “CA 2025.” 
 
139 
Social Network Analysis is certainly a missing component to the Civil Affairs 
analytic capability. As noted in the literature review, SNA is conspicuously absent from 
the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond and “Civil Affairs Force Modernization Assessment,” 
which is odd because the CA branch has speculated about incorporating SNA into CIM 
since 2015.393 SNA offers CA the potential to quantify and test its subjective assessments 
of the operational environment. CA should use SNA to assess itself, its network of UAPs, 
and the social structures of its operational environment, especially the socio-political and 
political-military networks.  
Many associate SNA with lethal targeting, yet Everton and Roberts contend that 
SNA is even better-suited to informing indirect strategies.394 However, CA’s use of SNA 
should not be limited to indirect strategies. CA elements should use SNA for assessing the 
potential effectiveness of potential kinetic targeting strategies. Partners within their 
network must understand the ramifications of their intended strategies across multiple 
networks. If Civil Affairs elements remain largely excluded from participating in kinetic 
targeting processes, then the Joint Force will continue to perpetuate the status quo blind 
spot that both Krohley and Flynn et al. reference in their articles and report.395 More 
importantly, it perpetuates the perspective that threat networks exist apart from the societies 
that support them. While Countering Threat Networks provides four engagement strategies 
for countering threat networks, three are kinetic.396 Commanders pursuing these strategies 
must understand when decapitation strikes and network fragmentation actions possess a 
greater potential for achieving the desired effects and when these actions will mobilize 
socio-political networks against their purposes. SNA possesses the potential for providing 
these types of insights to reduce the uncertainty associated with these fateful decisions.  
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5. Components of the Analytical Method 
The analytical methods behind SNA depend on a number of components including 
methodology, software, coding data, and developing an understanding of the metrics and 
how they inform strategies. For the purposes of this research, establishing a baseline of 
understanding is sufficient to outline what an initial operating capability would include to 
provide SNA as an analytics competence.  
a. SNA Metrics and Approaches 
Any CA SNA capability must include a working knowledge of the SNA metrics. 
In Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network 
Analysis, Cunningham et al. suggest developing a working knowledge in the following 
topics:  
• Collecting Coding, and Manipulating Social Network Data 
• Network Topography 
• Cohesion and Clustering 
• Detecting Subgroups 
• Centrality Power and Prestige 
• Brokers and Bridges 
• Structural Equivalence 
• Hypothesis Testing397  
They cover these topics in his book extensively using a conceptual approach, whereas 
Everton takes a different approach when he suggests developing a working knowledge on 
the same topics from a practical perspective using SNA software and datasets in a step-by-
step process in Disrupting Dark Networks.398  
 Cunningham et al. suggest that collecting, coding, and manipulating network data 
is essential for the practice of SNA.399 These processes determine the validity and 
reliability of an analyst’s data. Cunningham et al. continue noting network topography 
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addresses the structure of the network, such as its centralization, diameter, and average 
path distance.400 They describe cohesion and clustering as measures to determine the 
connectivity within a network and how resistant it is to fragmentation, while detecting 
subgroups evaluates the patterns of ties between actors and determines whether there are 
groups of nodes with stronger internal ties than external ties within a network.401 There 
are multiple algorithms that identify subgroups and their identification is useful in isolating 
the affiliations for further study.  
Cunningham et al. consider centrality, power, and prestige as well as brokers and 
bridges, which are SNA measures of power and influence.402 These measures are 
determined by the social structure of the network. Structural equivalence focuses on the 
patterns of ties and identifies actors of similar stature based on their patterns of ties within 
a network. Lastly, Cunningham et al. explore hypothesis testing, which offers methods for 
evaluating networks using a variety of statistical applications, models, and procedures to 
determine whether a network structure formed as a product of random chance or whether 
the network and tie formation is attributed to certain exogenous or endogenous factors.403 
A competent knowledge of these metrics and approaches will greatly enhance the 
understanding of target networks and the social processes underlying the formation of 
relationships between actors or organizations.  
The SNA workflows Cunningham et al. suggest isolate research questions and 
emphasize the proper amount of preparation to ensure the validity of data to enable more 
advanced SNA techniques of hypothesis testing such as Exponential Random Graph 
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Models (ERGM) and Stochastic Actor Oriented Models (SAOM).404 Essentially, if the 
analysts did not apply the proper amount of analysis in preparation phase of the 
methodology, it is pointless to apply more advanced measures. The quality of analysis 
depends on the quality of the data. 
b. Software 
There are multiple applications available to perform SNA. Each has its own 
individual level of user friendliness, network size limitations, file types, and style of 
visualizations. They vary in capabilities as some can perform time-series calculations while 
others cannot. The use of multiple applications is common because benefits offered in 
differing visualization and capabilities. The most popular SNA software includes the 
following applications: UCINet and NetDraw, Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA), 
Pajek, Gephi, and various SNA packages in R. 
Gephi is an open-source SNA tool capable of producing stunning visuals and 
processing large network files up to roughly one million nodes and edges. Cunningham et 
al. note that the Gephi Consortium, a French non-profit organization, owns Gephi.405 The 
software is available for use across Mac, PC, and Linux systems. Due to its open-source 
nature, developers regularly update Gephi to include new methods and measures in the 
form of plugins. Gephi’s website is a forum for learning and collaboration as it contains 
journal articles and training videos to help others build SNA skills.406 Gephi is available 
in several languages including English, Spanish, French, and Japanese, which makes is 
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attractive for sharing information with international partners and organizations outside of 
the U.S. government. However, Cunningham et al. offer that Gephi lacks certain measures 
as well as poses unique challenges to working with multiplex data.407  
Initially developed at the University of California Irvine, UCINet and NetDraw 
come together in same package from Analytic Technologies, which is owned by Steve 
Borgatti.408 While technically a standalone program with some limited capacity, NetDraw 
functions as a component of UCINet. These applications are only available in English and 
for computers running Microsoft Windows. UCINet composes the core of the software 
where analysts input, transform, and manipulate their network data. NetDraw’s core 
function is to visualize network data using various algorithms available in the application. 
Despite a few nuances, UCINet is user-friendly, but limited in the size of network files it 
can process in comparison to its competitors ORA, Pajek and Gephi. The other drawback 
is that it does not handle time-series data like ORA and Pajek.  
ORA is a powerful SNA software program developed by Kathleen Carley at 
Carnegie Mellon University. ORA is available for use on both PC and Mac platforms.409 
It is capable of processing large network datasets, calculating a variety of network 
measures, and visualizing network data. As Cunningham et al. point out, ORA differs from 
other SNA programs since it produces reports containing multiple network measures 
instead of one network measure specified by the user.410 They note this peculiarity is the 
source of one of the software’s weaknesses, which is ORA’s “Standard Network Analysis” 
reports may contain inappropriate metrics and measures with specific network data such as 
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calculating the closeness centrality of disconnected networks.411 While Cunningham et al. 
characterize ORA’s visualization capabilities as adequate, ORA provides clean 
visualizations which is especially useful when working with social media-derived network 
data.  
Developed by Andrej Mrvar and Vladimir Batagelj at the University of Ljubljana 
in Slovenia, Pajek is a powerful SNA program designed for the analysis of very large 
networks.412 Pajek is free for non-commercial use and available on Mac, Linux, and 
Windows.413 Pajek is capable of processing and drawing network data containing nearly 
a billions vertices.414 Pajek is less user-friendly than other SNA applications due to its 
nuanced inputs and lack of user interface menus. It retains a simple user interface that 
requires time for users to develop proficiency. Despite the nuances, Pajek is one of the 
most capable SNA programs for visualizing networks of all sizes. 
Cunningham et al. describe R as “a programming language and software 
environment for statistical computing and graphics that is widely used among statisticians 
for developing statistical software and data analysis, including social network analysis.”415 
As stated above, R is available on Mac, Linux, and Windows operating systems and 
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ARD. ARD is the preferred metric because it allows users to calculate closeness centrality incorporating all 
network data without the need for complicated data or algorithm modifications. Borgatti calculated ARD 
using the sum and average of all reciprocal distances between all actors in the network. Linton C. Freeman, 
Douglas Roeder, and Robert R. Mulholland, “Centrality in Social Networks: II. Experimental Results,” 
Social Networks 2, no. 2 (1979): 119–41, https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(79)90002-9; Stephen P. 
Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network,” Computational & Mathematical 
Organization Theory 12, no. 1 (April 2006): 21–34, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-006-7084-x; 
Cunningham, Murphy, and Everton, Understanding Dark Networks, 144,151.  
412 Andrej Mrvar and Vladimir Batagelj, Pajek, PajekXXL, Pajek3XL: Programs for Analysis and 
Visualization of Very Large Networks Reference Manual, Version 5.8 (Ljubljana, 2019), 
http://mrvar.fdv.uni-lj.si/pajek/pajekman.pdf. 
413 Andrej Mrvar and Vladimir Batagelj, “Pajek / PajekXXL / Pajek3XL,” Software, Pajek - Program 
for Large Network Analysis, 2003, http://mrvar.fdv.uni-lj.si/pajek/. 
414 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with 
Pajek: Revised and Expanded Edition For Updated Software, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with 
Pajek, 3rd Edition, vol. 46, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
415 Cunningham, Murphy, and Everton, Understanding Dark Networks, 336. 
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contains over 15,000 packages.416 Cunningham et al. list the two most useful packages as 
statnet and igraph as well as other standalone packages such as RSiena, which allow users 
to estimate SAOMs of their network data.417 While they comment on the power and utility 
of these packages, Cunningham et al. believe most users will opt for other SNA software 
options due to the difficulty of learning and using these packages in R compared to other 
software options.  
6. Operational Challenges and Risk 
Cunningham et al. also warn readers not to view SNA as a panacea.418 Everton 
echoes the same point when he suggests, “SNA is not a silver bullet in the fight against 
terrorism and criminal networks but rather one tool that can be used in conjunction with 
other tools in the crafting of potential strategies.”419 SNA is a powerful analytical tool to 
help make decisions, but it has limits. Researchers encounter three common challenges 
when evaluating dark networks using SNA. These problems include “the dynamic and 
evolving nature of networks, incompleteness of data, and fuzziness of boundaries”420 In 
the process of coding relationships, Krebs argues it is difficult to determine which actors 
to include in a dark network, which are covert by nature.421 He argues that the process is 
not impossible, but it requires great effort to mitigate.  
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Everton and Roberts highlight another issue with using SNA as a means for 
assessing resistance movements and opposition groups in their article “Monitoring and 
Disrupting Dark Networks: A Bias toward the Center and What it Costs Us.”422 They 
claim that the natural biases of emphasizing measures of centrality, leadership, and visual 
biases tend to drive analysis. In the case of the Syrian Opposition Network, Everton and 
Roberts suggest these biases blinded analysts from other actors in the network that aligned 
themselves with the Islamic State of Syria. They mention that clustering algorithms are 
helpful in mitigating these biases, but they suggest “it is important to not confuse centrality 
measures with importance and importance with leadership.”423 They recommend using all 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research offers several recommendations based on the analyses of the literature 
review, case studies, current CA analytical capabilities, and innovative tools and 
techniques required to enhance the objectivity, sophistication, and effectiveness of CA’s 
analytical capabilities. These recommendations aim to facilitate the following actions: 
1. Transition Civil Affairs Branch from an expertise-driven to a data-driven 
organization capable of leveraging the data it collects. 
2. Enable assessments of CA forces’ assumptions and activities in order to 
ascertain which investments and actions are profitable. 
3. Use data as a conduit to form better questions about the operational 
environment. 
This research provides the following baseline recommendations for retooling CA 
analytical capabilities for the future operating environment:  
1. Focus on analysis to generate knowledge in the form of insights. 
2. Focus on integrating insights into sophisticated targeting frameworks and 
strategies. 
3. Design this analytic capability around its core functions and expected 
operating environment using the principles of efficiency and effectiveness. 
4. Select and train personnel from within the Civil Affairs Branch with an 
aptitude for analysis to serve as analysts.  
The remaining recommendations fall into two broad categories. The first set of 
recommendations focuses on its theoretical applications, techniques, and purpose, while 
the second concern the structure and placement of this proposed Civil Affairs analytic 
capability.  
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A. RECOMMENDED ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 
This research recommends several analytic techniques to provide CA analysts with 
the tools they require to reach evidence-based conclusions about their operating 
environment. The following recommendations concern the type of analysis and techniques 
CA analysts should employ to gain insights into the civil component of their operational 
environments: 
• Develop proficiency in relational, geospatial, temporal, and lexical 
analysis techniques 
• Develop proficiency in analytic techniques that enable cross-domain 
analysis of the operational environment 
• Develop proficiency in using open-source data analysis software such as R 
and Python 
• Prioritize the use of social network analysis in the evaluation of both 
friendly and adversarial networks  
• Leverage the use of open-source datasets and supplement these datasets 
with partner and classified information 
• Build Application Programming Interfaces (API) into technology-enabled 
systems used for CIM to extract datasets for analysis in other systems 
• Utilize rigorous and transparent statistical modeling techniques to evaluate 
the efficiency and effectiveness of proposed strategies 
CA analysts with operational experience in specific regions possess context that 
will shape their perspective and research questions. Any future CA analytical capability 
must leverage open-source data analysis techniques, social network analysis, geospatial 
analysis, temporal analysis, and lexical analysis to understand the operational environment. 
CA analysts must select appropriate analytical methods (i.e., relational, geospatial, 
temporal, or lexical analysis) depending on their problem statements and subsequent 
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research questions. Many of these datasets are so large that they do not make sense in their 
raw form; thus, CA analysts must utilize open-source data analysis techniques to visualize 
the data and provide a sufficient, intuitive understanding of the operational environment. 
This exploratory analysis reveals patterns that may be worthy of testing using explanatory 
analysis techniques (i.e., confirmatory analysis or hypothesis testing).  
1. Use Open-Source Data Analysis to Model Violence and Allocate 
Resources 
Yager focuses on one major topic of interest for the Civil Affairs Branch in his 
article “Setting the Civil Affairs Analytic Foundation.”424 He suggests that Civil Affairs 
should start evaluating the effects of U.S. operations on areas and people of interest.425 He 
recommends organizing several variables into like units of analysis (e.g., country-year, 
region-month, or city-day) to run regressions and correlate variable indicators. The variable 
indicators include public perception using surveys or polls, pattern of life activities, market 
activities, demonstrations, security events such as small arms fire or detonation of IEDs, 
threat reporting or criminal activity increases, and engagements with official or traditional 
leaders. Given these variables, it may be possible to more accurately assess the probability 
of ambushes or attacks based on the results of logistic regression models. Analysts may 
use these models to allocate intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and close air 
support (CAS) assets to units based on the probability of receiving enemy contact.  
Another use for leveraging open-source data analysis is to assess the effects of aid 
saturation in specific areas during clear, hold, and build operations. As operations persist 
in the joint area of operations, the presence of U.S. forces and their partners disrupt the 
local economy. Food aid displaces regular agricultural activity within local markets 
because the additional supply keeps the market price artificially low. CA elements must 
model these market inefficiencies to regulate the flow of aid into areas affected by military 
operations. Without some mechanism to support these parties, the presence of U.S. forces 
may create a net negative effect for local farmers and their families.  
 
424 Yager, “Setting the Civil Affairs Analytical Foundation.” 
425 Yager. 
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2. Focus on the Connections between Threat Networks and Society 
In a similar argument, Krohley argues that CA forces should focus their attention 
on the socio-political structures that support irregular threats.426 Krohley claims that the 
current methods U.S. forces use to target threat networks set them apart from the civil 
populations that support them. In targeting the conduits that enable irregular threat 
activities, or their connections into society, CA may be able to disrupt access to the conduits 
supporting the political causes driving the violence. Koschade also captured this in his 
framework for analyzing the Noordin Mohammad Top terrorist networks of Jemaah 
Islamiyah when he found that school ties were the source of the trust network underlying 
the overall terrorist network.427 
3. Use SNA Measures as Assessment Metrics 
Traditionally, CA forces struggle to measure and articulate the value of their 
outputs, which many suggest leads to a perception of skepticism and contempt from 
commanders and institutions competing for resources.428 Two factors contribute to this 
reality, the lack of easily quantifiable outputs and ambiguous definition of CA operations, 
actions, and activities (OAA). First, measuring influence is not an easy task. As Blanken 
and Lepore describe in “Principals, Agents, and Assessments,” measuring influence ranks 
among one of the most challenging tasks associated with complex environments.429 While 
most U.S. military specialties possess the luxury of measuring input activity as outputs, 
CA forces remain in a state of continuously selling itself and its capabilities. Second, the 
ambiguous definition and circular logic associated with CAO makes it difficult to define 
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what CA forces do.430 The diversity of CA OAAs makes it difficult for practitioners to 
reduce them into a simple definition. Despite these difficulties, CA forces recently 
managed to define their operational roles more formally within the civil engagement and 
civil reconnaissance framework and find informal metrics of demonstrating their value to 
the U.S. Army and Joint Force.431  
In his article “Beyond Tacit Approval,” Ordiway argues that CA forces should 
formally transition their measures of performance towards generating and answering 
IIRs.432 While this pathway provides a respected measure of what CA forces provide the 
military intelligence community, it also presents a conflict of interest to CA’s status as a 
Title 10 activity.433 Transitioning to an IIR-based measurement of performance framework 
incentivizes CA forces to pursue generating and answering IIRs, which flirts with Title 50 
activity.434 With the power of CA forces resting in its Title 10 authority status, CA forces 
should supplement their current assessment practices with other metrics of value such as 
UAP network power, density, cohesion, and reach.435 Using SNA measures, CA could 
measure the power of their network using Metcalfe’s law, which assesses the power of 
networks as the square of connected users, and network density, cohesion, and reach using 
standard SNA measures.436 The benefits of using SNA measures to assess CMSE 
effectiveness include: developing an accurate reflection of the CMSE network, which 
aligns their incentives to their stated purpose; providing a means to develop more effective 
operational approaches such as holding capacity building conferences to strengthen ties 
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and enhance UAP network cohesion; and capturing CA effects relevant to SOCOM’s CME 
Program Directives.437 
4. Use SNA to Preserve Governance Networks 
CA forces should use SNA as a means to evaluate governance structures and 
identify actors that warrant further protection to preserve the legitimacy of the governance 
networks. One of the critical requirements for any insurgency is to destabilize and 
delegitimize the existing government. For example, during the Vietnam conflict, the Viet 
Cong delegitimized the South Vietnamese government through attrition.438 Jones argues 
that between 1957 and 1963, the Viet Cong assassinated 4,927 government officials and 
abducted another 6,032 officials. Losses of this magnitude would represent a staggering 
blow for any government. Sustaining any level of competency and legitimacy following 
such losses at the local level would be a significant challenge. The application of SNA 
identifies actors that require additional protections to preserve the cohesion of friendly 
networks. At the highest levels, Ahmad Shah Massoud and Yitzhak Rabin serve as 
excellent examples of political actors with significant legitimate socio-political networks 
that SNA would identify as worthy of additional protections.439 These boundary spanners 
with significant social capital possessed connections not easily replicated or replaced.  
Chaves et al. provide another example of preserving governance networks in their 
Master’s thesis titled “Humanitarian Assistance Organizations and their Role in Crisis 
Response on the Korean Peninsula.”440 Chaves et al. use SNA to show how the political 
situation between North and South Korea affect the capacities of traditional IGOs and 
NGOs and illuminate actors capable of providing effective humanitarian assistance if the 
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) governance structures cease functioning. 
SNA provided a critical tool in identifying the decisive actors across multiple networks, 
including education, food and security, logistics, and health networks. Chaves et al.’s 
example demonstrates the utility of using SNA to provide useful insights into the 
operational environment. These insights undoubtedly informed contingency planning and 
strategies for establishing effective humanitarian assistance in the event that the DPRK’s 
governance structures fail. 
5. Emulate Open-Source Datasets with Civil Information Capture  
Open-source datasets such as the Armed Conflict Location Event Database 
(ACLED) provide a useful framework for CA analysts to emulate.441 It contains lists of 
events between dyadic actors, a rigorous relationship coding system for analyzing the 
nature of the violence, and event location data for geospatial analysis.442 Since the lists are 
dyadic, analysts can transform them effortlessly into time-series edge lists and node lists 
for use in social network analysis applications. In other words, ACLED datasets are useful 
because they permit relational, geospatial, and temporal analysis all from one dataset 
without much manipulation. For example, the African violence network in ACLED 
visualized in Figure 20 is the depiction of the violence in Africa after the removal of nodes 
(vertices) with less than 25 ties using a K-core analysis.443 K-core analysis is useful to 
concentrate on the most relevant actors within a subgroup by removing actors without k 
ties.444 In other words, interactions occurring less than 25 times between actors were 
excluded from the graphic to concentrate on enduring violence between parties. Ties are 
also known as edges for undirected data and arcs for directed data sets.445 Figure 20 
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visualizes the dyadic relationships between nodes such as militaries, terrorists, political 
groups, ethnic groups, tribes, and civilians. The relationships, or arcs, are events between 
nodes that include armed clashes (pink lines) between two armed groups, attacks (green 
lines) directed at civilians, and violent demonstrations (blue lines) against government 
actors. Readers should note the interconnectivity and transregional nature of the violent 
groups. While many of the violent groups travel between regions, the clustering of violent 
events concentrates by region.  
 
Figure 20 is the product of the ACLED dataset spanning from 2010–2019, showing violence 
between actors by region using a K-core analysis of 25 ties. The ACLED African Violence 
Network displays the transregional nature of the network of violence and clustering or 
dispersion of actors committing violence in the specific regions. Of note, the distinction 
between Armed Clash (pink) and Attacks (green) is that attacks specifically target unarmed 
civilians, while armed clashes denote violence between two armed parties. 
Figure 20. ACLED African Violence Network446 
 
446 Adapted from ACLED, “ACLED Data”; Gephi - The Open Graph Viz Platform, version 0.9.2, 
Windows, Java (Gephi, 2019), https://gephi.org/; Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED.”  
155 
Observing the nature of the violence in this form displays how concentrated or 
disbursed the violence is in these regions. For example, the violence in the Lake Chad 
Basin and Sahel regions are different despite their geographic proximity. Violence in the 
Lake Chad Basin is much more concentrated than in the Sahel, indicating a more robust 
pattern of reoccurring violence between the actors, while the violence in the Sahel is 
between loosely affiliated actors. The green lines denote attacks specifically against 
civilians, while the pink lines indicate the clashes between two armed parties.447 ACLED 
characterizes armed clashes as violence between security forces and VEOs, but armed 
clashes could represent violence between armed ethnic or political groups as well.448 A 
look at East Africa reveals a concentrated pattern of violence between armed actors.  
While ACLED provides useful open-source data, its data is incomplete. CA 
analysts must fuse open-source data with other legitimate data streams from sources within 
the U.S. government to create a powerful analytic capability. For example, visualizing the 
ACLED ego network of U.S. Forces in Somalia yields the image of U.S. Forces in Figure 
21. Cunningham et al. describe ego networks as a focus on an actor’s immediate network 
of direct ties and the interrelations between those actors.449 Figure 21 is relevant because 
it provides a visual representation of the known U.S. military ego network, yet these 
relationships are incomplete. Supplementing the ACLED dataset with other civil and 
classified information would provide a more accurate and complete picture. Due to 
classifications of actors, this visual does not capture U.S. SOF operating by, with, and 
through their Somalian partners, which constitutes the majority of the U.S. military activity 
against the violent groups operating in Somalia. In addition to integrating adjacent U.S. 
forces, information about which categories of civilians Al Shabaab (AS) targets would 
provide the basis for further investigation and insights into AS’s behavior and motivations. 
While Figure 21 shows the U.S. Military’s ego network in East Africa, Figure 22 
displays Al Shabaab’s ego network for comparison. Figure 22 displays the intensity of the 
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violence AS is willing to employ to assert governance over areas it formally controlled. 
Figure 22 shows the diversity AS’s violence against other clans, militias, pirates, and the 
security forces of various countries. It also shows a lack of attacks (green arcs) on civilians, 
which positions AS as a legitimate governing actor in contrast to the Somali clans, militias, 
and security forces that attacked civilians in the past.450 Furthermore, the AS network is 
resilient and entrenched due to its credible threat of violence and brokerage position 
between clans, as exhibited in Table 1. Table 1 offers insights into the SNA measures of 
actors in the U.S. Military’s ego network in East Africa. It represents a portion of the AS’s 
ego network listing AS’s betweenness measure, which many consider a measure of 
brokerage, as double the measure of its closest actor, represented as a conglomeration of 
unidentified armed groups.451 AS leverages its brokerage position among violent actors in 
East Africa. In context, smaller clans in Somalia use AS as a hegemon against the influence 
of larger clans. In essence, Figure 22 and Table 1 fused with the contextual insight that the 
smaller Somali clans view AS as a legitimate hegemon against their rival clans and 
essential to their governance interests indicate that a purely kinetic approach is not a viable 
strategy for defeating AS. It is this type of civil knowledge integration that is needed to 
make strategic recommendations for policies dedicated to defeating Al Shabaab. For 
example, a combination of pseudo operations, information operations, and psychological 
operations would be an effective way to dismantle the AS network.  
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Figure 21 displays the dyadic ego network of U.S. Military Forces in Somalia following a 
K-core analysis at Core-25. It captures the violent interactions (colored edges) by type 
between U.S. forces and other actors. 
Figure 21. ACLED U.S. Military Ego Network in East Africa452 
 
452 Adapted from ACLED, “ACLED Data”; Gephi; Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED.” 
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Figure 22 is the visualization of the AS ego-network following a K-core analysis at Core-25. Like 
Figure 21, it displays relevant actors and describes the remaining clusters with general terms such 
as militias and clans. Of note, notice the clan and militia violence directed at civilians (green), 
whereas AS’s violence is characterized as armed clashes (pink) with clans, militias, and security 
forces.  
Figure 22. ACLED Al Shabaab Ego Network in East Africa453 
  
 
453 Adapted from ACLED, “ACLED Data”; Gephi; Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED.” 
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Table 1. U.S. Military Ego Network SNA Measures454 
 
Table 1 offers insights into the SNA measures of actors in the U.S. Military’s Ego Network in East 
Africa. This table represents a portion of the ACLED East African Violence Network and AS’s Ego 
Network. It is relevant because it lists AS’s Betweenness measure, which is widely-considered a 
measure of brokerage, as double the measure of its closest actor, which is a conglomeration of 
unidentified armed groups. Thus, AS possesses a high degree of brokerage among violent actors in East 
Africa. 
 
Lastly, the most useful aspect of ACLED is the inclusion of geospatial data. 
Figure 23 displays the location and nature of the violence in Somalia. It differentiates 
between violence committed by AS and other ethnic and political groups. Red dots denote 
locations of AS violence against civilians and green dots represent the locations of clan 
and political violence against civilians. These visuals add context and reveal the nature of 
AS’s campaign to re-establish itself as the legitimate governing authority in the Lower 
Shabelle and Juba regions of Somalia. 
 
454 Adapted from ACLED, “ACLED Data”; Gephi; Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED.” 
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Figure 23. Al Shabaab, Political, and Clan Violence against Civilians in East 
Africa (2010–2019) 455 
6. Evaluate the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Prescribed Strategies  
In keeping with Archie Cochrane’s lessons on testing the efficacy of physicians’ 
treatment protocols, CA forces must test the outcomes of its operations and activities.456 
One such way to test the effectiveness of CAA it to overlay open-source data with data 
regarding the USG’s obligation Building Partner Capacity (BPC) Programs in specific 
countries. For example, Figure 24 displays an example from Northwest Africa that appears 
to show significantly less violence in countries receiving a majority of the BPC obligations, 
such as Niger and Mauritania (colored dark blue). This visual prompt the question of why 
Mali and Burkina Faso received so little funding, as such funding appears to minimize 
violence across insurgents. The answer lies in the military coup d’états in both countries, 
in 2013 and 2014 respectively, that prohibits military assistance and aid. The data patterns 
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raise a clear question: should the U.S. reconsider its policy given these circumstances? A 
regression model with a Poisson distribution could predict the number of attacks per district 
based on U.S. BPC funds obligated to partner units in the districts. Such methods could 
provide a rigorous approach to weigh the cost and benefits of pursuing recommended 
policy changes.  
 
Figure 24. The Effect of Building Partner Capacity Programs on Insurgent, 
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These recommendations highlight some of the analytical techniques that should be 
employed to build a shared understanding of the operational environment. These examples 
are by no means a comprehensive account of the methods available for CA analysts. 
Rather, these recommendations demonstrate the utility of analytical methods CA analysts 
can use to build a common understanding of the operating environment using data-driven 
approaches.  
B. DEVELOPING AN ORGANIC CIVIL AFFAIRS ANALYTIC 
CAPABILITY 
This research offers several recommendations relevant to the development of a 
Civil Affairs analytic capability. Many of them contrast with the CA Proponent’s vision of 
CA forces and their future support to MDTFs, U.S. Army, and the Joint Force.  
1. Focus on Analysis 
Civil Affairs must put analysis at the center of its organizational structure. In 
Networks and Netwars, John Arquilla identifies the prominent role of analysis when he 
offers the Los Angeles County Operational Area’s Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) 
as an alternative hybrid structure to confront irregular threats.458 Figure 25 displays the 
TEW organizational structure. While Los Angeles County created the TEW Group to deny 
irregular threats the ability to exploit the seams between traditional law enforcement and 
military responses, Arquilla and David Ronfeldt note its relevance for three reasons. First, 
it focuses on irregular warfare, a problem that by design exploits the seams between 
criminal, military, and unconventional activities. CA should emulate this structure. Second, 
it relies on Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), which this research promotes due to its 
constant evolution and incorporation of new analytical techniques and large volumes of 
structured information that analysts can leverage using open-source software to generate 
conclusions. Lastly, and most importantly, TEW is relevant because it places its strategic 
analytical capability at the center of the organization, recognizing that the other 
organizational tasks must flow through this capability.  
 
458 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 139–42. 
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Figure 25. Terrorism Early Warning Group/Net Assessment Organization459 
a. End the Outsourcing of Analysis 
As noted in earlier sections, Civil Affairs outsources the analysis of its civil data to 
military intelligence analysts in a process known as Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield (IPB), or its joint equivalent, JIPOE. While this collaboration serves a vital 
function in both the U.S. Army and Joint planning processes, CA forces must take 
ownership of their analysis to ensure effective civil knowledge integration. Critics might 
argue that this type of analysis is better suited to military intelligence or Operational 
Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA) personnel; however, the skills they provide are 
limited by the differences in their operational experiences. CA forces possess unique 
experiences that other entities within the joint force cannot replicate. Their operational 
experience and regional context include working with partner nation forces, indigenous 
partner institutions, interagency, multinational, and unified action partners to achieve U.S. 
objectives in both Title 10 and Title 22 environments. As Flynn et al. argued, traditional 
 
459 Source: Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 142, Figure 4–2 
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intelligence channels will always prioritize their efforts towards threat actors. If CA forces 
continue to delegate their analysis to other entities, then there is no guarantee that these 
analytical functions will fulfill the organizational and institutional priorities necessary for 
operating beneath the threshold of armed conflict. 
b. Invest in Human Potential 
The U.S Army’s Capstone and MDO concepts both direct significant investments 
in human potential to prepare soldiers for operations in future operating environments. 
Oddly, these investments are absent within the Civil Affairs Proponent’s supporting 
concept outlined in the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond. The CA Proponent document 
outlines its desired analytical techniques without offering pathways for their development. 
Fortunately, the educational components exist at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 
Monterey, CA. The Defense Analysis Program offers courses specifically designed for 
Special Operations personnel in statistics, strategy, anthropology, research methods, social 
networks analysis, visual analytics, and open-source data analysis. Civil Affairs Branch 
should prioritize sending more CA Officers to receive this education and training at NPS 
for their Intermediate Leaders Education and graduate degrees. Following their graduation, 
CA Branch should provide these graduates with the option of accepting two-year utilization 
assignments at a regionally-aligned TSOC or GCC, where the CA Officer would be 
responsible for civil knowledge integration within the operational staff. 
2. Focus on Civil Knowledge Integration 
The placement and design of the Civil Affairs analytical capability are crucial to its 
performance. The critical requirements necessary for this to operate efficiently and 
effectively are the following: 
1. Access to information: U.S. operations, NATO operations, partner forces 
operations, interagency, IGO, NGO, OHDACA, BPC, and partners from 
across civil society and academia 
2. Efficient and effective integration into planning staffs and targeting 
working groups at TSOCs or GCCs 
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3. Ability to travel to locations to obtain further context 
4. Access to a graduate-level research library 
In contrast to the Civil Affairs Proponent’s answer for joining the ICEWS sections 
supporting MDTFs, CKI functionality would benefit the most from a strategic analytic 
capability within the TSOCs and GCCs. While the U.S. Army’s MDO concept promotes a 
calibrated forward force posture, these forces would remain rotational forces. Rotational 
forces lack the endurance to develop the types of information (e.g., long-term trends) and 
position (e.g., staff working groups) necessary to inform both operational and strategic 
approaches of TSOC and GCC staffs where the integration of civil information is decisive 
for long-term planning.460 Building these analytical elements into the TSOCs and GCCs 
would provide CA analysts with assignments lasting between two and three years, which 
provides sufficient endurance to design and complete projects supporting the employment 
of these techniques.461 For example, a two-year assignment allows CA analysts to evaluate 
multiple rotations of persistent engagement forces and oversee potential responses such as 
Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs that develop over a three-year timeline.462 
  
 
460 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 
2028, iii; U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, RE: CIM/HTA 
Information. 
461 Atkinson, “HRC CA Branch Brief”; Yager, “Setting the Civil Affairs Analytical Foundation,” 5. 
462 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Section 333 Authority to Build Capacity,” Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency: Security Through Global Partnerships, accessed March 10, 2019, 
https://www.dsca.mil/programs/section-333-authority-build-capacity. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This research provides a qualitative analysis of the analytic capabilities possessed 
by the Civil Affairs Branch and argues that an organic, data-driven Civil Affairs analytic 
capability will improve the performance of the U.S. Forces against irregular threats in 
future operating environments. It used a critical assessment of CA doctrine and case studies 
of organizations that leveraged innovative data-driven approaches into disruptive 
competitive advantages to show the potential benefits of transitioning CA forces towards 
a data-driven understanding of its operational environment. The critical assessment of CA 
doctrine found several factors limiting the utility of the civil information currently 
produced by CA forces. While CA doctrine recommends numerous analytical techniques, 
it provides no direction or context on how these techniques should be employed. Moreover, 
CA doctrine also possesses no means of modeling, testing, or critically assessing the 
veracity of its conclusions about the operational environment. 
Despite the focus of this research on CA analytical techniques and their limitations, 
it also touched on the organizational structures required to meet the challenges of the future 
operating environment, mechanisms for effective civil knowledge integration, and the 
impact of SOF CA’s preference toward retaining force structure in their tactical formations 
at the expense of adequately supporting operational and strategic staffs. Designing 
organizational structures for their expected operating environment is a key component of 
their success, as each environment carries different requirements for leadership, personnel, 
resources, and training. Additionally, prioritizing civil knowledge integration at key 
echelons, primarily the TSOC and GCC staffs, is vital to shaping CA’s operational and 
strategic approaches towards disrupting and defeating irregular threats. 
The main finding of this research is that CA forces must change how they interact 
with data. Many of the components of a data-driven approach already exist within CA 
doctrine, but they are underemphasized. With modest changes in structure, methodology, 
and investment in human potential, the Civil Affairs Branch can provide a strategic asset 
to the Joint Force and greatly improve its performance against irregular threats.  
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